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ABSTRACT
International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) face increasing
accountability challenges stemming from past scandals and their claims to advance the
public good. Since the 1990s, INGOs have responded with numerous reforms. The
creation of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership in 2003 and the INGO
Accountability Charter in 2009 reflect sector-wide efforts to enhance accountability to
mission, intended beneficiaries, and peer organizations.
Many INGOs have adopted a broad range of accountability reforms. This
dissertation focuses on how World Vision, the world’s largest INGO, has done so.
Downward accountability remains elusive due to such factors as INGOs’ lack of
transparency toward beneficiaries; the power imbalance between them; donor pressures;
and competition with other INGOs.
In the first phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 past and
present staff members across nine countries and a wide range of seniority levels, using
these sensitizing concepts: downward accountability, social accountability, humanitarian
relief, development. The second phase comprised analysis of an internal dataset
summarizing annual reports from 64 country offices; and review of documents including
annual reports spanning 18 years.
Using a within-case comparison, the study demonstrates that World Vision has
experienced most progress in the area of beneficiary feedback and complaints (as
opposed to consultation, participation, or information provision). This has typically taken
place within emergency relief rather than development projects. A principal reason is the
comparative simplicity of relief aid, contrasted with the difficulty of achieving long-term

change through consultation and participation. Another is the greater role of institutional
funding (vs. individual donations) in humanitarian relief. However, these donor
pressures can lead to a “tick-the-box” mentality in which routinized compliance
substitutes for authentic accountability.
This study suggests that current downward accountability practices fall short of
accomplishing a reconfiguration of power relations between the INGO and beneficiaries.
They risk becoming another technical component in a large apparatus used to meet donor
requirements. This is not surprising when we consider that service delivery comprises a
significantly greater proportion of World Vision’s work than does advocacy.
Consequently, the relationships between agency and beneficiaries are potentially more
susceptible to clientelistic tendencies.

Keywords: Downward accountability; international nongovernmental organization;
international development; humanitarian assistance.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The INGO Accountability Challenge
In April 2017, the international humanitarian relief and development NGO, World
Vision,1 participated in a high-level event at United Nations headquarters aimed at ending
violence against children, part of a new global campaign for that purpose. Informed by a
consultation of 2,000 children from 28 countries, this event embodied the organization’s
goal of increasing the participation of children and youth in its global advocacy work. It
thus vividly exemplified World Vision’s aspiration to hold itself downwardly accountable
to its primary constituents (World Vision (a)).
Then in 2018, fellow international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) found
themselves at the center of controversy when it was revealed that a country director and
other staff members employed by Oxfam had sexually abused and exploited women and
children recipients of the aid being disbursed in Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake.
International NGOs realized that the issue would come to affect the entire sector, and a
heightened sense of urgency with respect to safeguarding vulnerable people from such
abuse followed. Today hiring of safeguarding experts has increased, and World Vision’s
own most recent annual report reflects this concern.
The two events can be seen as corresponding sides of attention to the need to be
held accountable to the persons whom INGOs set out to serve. To draw an analogy from

1

Throughout this dissertation, “World Vision” will generally be used to refer to the
global federation known formally as “World Vision International,” except where the full
name needs to be used for context. Where a national entity is discussed, it will be
referenced as such (e.g., World Vision USA, World Vision Tanzania, etc.). The list of
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Table 2-1 refers to the CEOs of World Vision
International and its predecessor, which began as a U.S.-based NGO.

2
the field of human rights, the positive right of project-affected persons to have greater
agency, expressed as participation in decisions that affect them as in the UN event above,
may be considered as corresponding to social, cultural, and economic rights; while the
negative right to be free from exploitation and abuse may be considered analogous to
civil and political rights. This dissertation will seek to show that the right and ability to
present feedback and complaints is, in the case studied, overall better developed than the
right to participate meaningfully in the envisioning, designing, developing and
implementing of development and humanitarian projects and programs.
The analogy, like perhaps all analogies, is inexact, as the feedback and complaints
typically seem to pertain to the receiving of humanitarian aid, rather than to complaints
about illicit activity such as corruption or abuse. However, the distinctions among four
different facets of accountability to beneficiaries – feedback and complaints; information
provision; participation; and consultation; yields important insights for understanding
how much has been accomplished and how much yet remains to be done.
The UN event described above represents but one of myriad initiatives that speak
to World Vision’s downward accountability commitment. Why has it undertaken, over
the past eight years in which it has been issuing annual accountability reports, this
responsibility? To address this question, it is necessary to reflect on the forces that have
impelled international NGOs to address accountability needs more generally.
Background of the Problem
Since approximately the late 1990s international nongovernmental organizations
have gone from being lauded by donors as the “magic bullet” to poverty and
underdevelopment (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000), to being
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seriously questioned not only by donors but also by the public at large (Dhanani and
Connolly, 2014; Ebrahim, 2009). Legislation passed in the United States in the early
2000s to ensure accountability in the corporate and nonprofit sectors affects INGOs as
well as domestic nonprofits; but it is only the most salient aspect of the drive for
accountability, writ large. Yet accountability, whether upward to donors or downward to
beneficiaries, is increasingly crucial to maintaining – or as it may be, shoring up –
support to INGOs. When the currency of INGOs is the urgency of their moral mission,
then efficiency and good stewardship of donor resources, and even more, attention to
beneficiaries’ self-defined priorities arguably become equally essential to maintaining
their legitimacy and thus sustaining their existence.
This dissertation focuses principally on the feedback-and-complaints aspect of
downward accountability, on the rationale that it is here that communities and individuals
can most meaningfully call the organization to account. Therefore, for the purposes of
this paper, downward accountability is defined in the following way: Downward
accountability refers to those policies and practices, undertaken by a nongovernmental
organization, and the procedures used to promote and enforce them, designed to collect
and act upon beneficiary feedback and complaints.
The idea that INGOs must practice accountability “downward” – i.e., to the
persons intended to receive their assistance and benefit from their projects – has in recent
years been adopted by the leadership of the largest INGOs, in what has been referred to
as a “normative shift” (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken, 2012, p. 1180;
Hielscher, Winkin, Crack and Pies, 2017). But efforts to increase downward
accountability have encountered significant obstacles ranging from institutional inertia
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and opportunity costs (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012), to moral
dilemmas posed by the need for competition for resources (Hielscher, Winkin, Crack and
Pies, 2017; Cooley and Ron, 2002).
Statement of the Problem
Social accountability is similar to, but distinct from, downward accountability.
While it may sometimes be used to refer to social responsibility more broadly understood
(e.g., as in relation to the social accountability of corporations), in this dissertation it is
used to denote the practice of holding the providers of public services accountable to
those who use those services (Fox, 2015; Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). Social
accountability has also been applied more broadly to encompass INGOs. Donors at all
levels increasingly demand greater accountability, but downward accountability has until
recently received less attention. It is also arguably more difficult to attain, due to the
inherent power dynamics involved: while donors can – implicitly or explicitly – threaten
to withhold funding if an INGO does not meet accountability standards, beneficiaries
have no comparable lever. Put another way, while upward accountability is enforced by
the donors’ ability to exercise their option to “exit” in the case of unsatisfactory
performance (Hirschman, 1970), beneficiaries frequently lack such an option, making
downward accountability more difficult and more rare (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair,
2014, p. 91). They can exercise their right to voice feedback and complaints, but without
the “teeth” of a possible exit option, that voice may prove ineffectual. Indeed, as will be
demonstrated, all too often the pull toward loyalty toward the NGO proves the strongest
impulse, leading beneficiaries to provide positive feedback and/or thanks more often than
constructive critical feedback or outright complaints (Hirschman, 1970).
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to open the “black box” of downward accountability
processes, in order to illuminate what influences, both organizational and external, shape
the ways in which downward accountability is carried out. Because the case selected is
that of a large and influential INGO, it is anticipated that findings from this dissertation
may inform what is known about the sector more generally regarding its downward
accountability practices, and even more important, the prospects for their effectiveness.
Research Questions
Despite the structural factors militating against it, increasing numbers of INGOs
seek to adopt downward accountability mechanisms (Crack, 2014; Crack, 2016; Deloffre,
2016). This leads to the question of why they aspire to downward accountability and how
they come to implement it. This paper therefore poses the following research questions:
RQ1: How did World Vision come to decide to adopt downward accountability?
RQ 2: How is downward accountability being implemented at World Vision? What
obstacles – if any – is the organization encountering in the course of implementation, and
how is it addressing them?
Research Design Rationale
Case Selection: World Vision
Scholars have noted the lack of attention to matters of religion and faith in
mainstream development discourse and practice. International development, as
conceptualized by economists and financed by governments and multilateral institutions,
traditionally has seldom made room for religious ways of knowing (Bornstein, 2003;
Lunn, 2009; Marshall, 2001; McDonic, 2004;). Correspondingly, many faith-based
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organizations “have viewed the work and thinking of development institutions with
skepticism” (Marshall, 2001, p. 339). Despite the significant presence of faith-based
organizations among international development NGOs (McCleary and Barro, 2008), this
split prevailed until the turn of the present century (Marshall, 2001; King, 2011).
However, even despite the comparatively recent turn within the development
establishment toward faith-based institutions, “too often, development circles care only to
know whether an organization is either religious or secular,” without taking pains to
discern the nature of the organization’s religious identity (King 2011, p. 21). At most,
funders such as multilateral development organizations might take an interest in whether
an organization engages in proselytizing, or whether it is politically liberal or
conservative (King, 2011).
Among faith-based NGOs, World Vision has represented something of an
anomaly, since rather than having its origins in one of the mainline Christian churches or
other faith traditions, it began as a Protestant missionary organization and is still
significantly shaped by its evangelical roots (Whaites, 1999; King, 2011). At the same
time, professionalization and rationalization have characterized the evolution of the
nonprofit sector generally over the past several decades (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz,
2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hwang and Powell, 2009), and World Vision has not
been immune to these trends. It therefore presents an arguably unique organization for a
case study: the largest Christian humanitarian and development organization in the world;
highly sophisticated and therefore fluent in the grammar of development discourse (King,
2011, p. 23); yet possessing a strong evangelical religious identity manifested in the daily
life and practice of its thousands of staff members, through phenomena ranging from
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daily staff devotions to the requirement that employees sign a statement of faith
(Bornstein 2003, pp. 59 – 60).
Like an increasing number of large INGOs, World Vision functions through a
federated system, coordinating the numerous entities worldwide that comprise the global
partnership. With an annual budget of close to $3 billion, World Vision and its
consolidated affiliates (referring to the nearly 100 national-level organizations
comprising the global partnership) constitute one of the largest U.S.-based INGOs, if not
the largest.
World Vision’s efforts to hold itself downwardly accountability to its
beneficiaries are embedded within a larger system of accountability. World Vision is a
member of Accountable Now, a peer regulation body, and has signed its ten
Accountability Commitments comprising the following areas: respect for human rights;
ethical fundraising; professional management; independence; responsible advocacy;
diversity and inclusion; transparency; environmental responsibility; good governance;
and participation (Accountable Now (a)). As can be seen, these touch on the political,
bureaucratic, legal, professional, and managerial aspects of accountability (Williams and
Taylor, 2013, p. 562). Moreover, in 2015 World Vision United Kingdom began
implementation of a pilot project funded by the UK’s foreign assistance agency, the
Department for International Development (DFID). The purpose of the pilot project was
to “design, monitor and implement three different types of ‘beneficiary feedback
mechanisms’ in seven DFID-funded maternal and child health projects” (INTRAC, not
dated).
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This paper focuses on the practices of downward accountability at World Vision,
on the assumption that due to the organization’s size and influence, analysis of its
downward accountability practices can shed light on the prospects for such practices
elsewhere. As the largest evangelical INGO, World Vision evolved over six decades in a
manner distinct in many respects from that of otherwise similar INGOs, including other
faith-based ones. For example, its growing connection with global evangelicalism led it
to decentralize earlier than most NGOs, moving to a federated model as early as 1977
(King, 2011; Whaites, 1999). It is worth exploring whether and how World Vision’s
experiences with decentralization may have affected its propensity to undertake
downward accountability reforms. In addition, World Vision’s adoption of downward
accountability takes place in a context in which the role of faith-based organizations, and
indeed religious faith itself, within international development has become increasingly
recognized (Clarke, 2006; Lunn, 2009; Marshall, 2001).
In summary, as a large Christian humanitarian and development INGO, World
Vision constitutes an exceptionally interesting case among those leading INGOs seeking
to implement downward accountability. Firstly, it comprises part of a larger trend toward
the increased profile of faith-based, and specifically evangelical, INGOs working in
humanitarian aid and international development. Secondly, its efforts also comprise part
of a much broader trend within twenty-first century philanthropy for greater
accountability. Due to the power imbalance inherent in relations between INGOs and
their beneficiaries, implementation of downward accountability presents challenges and
is worth researching for its possible implications for INGO-beneficiary relations, and for
donor-NGO relations as well. Finally, and most importantly, significance lies in its
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potential to contribute to understanding of the processes at work in implementation of
downward accountability, considered important for program effectiveness (Cornwall and
Gaventa, 2000; Jacobs and Wilford, 2010) and for the organizational learning so
important to program effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2005).
Findings
This study has the following principal findings. First of all, downward
accountability practices are typically strongest in the context of humanitarian emergency
relief. Within that context, it is the mechanisms and systems set up to facilitate feedback
and complaints from beneficiaries that perform the best, as contrasted with those set up to
promote consultation, participation, and the provision of information to beneficiaries. A
possible explanation is found in two important forces shaping the delivery of
humanitarian aid. First is the very nature of such aid, consisting as it does in large
measure of discrete material goods whose distribution is easily tracked, and which can
therefore elicit clear-cut feedback if these are not delivered satisfactorily.2 Secondly,
humanitarian emergency assistance relies on grants and contracts, as distinct from
development programming, which in World Vision is largely funded through child
sponsorship donations. Because large donors – typically governments or multilateral
governmental agencies – have strict reporting requirements, including on downward
accountability, work funded by them typically adheres more closely to the downward
accountability standards now increasingly common in the international aid field.

2

Ramalingam puts the matter thus: “Many emergency and basic services operate on a linear, or
focused, theory of change: get shelter, food and water to people facing a crisis in order to avert
further disaster… The logistics and process of doing so can be highly complicated, but the basic
intervention logic is fairly straightforward” (Ramalingam, 2013, p. 353).
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Secondly, the diffusion of the tools and processes of organizational learning –
handbooks, self-evaluation, and various types of metrics – has increased over time and
has been placed at the service not only of improving humanitarian and development
effectiveness generally, but also and more recently, of tracking success in downward
accountability itself. Where the diffusion of those tools and processes among World
Vision staff is most successful, downward accountability can be expected to – and does –
follow, as staff reporting reveals. Conversely, where the diffusion of the tools and
processes is lacking, information on downward accountability implementation is also
lacking.
Thirdly, the finding that consultation and participation lag behind feedback and
complaints (and to a lesser extent, information provision) at first seems inconsistent with
the conclusion reflected in World Vision’s own recent annual accountability report of
2016. That report observes that it is in the area of feedback and complaint where more
work remains to be done. However, this is less surprising if the concepts of consultation
and participation are explored a bit further. With their roots in development discourse
and practice, they have a longer history of implementation as elements of downward
accountability than do either information provision or feedback and complaints.
Furthermore, the nature of development work is longer-term – and has outcomes
arguably harder to measure – than is the case with humanitarian emergency relief.
Even more, development as undertaken by World Vision – as by many of its peer
INGOs – is intended to make changes that are not only enduring but transformational –
indeed, the organization’s approach is termed Transformational Development, as will be
explained in the chapter to follow. Consultation and participation in the truest sense are
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meant to involve those intended to benefit from development work in all stages of
programming, from envisioning desired outcomes and setting priorities all the way
through to working on implementation (even if an intermediate stage, technical design, is
within the province of agency staff). The problem with translating these to downward
accountability, however, is this: in some cases, participation by beneficiaries is used to
denote only labor provided for projects, rather than a more comprehensive role. Thus,
when greater success is reported with feedback and complaints than with consultation
and participation, it may point to the greater feasibility of attaining effectiveness in the
former, rather than in the latter.
Table 1-1, below, summarizes the findings. The horizontal category refers to the
degree to which a transformational approach is adopted. The vertical category refers to
the degree to which adaptation is employed in enacting downward accountability. Thus,
the more that World Vision staff employ cycles of adaptation and iteration in using
feedback and complaint mechanisms to specific situations – the more that they
contextualize such mechanisms – the more successful such downward accountability
practices are likely to be. This is more likely to be the case in humanitarian assistance.
However, the less adaptive World Vision is in enacting consultation and participation, the
less likely these practices are to be successful – and this is more likely in the development
area of its work.
Table 1-1: Summary of Findings
More adaptive
Less adaptive

Technocratic

Transformational

Feedback and complaint,
where they occur, are
successful (humanitarian)
Feedback and complaint are
limited

Participation and consultation
would be done more
authentically
Participation and consultation
are done, but are less
successful (development)
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Possible Theoretical Explanations for the Findings
There are a number of possible theoretical explanations for the findings from this
dissertation. Recall that the focus has been on the organizational mechanisms, processes,
and systems, and the organizational learning tools, employed in order to hold the
organization downwardly accountable to the project-affected persons whom it seeks to
serve. In an organization of the scale and scope of World Vision, these become
necessary due to principal-agent pressures to ensure that downward accountability
implementation is taking place and is taking place effectively.
In classic agency theory the goals of the principal and agent are assumed to
conflict with each other, and because the agent, as the one closer to the implementation of
the work of the organization, necessarily has more information about that work than does
the principal, the principal faces the dilemma of ensuring that the actions of the agent
maximize the gains to the organization and therefore to the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Van Slyke, 2012; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
The first observation in the case under consideration, therefore, is that the global
headquarters; the staff members formally tasked with leading accountability work; and
those tasked with conducting downward accountability trainings across different field
offices, all constitute the principals; while the field staff tasked with collecting and
reporting information about downward accountability implementation are the agents.
The tasks of aggregating information collected at the program and project level (that is to
say, “in the field”), comparing it across countries and across time, and making meaning
from it are onerous and complex – although, it is fair to conjecture, less so than collecting
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such information under field conditions in the first place. The incompleteness of the
information and the distance between the principal and agent levels both complicate this
meaning-making enterprise, and, as principal-agent theory would predict, leave less-thansatisfying results. The use of all four pillars to improve downward accountability, and
then the evaluation and reporting of performance in this regard, are all burdens to some
degree for the agents, as we have seen amply from the data. One interviewee put it this
way:
Program managers and leaders, they don’t see good examples of this done
properly and they just get resentful and they don’t want to put money in it. So, it
just becomes like a check the box exercise, “Okay, we have to do an assessment,
so we’ll just do it, check the box, boom, it’s done.” They don’t say, “Oh, we need
an assessment, so we can understand what communities need. And we want the
information to inform our decisions.” It’s not like that, because they haven’t seen
it done properly, in a lot of instances. And with accountability it’s similar. It just
seems like a lot of money being put out there for staff to go out and who-knowswhat. Because it’s not done properly as it should [be] (World Vision
accountability and monitoring and evaluation [M&E] specialist).
The same interviewee expressed that, in contrast, meaningful involvement of
communities, when it does happen, makes it possible to transcend the problem:
You know, you’ve got heavy satisfaction when communities are involved in the
decision-making, they’re participating. You know, they throw complaints out
there and they actually get feedback from the program staff, they actually get
answers to their questions. Communities are deeply, infinitely more satisfied than
when none of that is taking place. And certainly, programs are far more relevant
(World Vision accountability and M&E specialist).
In summary, the problem of downward accountability implementation is, in part
at least, a principal-agent problem: the burden of downward accountability
implementation, when the need for it is not completely understood or appreciated,
disincentivizes field staff from both implementation and complete reporting, leaving the
principal to cope with a situation of information asymmetry.
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However there are further layers to the phenomenon. The condition described
above leads to the question of why World Vision – or for that matter other INGOs –
should undertake downward accountability in the first place. Here, a possible
explanation comes from institutional theory, and in particular from institutional
isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism and coercive isomorphism, as will be shown, are
likely explanations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Finally, the role of donors has been a recurring theme, and resource dependence
theory leads to the understanding that INGOs, dependent as they are on donor funding,
experience donors as having power over them. Moreover, as donor agencies are likewise
dependent on INGOs to implement projects and to make it possible for the donors to
disburse funding, the two types of entities are interdependent – even if INGOs
experience the donors as having more power over them than vice versa (Davis and Cobb,
2010, p. 6; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p. viii). In light of their dependence on donors,
INGOs’ propensity to implement donor requirements with respect to often onerous
accountability reporting is to be expected. But while resource dependence theory would
lead observers to predict that INGOs would therefore seek strategies to increase their
autonomy, this dissertation found very little in the data leading to that conclusion.
Instead, the increased role of grants as a source of income seemed to be more or less
accepted as given by the interviewees.
Rather than seek to increase its autonomy with respect to government donors,
World Vision found itself taking on the aforementioned onerous downward
accountability reporting burdens in order to comply with grants and contracts
requirements, presumably in hopes of remaining competitive for the next grant. In this,
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they shared with their fellow INGOs the concern for survival implied in that resource
competition (Cooley and Ron, 2002). That this concern is almost to be taken for granted
is implied in the following quote from one of the interviewees:
But the struggle to get any funding in the fragile states – because we had no
presence. Because of [the disaster] a lot of the large INGOs who work in conflictaffected emergencies really opened up huge programs there. So, this would be
the CAREs, the Plans, the ACFs, and Save the Children. [INGO] is the biggest
NGO in [country] right now. They’ve got more like 1,400 staff. And they’ve got
a huge footprint in [state] especially. And they really monopolize a lot of the
donor funding available in the country. They are the go-to partner (World Vision
program officer, emphasis supplied).
Moreover, the proportion of funding coming from public grants has steadily
increased in the past few years, as was seen in Table 3 – from 17 percent in 2011, to 29
percent in 2017. This leads to the question whether feedback and complaints
effectiveness is likely to improve as the proportion of funding flowing from such grants
increases.
Finally, the cultural differences between the humanitarian project and the
developmentalist project are another: as noted, paradoxically humanitarianism, while
constituting a lofty ideal, is also a very pragmatic endeavor. This pragmatism seems to
permeate the practices of humanitarian staff, making possible the implementation of
some downward accountability mechanisms and systems to a greater degree than is the
case in development work.
This dissertation therefore concludes that current downward accountability
practices still fall short of accomplishing the reconfiguration of power relations between
World Vision and its beneficiaries that World Vision intended when adopting
transformational development as a mode of carrying out its work. These practices risk
becoming part of a “culture of compliance,” in which meeting technical requirements of
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downward accountability, particularly those imposed by donors, becomes an end in itself.
In this way, downward accountability risks becoming merely part of a large apparatus
used to meet managerialist imperatives.
The goal of transformational development, in contrast, ambitiously seeks to
undermine the very power imbalances inherent in the relationship between World Vision
and its beneficiaries. In doing so, it seeks to counteract tendencies that in some ways
parallel the clientelistic relations between citizens and the state, political parties, or other
elites (Roninger, 2004; Montambeault, 2011; Stokes, 2011). For transformational
development to become a reality, downward accountability must be internalized by staff
trained in its implementation; and must use processes of consultation and participation as
or more effectively than it currently uses feedback and complaint mechanisms and
systems.
Delimitations and Limitations
With respect to delimitations, the first one is that this is a single-case study. It is
also important to clarify that this dissertation, by design, does not purport to address
whether and to what extent World Vision is actually being held downwardly accountable
to its beneficiaries. To do so it would be necessary to survey the beneficiaries themselves,
which, due to resource constraints, falls outside its scope. Instead, the purpose has been
to explore and analyze how World Vision’s history has shaped its approach to
development and humanitarian relief work; how, as an organization, it is influenced by
trends in development thinking and practice, and also contributes to them; how its
organizational learning practices inform and support its downward accountability
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practices; how staff are working to help the agency hold itself accountable to the persons
World Vision seeks to serve; and finally, what challenges they still face in doing so.
The limitations encountered in the course of this study have been those inherent in
the use of nonrandom sampling, and of a comparatively modest sample size. However,
although the use of snowball sampling may have introduced some bias, it has also made it
possible to access downward accountability experts who might not otherwise have been
contacted or interviewed. As to sample size, the increased repetition of themes and of
recommended names to contact as interviewing proceeded, both indicated that saturation
had been reached. In this way, both limitations were addressed.
Significance
The findings are significant for the following reasons. First of all, although calls
for increased NGO accountability downward have been going on for some time – indeed,
they appear as early as 1996 – still today too little is known regarding how much progress
INGOs have made in holding themselves downwardly accountable. Secondly, the NGO
“crisis of legitimacy” has, if anything, increased in recent years (Edwards and Hulme,
1996; Walton, Davies, Thrandardottir and Keating, 2016). Getting downward
accountability “right” is an important – some would say central – component of
addressing that crisis. Thirdly, the findings themselves are, if not actually
counterintuitive, then slightly different from conclusions found in recent reports from the
agency itself. If anything, they point to greater success – in feedback and complaints –
but, crucially, that success is limited by the circumstances of humanitarian aid. Fourthly,
they illuminate the extent to which a “culture of compliance,” coupled with donor
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requirements, may inadvertently limit the effectiveness of downward accountability
efforts.
Chapter Overview
The dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter traces the history of
World Vision from its origins as a parachurch evangelical missions organization
dedicated to relieving human suffering abroad, through decades of growth and its
enthusiastic embrace of an increasingly sophisticated approach to international
development work. The narrative is one of distinct – sometimes even contrasting –
strands in the agency’s DNA, one technocratic and modernizing, and the other idealistic
and politically aware. This evolution is placed within the context of changes in
development and humanitarian assistance in the second half of the twentieth century and
the early years of this one. The literatures on development effectiveness; downward
accountability as well as accountability more generally; and on the role of faith-based
development organizations in relation to their secular brethren and donors, each inform
this chapter.
Chapter Three describes the research design and rationale in further detail, as well
as the methods used to collect and analyze data from a range of sources both primary and
secondary.
Chapter Four presents findings from annual reports and specialized
accountability reports; internal data from national-level reports on the state of child wellbeing, including on the role of downward accountability; and correspondence between
World Vision and the peer-review mechanism of which it is a member, Accountable
Now.
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Then, Chapter Five further develops these themes by describing the tools for
performance measurement developed by World Vision. It then goes on to analyze
interview data to examine where the humanitarian, development, and to a lesser extent
the advocacy areas of the agency’s work differ in their approach to downward
accountability, and where they are similar. Their relative success, and ongoing
limitations, with respect to the “four pillars” of downward accountability – consultation,
participation, information provision and feedback and complaints – is assessed.
Finally, the sixth and final chapter draws conclusions and their significance,
points to directions for possible future research, and presents policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
World Vision and Its Journey to Program Accountability
Downward accountability rests on “the right to say and the duty to respond,” as
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) attests (Guide to the 2010 HAP
Standard in Accountability and Quality Management, p. 43). With these words, the
statement clearly points to accountability firstly as being grounded in rights, rather than
its being desirable as a conduit to improved effectiveness in the delivery of development
and humanitarian outcomes.
Nevertheless, the imperative of improved effectiveness applies to development
and humanitarian work as well, as will be discussed below. Both those two aspects of
World Vision’s work, then, are required – by donors, as well as by the agency itself..
Accountability to project-affected persons is a part of that, but the impulses driving it are
varied in nature, and rooted in World Vision’s own history as an organization that was
and arguably remains not only mission-driven, but that began as a supporter of actual
religious missionaries. World Vision also became, over time, a highly organized and
bureaucratically rational organization (Weber, 2013).
The story of how World Vision was established and evolved over the decades in
response to those two contrasting impulses forms the first part of this chapter. Secondly,
the chapter goes on to situate the organization within the broader context of emerging
trends in humanitarian and development policy and practice. These are mirrored in
alternating influences within the organization: firstly, a commitment to what it terms
“transformational development,” formally adopted at the highest levels. This approach
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was subsequently in danger of being marginalized by the ascendancy of an evidencebased approach, and later returned to primacy in the context of broader donor and
academic support for arguably transformational and bottom-up approaches (called,
“Doing Development Differently”).
Thirdly, World Vision’s three principal areas of work – development,
humanitarian relief, and advocacy – are described, with particular attention to their
varying funding sources and the implications of the same.
This chapter therefore sets the stage for a discussion in the following chapters of
the various different tools for performance measurement, as well as for organizational
learning, that have been used by World Vision to measure the effectiveness of downward
accountability implementation: that make it possible, in short, to observe the
phenomenon from the distance imposed by geography and – as Robert Chambers would
put it – language, culture and class (Chambers, 1983, pp. 3 – 4).
Paradoxically, as Gross Stein argues, “accountability is no panacea” and “is most
likely to cripple when it becomes mechanical, technical, and routinized, more and more
divorced from the purposes of an organization, its challenges, and its opportunities”
(Gross Stein, in Barnett and Weiss, eds., 2008, p. 142). But the reality of World Vision’s
being still powerfully shaped both by its mission-driven character and its ever-increasing
technical sophistication, as well as by the external pressures of donor demands and an
increasing reliance on grants and contracts, leads to a series of dilemmas and tradeoffs in
carrying out downward accountability, which will be explored in the succeeding chapters.
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A Tale of Contrasting Impulses
World Vision describes itself as “the largest Christian-based global NGO,”
prompting reflection at the very outset on two potentially competing aspects of its
character: an explicitly Christian faith-based organization, and an organization so large
that it has taken on many of the characteristics of a multinational corporation; indeed,
many of its staff have, particularly in recent years, been drawn from the ranks of
corporate executives. As for its leadership, its last two presidents, especially, came to the
organization from long careers in the corporate sector, as did their counterpart at World
Vision U.S., Richard Stearns (see Table 2-1).
From its very inception, the agency appears to have drawn from two impulses:
one, a passionate and devout response to the suffering of impoverished people –
especially children – in Asia and elsewhere. This was embodied in its charismatic
founder and manifested in its early years in a freewheeling and emotion-driven approach
to relief work. The second was also evident almost from the beginning and consisted in a
readiness to employ technology and modern managerial methods to achieve the
organization’s goals. In this second aspect, World Vision was modernist in its impulses
and observers should not be surprised to find, for example, that little more than a decade
from its founding the agency would be the first of its kind to take up the use of computer
technology to help track donations and organize its child sponsorship practices (Rohrer,
1987).
Approximately one generation later, these two strands in the organization’s DNA
had developed into two distinct approaches to carrying out its work: one, termed
transformational development, employed an emancipatory frame for conceptualizing the
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way that development work should be carried out, and emphasized the importance of
sustainable outcomes and therefore of long timescales. The other emphasized measurable
objectives, and as such comprised part of the evidence-based revolution of the early 21st
century (Barnett, 2015, p. 137). These two impulses in turn have both influenced the
ways in which World Vision approaches downward accountability, and this chapter will
argue that one outcome has seen contrasting levels of success in its implementation.
The reason for the contrasting approaches in some ways reflects the contrast
between charity and philanthropy throughout American history. As Robert Gross has
pointed out, these “two traditions of American humanitarianism… stand at opposite
poles: the one concrete and individual, the other abstract and institutional” (Gross, 2003,
p. 31). As described below, charity, rooted in Judeo-Christian teachings, animated the
Western missioners and local religious leaders whom World Vision founder Bob Pierce
met in his travels throughout Asia; and it also animated him and the early World Vision
staffers, funders and supporters who with equal zeal brought the organization into being.
The increasing introduction of bureaucratic rationalization, even as early as the 1950s –
and especially the increasing reliance on expertise that became more pronounced in the
1960s and 1970s – reflect, on the other hand, characteristics of philanthropy: “pragmatic
[and] efficiency-minded” (Gross, 2003, p. 30), and bent on finding and solving the root
causes of poverty rather than only ameliorating its effects. VanderPol has described as
“eclectic” the combination of charity and philanthropy that characterized World Vision
even in the beginning. In its origins within a charitable model, World Vision not
surprisingly was of a piece with evangelical efforts in mid-century America more
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generally. In its increasing embrace of philanthropy, it was wholly in tune with the
broader society:
It was strongly committed to a supernatural world view in which
God’s special providences ensured staff that they were doing God’s will, yet was
equally beholden to Enlightenment modernity, whose gifts of technology, science,
and organizational bureaucracy were God’s chosen instruments to succor the
poor. It was intimately personal and individualistic in its view of the poor, while
enthusiastically engaged in making the biggest impact possible, using mass media
of every kind to promote its message. (VanderPol, 2010, p. 87).
Decades later, this pragmatic emphasis on impact would form the backdrop to –
and perhaps provide the justification for – the adoption of the so-called results agenda
that overtook the development sector in the first two decades of the 21st century (Natsios,
2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Ramalingam, 2013). The list of World Vision’s CEOs
across the years, found in Table 1-1 below, shows that the organization’s leaders initially
were drawn from the church, while their successors came from the corporate sector.

Table 2-1: CEOs/Presidents of World Vision and their former occupations
1950 – 1969
1969 – 1982
1982 – 1987
1987 – 1998
1996 – 2010
2010 – 2019
2019 -

Bob Pierce – Evangelical minister
Stanley Mooneyham – Evangelical minister
Ted Engstrom – Evangelical youth leader
Robert Seiple – college president, athletic director, sales executive
Dean Hirsch – World Vision senior executive
Kevin Jenkins – managing director of Canadian investment firm
Andrew Morley – CEO, ClearChannel UK

Bob Pierce and Stanley Mooneyham were both evangelical ministers, and as a
former leader of the evangelistic organization, Youth for Christ, Ted Engstrom likewise
came from a parachurch background (Rohrer, 1987). Robert Seiple seems to have been
something of a transition figure, having been a sales executive but also a college
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president and athletic director, as well as being a military veteran (Chandler, 1986). He
was succeeded by Dean Hirsch, who had risen through the ranks to become CEO in 1996,
stepping down from the position in 2010 (Christian NewsWire (a)). The next three
heads of the organization all have come from corporate backgrounds. Kevin Jenkins, a
former executive in the Canadian investment firm TriWest, and former president and
CEO of Canadian Airlines, followed, serving from 2010 – 2019 (Christian NewsWire
(b)) He then was replaced by Andrew Morley, a former executive in the
telecommunications, technology, financial services, and media sectors (World Vision,
(q)). The turn toward corporate expertise at the top thus reflects a decided shift toward
corporate efficiency norms within the organization.
Early Years: Stepping Forward in Faith, Joining the Anti-Communist Crusade
Far from constituting a new and contradictory development, the affinity with
corporate expertise was, as noted above, embedded in World Vision nearly from the
beginning. Like so many mission-driven nongovernmental organizations, it was founded
by a visionary, energetic, leader – seemingly larger than life.
As has been amply documented elsewhere, World Vision was founded in 1947 by
evangelist Bob Pierce, who while on a mission trip to China met a child named White
Jade and converted her to Christianity. Versions of the organization’s origin story vary,
but most seem to concur that on the following day, a missionary named Tena Hoelkeboer
confronted him at his doorstep, child in tow, with the news that the little girl’s family had
thrown her out upon learning of her conversion. What, asked Hoelkeboer, was Pierce
going to do now? Deeply moved, he undertook to support the child with five dollars per
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month. In this manner was born World Vision’s model of child sponsorship (King, 2011;
VanderPol, 2010; Rohrer, 1987, pp. 45-46; Pierce Dunker, 2013, p. 1).
Through the next six decades, child sponsorship would remain the backbone of
World Vision’s fundraising, providing it with a steady flow of income that made it
possible for the organization to make long-term development programming
commitments, free from the constraints typically characterizing short-term government
grants and contracts. From the perspective of individual donors, child sponsorship
provided a sense of immediacy, connection and efficacy, not to mention fulfillment, that
other forms of donation presumably do not (Bornstein, 2001). In doing so, it fulfilled the
role that charity has traditionally done for charitable individuals (Gross, 2003).
In the years that followed, Pierce traveled frenetically throughout Asia, repeatedly
encountering missioners who were taking on emergency care tasks in the absence of any
kind of official church support. Frequently these were European or North American
women, such as missioners Lillian Dickson, Beth Albert and the aforementioned Tena
Hoelkeboer (VanderPol, pp. 47-48, p. 55). It may be difficult for a contemporary
audience to understand the degree to which social ministry (of even the most apolitical
sort) was regarded as suspect by evangelicals in the middle of the twentieth century, and
the extent to which Pierce had to work to make World Vision’s relief activities acceptable
to its evangelical constituency (King, 2013, p. 75). As Pierce attested, “One of the big
questions that often comes across my desk is, ‘Are you really a Bible-believing group of
folks? Aren’t you a little bit social-minded in the gospel you preach?’ ” (Graham and
Lockerbie, 1983, p. 49). Jarring as it may be to find social consciousness considered
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objectionable, this was the reality within which World Vision functioned in its early
years.
The explanation is found in what theologian Timothy L. Smith has termed the
Great Reversal, in which early 20th-century fundamentalist Christians turned away from
the social commitments championed by their 19th-century brethren (VanderPol, 2010, pp.
24 – 26; King, 2013, p. 73). Into this breach stepped World Vision, to the extent that,
“from 1950 to 1966, [it] was the major force in reintroducing evangelical mission to the
poor by publicizing the pre-existing charitable ministries of previously isolated
missionaries” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 59). During this first phase of World Vision’s work,
the emphasis was on charitable assistance, motivated by compassion, to meet urgent
individual needs (VanderPol, 2010, p. 60; Gross, 2003). Pierce wrote on the flyleaf of his
Bible, “Let my heart be broken with the things that break the heart of God”– a prayer that
would later become World Vision’s motto (Rohrer, 1987, p. 53).
The World Vision founder had “deep roots” in the faith missions practice, which
is that one sets out on mission with faith that God will provide. Accordingly, and in
keeping with his spontaneous, even zealous nature, he would respond to need with
immediacy, trusting that the resources would materialize. He once famously sent a
telegram from India to headquarters in Monrovia, California, stating: “Have written a
check for $40,000. Cover it.” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 83).
During this time, World Vision remained small in size in comparison with the
large mainline faith-based development organizations that were, for the most part, formed
during and after the Second World War: Catholic Relief Services, Church World
Service, Lutheran World Relief, and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
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(King, 2013, p. 75). As a point of comparison, in 1956, World Vision’s budget was a
mere $1 million, while the budgets of Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service
were, respectively, $126 million and $38 million (King, 2013, p. 76). Yet at the same
time, the rational use of technology characterized the agency’s work almost from the very
beginning. Pierce did not hesitate to use technologies and communication methods in
innovative ways: films, which at the time were barely considered morally permissible by
the evangelical community; and newsletters of various sorts, that went out to individuals
instead of having to go through church bulletins (VanderPol, 2010, pp. 51 – 53). When a
seven-month U.S. tour of a Korean children’s choir, organized by World Vision, resulted
in an avalanche of mail from would-be child sponsors, threatening to overwhelm the
capacity of the administrative staff, Pierce saw the necessity of adopting then-novel
computer technology, and in 1963 the agency leased an IBM 1401 mainframe for $6,000
per month (Rohrer, 1987, pp. 83-87).
Bob Pierce enjoyed bringing friends into the computer room where punched cards
were streaking through like lightning. He usually had the terminology all wrong,
but the general idea was correct—God had both man and machine ready to meet
emergencies. (Rohrer, 1987, p. 87).
In this, it can be said that World Vision anticipated the rationalization of the
nonprofit field (Hwang and Powell, 2009). The professionalization of its staff would
come later.
Transformation: From Missions and Relief Work to Holistic Development; and
from Charismatic Leadership to Bureaucratic Rationality
The 1970s were marked by significant shifts in World Vision’s work: firstly, from
missions and relief work, powered by the vision of a charismatic founding leader and
shaped by Cold War geopolitics (countering atheistic Communism), to a new emphasis
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on long-term development work, with all the panoply of technocratic expertise that that
implied (King, 2011, p. 23; Rohrer, 1987, p. 149; VanderPol, 2010, p. 113; p. 118;
Whaites, 1999, p. 414). They were also marked by its internationalization, when in 1978
the agency created “a new partnership secretariat and implementing body, World Vision
International (WVI), to be governed collectively by the agency’s constituents by a
Triennial Council and Board” (Whaites, 1999, p. 415). These constituents comprised both
those World Vision offices in wealthy countries, responsible for fundraising, and those in
poor countries, where relief and development programming were carried out.
A number of factors contributed to these shifts. Operationally, World Vision had
expanded significantly in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War. Indeed, it
had gone so far as to identify itself with the Americans’ anti-Communist crusade. This
was consistent with its stance during the Korean War and in China before 1949 (King,
2013, p. 76). With the fall now of the South Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian
regimes to communism, the organization faced a near-crisis. World Vision staff fled the
Communist takeover and “nearly 30,000 sponsors lost touch with their sponsored
children,” just as revenue was “skyrocketing” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 108). The agency
recovered by shifting its child sponsorship to Latin America, Africa and South Asia, as
well as by participating in relief work in the aftermath of war’s end: airlifts of refugee
children and rescue operations for boat people (VanderPol, 2010, p. 108; Whaites, 1999,
p. 414).
With respect to governance, internationalization and a shift away from a U.S.centric model were accomplished by the creation of the secretariat referenced above.
And finally, the focus on development reflected a curious combination of both a turn
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toward professionalization as well as a new commitment among evangelicals more
generally toward social action that sought to tackle root causes of poverty, and in so
doing embraced a critique of the existing international economic order.
The turn toward rationalization was, as has already been noted above, an early
development in World Vision’s evolution:
Only the One for whom we speak knows the special opportunities for enlarged
Christian witness which are now possible through the utilization of today’s
satellite communications, global television, the marvels of electronic data
processing—and in days ahead through the application of tomorrow’s scientific
achievements . . . opportunities which lie ahead as we seek to “by all means save
some” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 85).
By the early 1970s, however, the turn toward development had begun in earnest –
and perhaps this was not so surprising, as the United Nations had declared the 1970s to
be the Second United Nations Development Decade (United Nations, 1971). In 1974, a
retired Army colonel, Henry (“Hal”) Barber, was hired to establish a Relief and
Development division at World Vision. It is true that the original impetus for this
decision was the agency’s response to a cataclysmic earthquake in Nicaragua in 1972,
which apparently prompted him to propose “a change in World Vision’s approach to its
relief efforts” (Rohrer, 1987, p. 149). However, the elements of what Krause has termed
“the good project” were there from the beginning: how to identify a project, then
determine objectives and set out a logical sequence of activities for attaining them
(Krause, 2014; Rohrer, 1987, p. 149). In 1978, the turn toward development work
reached a “watershed moment” when its development staff, numbering over 50 people,
attended a five-week training course in the Philippines sponsored by the International
Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) (Rohrer, 1987, p. 152; VanderPol, 2010, p. 115).
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This was also a time during which evangelicalism found itself influenced by the
“evangelical Left,” led by such figures as Sojourners editor Jim Wallis; the academic Ron
Sider; and John Perkins, founder of Voice of Cavalry ministries; all of whom, to varying
degrees, undertook a critique of problems of racism, economic injustice, and
overconsumption in the global North (King, 2013, p. 79; VanderPol, 2010, p. 135).
These influences made themselves felt in a series of evangelical conferences,
culminating in one in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1974. The Lausanne Conference –
VanderPol considers that it can even be thought of as evangelicals’ Vatican II – was
attended by 2,500 evangelicals and produced a document, called the Covenant, stating
that “God’s missional concern includes ‘justice and reconciliation throughout human
society and the liberation of men from every kind of oppression;’ therefore, ‘evangelism
and socio-political involvement are both parts of our Christian duty.’” (VanderPol, 2010,
p. 99). Latin American evangelicals René Padilla and Samuel Escobar urged the
delegates to go still further (King, 2013, p. 92; Myers, 2011, p. 38; VanderPol, 2010, p.
99).
During the preceding years, World Vision had also undergone a change in
leadership. Founder Bob Pierce had stepped down in 1967, frustrated by the board’s
increasing insistence on stricter financial controls, which he saw as “Spirit-quenching red
tape” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 112). These accountability reforms had been spearheaded by
the new executive vice-president, Ted Engstrom, mandated by the board to “put World
Vision into the black” – the organization had grown too much too fast, incurring
excessive debt and finding itself generally unable to meet financial obligations in a timely
manner (King, 2013, p. 79; Rohrer, 1987, p. 90, pp. 91-96). As the founding director,
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Pierce had been motivated by charity more than by the desire for technological efficiency
and efficacy, and the reforms led to sharp conflict between him and the board. After a
nervous breakdown, followed by a stay in Swiss sanatorium, Pierce came out of
retirement and went on to lead a small organization called Food for the World, which he
later renamed “Samaritan’s Purse” and at which he was succeeded by fundamentalist
Franklin Graham, the son of evangelist Billy Graham. As King puts it, “From founding
the organization in 1950 until his departure in 1967, Pierce was World Vision, but World
Vision had outgrown him” (Davis and King, 2013, p. 83).
The changes undergone when a nonprofit organization transitions from leadership
by an original charismatic founder to a more managerial and professionalized style of
leadership constitute a familiar narrative (Block and Rosenberg, 2002; Stewart, 2016).
However, in the case of World Vision the change was perhaps especially substantial:
under the leadership of Pierce’s successor, Stanley Mooneyham, World Vision’s budget
grew from $4.5 million in 1969 to $94 million by 1982 (King, 2013, p.84). In the coming
years, the agency would be led by a succession of presidents who would take it from
strength to strength. As with the international NGO sector more generally, the growth in
size often occurred in the wake of massive responses to equally massive humanitarian
disasters (Baobab, 2015, p. 2). The following section will describe the governance of the
federation that was established in 1978, as well as discuss the growth in revenue it
experienced over the years after 1978.
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Governance: Decentralization in Structure and Practice
Decentralization in Structure
According to Tallack’s typology of INGO structures, World Vision is situated
near the middle of a continuum ranging from a unitary model, consisting of a single
organization, through to networks and alliances. As a federation, it consists of “national
members of a global entity which has (some degree of) control over the members on
governance, strategy, management, finance, brand, operating rules.” (Tallack, n.d., p. 2).
Furthermore, “[b]y signing [a] Covenant of Partnership, each national office agrees to
abide by common policies and standards” (World Vision, (i)).
World Vision (known internally as “the partnership”) is governed by a 24member international board that meets biannually and appoints senior leadership,
approves strategic planning and budgeting, and sets international policy (World Vision,
(i)). The federation is comprised of 65 national offices in which programs take place; 10
support offices tasked with fundraising via donations and/or child sponsorship; eight
regional offices; and administrative offices located in London, Brussels, Geneva and New
York, all listed in Appendix A Of these, the last three – Brussels, Geneva and New York
– are dedicated to liaison work with the European Union and the United Nations (World
Vision (j).
The London offices contain, in effect, the headquarters of World Vision.
However, for historical reasons, World Vision itself is incorporated in the state of
California, and the office located in Monrovia, near Los Angeles, remains its official
headquarters, although the office is now tasked with mainly administrative functions
(World Vision (i); World Vision accountability specialist). Reflecting a marked recent
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trend toward decentralized offices, the Global Centre – as the London offices are known
– actually comprises staff persons spread across the globe. This includes, in the case of
World Vision staff tasked formally with program accountability leadership functions,
personnel based in Nairobi, and in and near Toronto, as well as in London (World Vision
accountability specialist).
Besides the International Board, an executive body that has as its remit the areas
outlined above, World Vision is governed by the Council of Members, which meets
every three years. At a lower level, national boards govern many national offices, with
national directors approving “more than 90 percent of projects within previously
approved budgets.” (World Vision (i)). However, the International Board is “the ultimate
governing body for the World Vision Partnership” (World Vision (k)). The board
members are elected by regional forums, to which each national board sends a
representative (World Vision (k)). At this writing, the members represent six support
offices (Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States); 11
program offices (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jerusalem/West
Bank/Gaza, Malaysia, Mali, Philippines, South Africa, Uganda); and two hybrid offices
(South Korea, Hong Kong). Australia, Canada, and the United States are represented
each by two members, with Canada’s representative, Kevin Jenkins, having served as the
president and CEO until late 2018, for a total of 24 members. The greater voting power
held by those three countries reflects their historical role as the largest funding sources of
World Vision (Ronalds, 2014, p. 153; Tallack, 2018, p. 11; Whaites, 1999, p. 414).
The Council of Members is “the highest governing authority for certain
fundamental decisions” (World Vision (i)), and its periodic meetings, known as the
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Triennial Council, constitute key milestones in terms of setting strategic directions for the
federation (Ronalds, 2014, p. 152). For example, World Vision’s current strategy
document, Our Promise 2030, was informed by the Triennial Council held in 2016. At
the time of the 2007 Triennial Council, radical evangelical leader and Sojourners editor
Jim Wallis took the opportunity to remark upon how much World Vision had grown
since the tsunami disaster of 2004, and on the added responsibility this conferred on the
organization: “World Vision’s size, influence, and credibility positions [sic] the
organization very well to be a prophetic leader in that movement for justice on the global
stage that speaks truth to power – not just as a service provider when disaster strikes”
(Wallis, 2007).
Decentralization in Practice
Among federations, World Vision is one of the more decentralized. It perhaps
comes the closest to equality among all its affiliates (with the significant caveat above
regarding the voting power of the Australian, Canadian and U.S. affiliates), as well as
equality between affiliates and the international secretariat, but with “reserve powers”
held by the secretariat, “such as involvement in appointment of member CEOs or veto”
(Tallack, p. 5). This has its roots in the original decision to form a federation. Whaites
notes that, “Even in 1976, internal voices were calling for [the concept of partnership] to
be taken to its logical conclusion with strict equality between North and South” (Whaites,
1999, p. 415).3
3

Complicating this picture of decentralization and devolution, however, is a countrylevel study of World Vision Tanzania, which analyzes the paradox involved in promoting an
empowerment discourse while failing to appreciate that an individualistic interpretation of
empowerment overlooks the potential for conflict among different subgroups within a community
(Kelsall and Mercer, 2003).
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With respect to accountability, World Vision like other INGOs faces the
challenges involved in juggling what Koppell has memorably termed “multiple
accountabilities disorder,” that is, the need to be accountable to multiple stakeholders at
the same time (Koppell, 2005). However, while “[s]everal INGOs have put in place tools
and processes to address the issues of holding the different entities to account for
delivery… World Vision stands out as the one that has gone furthest in achieving the goal
with its vertically integrated [a]ccountability mechanisms” (Tallack, 2018, p. 4).
Paradoxically, this is so even in the context of decentralization – exemplifying the larger
paradox of the duality that is a theme of this dissertation: between technocratic and
transformative approaches to development and humanitarian work.
It was noted above that the tsunami that devastated Banda Aceh, Indonesia; Sri
Lanka; and parts of southern India on Christmas Day in 2004 was a key milestone if not a
turning point in World Vision’s growth. The next section will consider the ways in
which World Vision grew in scale over the decades, the connection of that growth with
the occurrence of complex humanitarian emergencies, and the case of the emergency
response to the tsunami in particular.
Budgeting: Decentralization and Growth
Revenue Trends in the 21st Century
Figure 1 below illustrates the trends in World Vision’s revenue, measured in
millions of U.S. dollars, over the twenty years from 1998 to 2017, inclusive. During that
time (these are the years for which data are readily available), revenue more than
quadrupled, increasing from $665 million in 1998 to $2.76 billion in 2017. While the
steepest year-over-year increases started in 2003 – possibly in response to the beginning

37
of the Iraq war – sharp increases are also apparent in 2005 (just after the tsunami of
December 2004); in 2008 (the year that Cyclone Nargis made landfall in Myanmar); in
2011; and in 2014, after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in late 2013. Less notable is
the increase in 2010, when an earthquake struck Haiti in January of that year.
Figure 1-1: Trends in World Vision Annual Revenue, millions of dollars
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Nevertheless, this observation is consistent overall with conclusions reached by
the research organization, Baobab, which in a briefing paper on international civil society
global financial aid trends of 2015, asserts that the largest increases (across the INGO
sector, not only at World Vision) typically take place after humanitarian disasters:
“These have had a much bigger impact on rates of income growth than the [2008] global
recession…[H]igh profile disasters often act as catalysts for longer term growth, bringing
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in new supporters, and providing the stimulus for strengthening global capacity”
(Baobab, 2015, p. 2).
In other ways, however, World Vision has differed from other large INGOs.
Although its income is the largest among the seven leading INGO federations surveyed
by Baobab, its rate of growth has been among the slowest, at 3 percent compared with
Save the Children’s 12 percent. In part this may be attributed to its still minimal reliance
on government funding, which in some cases has fueled the growth of other federations,
of which Save the Children is only the most notable. However, the proportion of funding
coming from grants and contracts – whether from the government or foundations –
comprises an increasing proportion of World Vision’s funding sources (Baobab, 2015).
Finally, World Vision finances microfinance institutions around the world
through its VisionFund, established in 2003 for that purpose (World Vision (l), 2015, p.
27). As of 2016, VisionFund’s network of those institutions had disbursed over 1.44
million loans; held a global loan portfolio of $509 million; and had a global staff of 7,254
persons (World Vision (m), 2016, p. 41). With a reported global average repayment rate
of 97.9 percent, and a majority of clients being women – particularly in Asia – the
VisionFund paralleled similar initiatives, along the lines of the classic model pioneered
by the Grameen Bank (World Vision (m), 2016, p. 41).
Conceptualizing Transformational Development
With respect to World Vision’s new-found focus on development, increased
social consciousness was reflected in an impulse toward what Bryant Myers, director of
the field development division in the 1980s, called “transformational development.” He
would go on to say,
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We’re not in the business of developing institutions, infrastructures, roads, dams,
and that kind of thing… Our focus is on people. And all people are created in
God’s image… So, there’s no room for paternalism. We’re not going to help the
person “over there;” we’re going to extend hands to brothers and sisters. They
have a right to expect that and we have an obligation to act in that way (Quoted in
Rohrer, 1987, p. 148).
The focus on transformation had, on the one hand, theological roots. Following
the Lausanne Conference, evangelicals, having accepted the importance of social justice
concerns as something mandated by the Bible, went on to debate their relative importance
with respect to evangelism. In response, Wayne Bragg of the Wheaton Hunger Center
elaborated the concept of transformation, as encompassing the “material, social and
spiritual change” envisioned in the Gospels (Myers, 2011, p. 48). The concept went by
several names: “holistic mission, holistic development, integral mission, holistic
ministry…” (Myers, 2011, p. 49; Sen, 1999). If, on balance, the emphasis seemed to be
on social dimensions of transformation more than individual, nevertheless the individual
dimension remained inseparable from the larger understanding of the concept:
The argument over whether evangelism or social action was prior in the mission
of God was resolved to a certain extent by the use of the term transformation in
the following way. The difference between the two positions turned to a large
extent on people’s view of humanity – either as autonomous individuals
(evangelism) or as persons in relationships (social action). The term
transformation assured those concerned for evangelism that their vision for
changing or transforming people would not be lost in the concern to transform the
social relationships in which people were set (Sugden 2003, p. 71).
Thus, in transformational development the beneficiary is changed; but also and
(arguably) more importantly, the society in which beneficiaries are living in deprivation
needs also, urgently, to be changed.
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But in addition, in developing the concept of transformational development,
Myers drew upon the work of a host of experts in international development and related
fields, whose work ranged across decades.
The experts include Robert Chambers, whose framework for development
incorporated responsible well-being, encompassing livelihood security, capabilities
(drawing on the work of Amartya Sen), equity, and sustainability. (Myers, 2011, pp. 164165). Myers also drew directly on Sen’s concept of development as freedom, based on
instrumental freedoms necessary to the support of individual freedoms, including
political freedoms, economic capabilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees,
and protective security in the sense of safety nets, “as well as the protection of the rule of
law” (Myers, pp. 167-168; Sen, 1999). World Vision’s transformational development
emphasis drew inspiration, too, from the work of David Korten, whose people-centered
development critiqued the classic model based on economic growth promoted by most aid
donors. Korten set out a typology of four responses to poverty, ranging from relief and
welfare, through small-scale, self-reliant local development and sustainable systems, and
culminating in people’s movements (Myers, 2011, pp. 154-156).
However, while valuing the work of these and still other thinkers, Myers and by
extension World Vision saw shortcomings in the propensities of each of them to
sometimes neglect the role played by religion, whether for good or ill. This critique went
further, objecting to the inclination to put faith in human perfectibility rather than
acknowledging humanity’s fallenness (Myers, 2011, p. 167). For an orthodox and
explicitly Christian organization, this constituted an obvious shortcoming (Byworth,
2003; Myers, 2011). Nevertheless, World Vision accepted some elements common to
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these thinker/practitioners and declared “the twin goals of transformation: changed
people, who have discovered their true identity and vocation; and changed relationships
that are just and peaceful” (Myers, 2011, p. 202).
The practice of transformational development also shared assumptions with the
Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to development, which emerged in the early 21st
century (Schmitz 2012, p. 524). HRBA (also sometimes termed RBA), envisioned
development not as charity nor yet as a technocratic exercise, but rather as the fulfilling
of people’s human rights. A corresponding assumption held that government
representatives were therefore duty-bearers, who could be held accountable by their
constituents for fulfilling those rights (Schmitz 2012, p. 528). Based on the above
analyses, World Vision pioneered its Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) methodology, a
social accountability practice whereby it trained community members to, first of all,
ascertain the obligations of local governments for providing services; determine whether
these were being met adequately; and lobby for redress if they were not (Walker, 2018).
CVA had its precedents in the citizen scorecards and social audits that emerged from
countries of the global South in the 1980s and 1990s, and its origins can therefore be
traced to grassroots struggles for transparency and accountability (World Vision senior
development researcher). As shall be seen in the discussion below, this social
accountability work would become a key component of the operationalization of
Transformational Development (henceforth capitalized, to denote the official World
Vision policy rather than only a general description of the approach).
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Operationalizing Transformational Development
The question remained as to how Transformational Development was to be
operationalized. Curiously, this entailed the use of that classic tool of development
planning, the logical framework, or logframe. The logframe, devised by a management
consulting firm fifty years ago for use by USAID, can be understood as the epitome of
rationality in development planning (Krause, 2014, p. 84). Its purpose is to provide a
framework whereby development planners articulate the goals and objectives of a project,
determine the inputs (i.e., activities) needed to reach them and the outputs that will result,
and set forth assumptions undergirding the plan as well as risks to be mitigated (Krause,
2014, pp. 70-75; Myers, 2011, pp. 240-241).
The use of logframes remains prevalent throughout World Vision, owing mainly
to donors’ requiring them (according to interviewees in both the development and
accountability areas of work within World Vision). This is true despite the Theory of
Change having become increasingly popular in development planning – a comparatively
new approach in which assumptions, rather than being treated as something external as in
the logframe, are “brought into the narrative of the theory” (Valters, 2014, p. 14). In
using theories of change, agencies begin by describing the desired outcome, then work
backward to determine the objects and activities that will be needed to attain it (Valters,
2014). While World Vision now uses both logframes and theories of change, financing
becomes the determining factor with respect to deciding which one will predominate:
“[W]hereas a grant-funded project in an office would have a logframe, they would
sometimes have a Theory of Change as well. But I think it’s unusual to have a grantfunded project which would only have a Theory of Change and not have a logframe”
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(World Vision accountability and learning specialist). The logframe, as a technical
product, would be likely to be devised by staff rather than beneficiaries, with an eye to its
consumption by donors as an indication of the rigor of World Vision’s planning process.
This has clear implications for downward accountability, as the logframe can be
interpreted as adding a layer of distance between beneficiary input and the agency’s
programming. Referring to the logframe’s counterpart within domestic nonprofits,
Mirabella points out that “the rationalist approach emphasizes a logic model that falls
short of meeting its objectives when applied across diverse cultural, social, and political
settings. One approach does not fit all programs” (Mirabella, 2013, p. 91).
Thus, Myers himself acknowledged the limitations of logframes, pointing out that
“social change is neither linear nor logical,” and that “the key to mitigating [the] potential
weaknesses of the Log Frame is to focus first and foremost on the goals of transformation
– changed people and changed relationships” (Myers, 2011, pp. 242 – 243). Currently,
both the logframe and the theory of change have been used and have even on occasion
been merged into hybrid documents that incorporate assumptions into projected
sequences of events, the fulfillment of which would lead to desired objectives. The theory
of change, as a more flexible instrument that is not as closely tied to inputs and outputs as
is the logframe, is potentially more conducive to downward accountability. Nevertheless
the interviewee’s remark above that donors continue to insist on a logframe even in
combination with a theory of change is indicative of the degree to which instruments
supportive of downward accountability remain subject to constraints.
In order to operationalize Transformational Development, World Vision’s
thinking also drew on a number of strands in development theory and practice. This
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dissertation has already referenced Sen’s capabilities approach; in addition,
Transformational Development made use of the concepts of sustainable livelihoods;
community organizing; participatory learning and action; appreciative inquiry; and
positive deviance (Myers, 2011). Table 1, below, outlines selected highlights from each
of those six approaches, together with the contributions that each makes to the mission of
transformational development, and potential drawbacks and caveats (from World
Vision’s perspective). It also selects a few of the key leaders for each, and the
institutions with which they are perhaps most closely associated (although the list is not
by any means exhaustive). The range of institutions is arguably indicative of the breadth
of the sources of inspiration for Transformational Development. The various approaches
also encompass a significant degree of technical expertise.
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Table 2-2: Approaches Informing/Inspiring Transformational Development
Approach

Characteristics

Advantages (from WV
viewpoint)

Disadvantages/
cautions (from WV
viewpoint)

Selected leading
thinkers/practitioners
and associated
institutions

Capacities and
vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities affect community
response to shocks and disasters.
Capacities are long-term strengths.
Both apply to these domains:
physical and material; social and
organizational; and motivational
and attitudinal. Analysis should be
disaggregated by class and gender,
to overcome bias.

Aids an understanding of
root causes.

None identified.

Mary Anderson and
Peter Woodrow (codirectors of the
International Relief and
Development Project at
Harvard University at
the time the approach
was elaborated; later
associated with CDA
Collaborative, led by
Anderson).

Sustainable
Livelihoods

Five different types of capital:
financial, human, physical, natural,
social, and spiritual. Goal is to
increase these assets and mitigate
shocks/seasonal variations that
undermine them. Forms of capital
are examined with respect to public
policies, social institutions, &
institutional processes. Strategies
devised to improve livelihood
outcomes.

Expands capabilities
beyond the personal to
include the social and
environmental contexts.

None identified.

Robert Chambers (IDS
Sussex), Gordon
Conway (IDS Sussex,
Rockefeller Foundation,
Gates Foundation)

Community
organizing

Five steps include: networking,
coalition-building, actionreflection-action, leadership
empowerment, birth of a
community.

Proven effective in
creating participation and
ownership; is especially
helpful in urban settings.

Confrontational
approach may
undermine
sustainability,
reconciliation and
peacebuilding.

Saul Alinsky (Industrial
Areas Foundation);
Robert Linthicum
(Partners in Urban
Transformation).

Participatory
Learning and
Action (PLA)

Outsiders help rural people to
identify their own knowledge, thus
helping them recover their identity,
increase their agency.

Community can develop
its own analysis, become
its own advocate.

None identified.

Evolved from Rapid
Rural Appraisal (Robert
Chambers, IDS Sussex).

Appreciative
Inquiry

Is based on an assumption of health
and vitality. Asks what went right,
how to increase it, what gives life,
what might be, what should be
(Delivery, Discovery, Dream,
Dialogue).

Adds energy to that
which is already
effective; avoids retrying
that which is not.

Unclear whether
benefits can be
sustained, especially
in the face of
potential resistance
from those with a
stake in the status
quo.

David Cooperrider and
Suresh Srivastva
(Weatherhead School of
Management, Case
Western Reserve
University)

Positive Deviance

Explores diffusion of innovation in
communities by seeking early
adopters: those who are mitigating
the problem.

Promotes empowerment.
Behavioral change
research suggests new
behaviors will result.

Approach is very
time-consuming;
success depends on
highly-skilled
facilitation. Is not for
all problems.

Jerry and Monique
Sternin (Save the
Children Vietnam)

Prevents the increase of
vulnerabilities caused by
development projects
(“Do No Harm”).

(Adapted from Myers, 2011, pp. 251-267)
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Transformational Development was ultimately adopted as an official policy at the
highest level in the agency: defined in a document presented to and approved by World
Vision’s governing board in 1995, then revised in 2002 and again in 2017. The dates are
worth noting: World Vision adopted Transformational Development in the mid-1990s, at
a time when participatory development methods were arguably in their ascendancy, and
revised the policy seven years later. However, in the early 2000s the approach decreased
in importance within the organization, relative to new priorities (according to World
Vision specialists in accountability and learning). Those new priorities, in turn, reflected
changes within the development community just as much as had the emergence of the
currents that fed into transformational development. In order to contextualize each of
these, a discussion of the international development enterprise, and World Vision’s place
within it, is necessary.
Changes in the International NGO Sector: Emerging Trends in Development and
Humanitarian Policy and Practice
What we might term the international development enterprise originated in the
construction of the post-war international order. These origins are variously ascribed to
President Harry Truman’s Four-Points speech in 1949 (Escobar, 1995); and to the 1944
meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, which by founding the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later
one of the two concessional lending arms of the World Bank Group), established much of
the international financial architecture that governs multilateral lending and, arguably at
least as importantly, sets the terms for international development policy and practice. In

47
so doing, that architecture also set the stage for the disproportionate influence of wealthy
donor governments on the same.
By the start of the 21st century, World Vision had grown exponentially in the
wake of the humanitarian emergencies of the 1980s and 1990s, as noted above, and had
reached a budget of more than $886 million (World Vision 2000, p. 4). This moment
coincided with the rise, within the broader philanthropic community, of an emphasis on
outcomes and results rather than mere outputs (Brest, 2010). The World Bank, as a
source of policy advice and professional expertise, as well as – most importantly – the
conditions it attaches to its loans, is tremendously influential (Santiso, 2001; Clemens and
Kemerer, 2016). Its embrace of the results agenda has proven problematic, as the
approach rewards form over function – in other words, and paradoxically, the enactment
of institutional reforms without due attention to whether the reforms are functioning and
delivering results (Buntaine, Buch, and Parks, 2013).
However, the World Bank, too, has in places acknowledged that a more
sophisticated way of evaluating results is needed:
While few would argue that results are not important, the unintended
consequences of the reporting systems that are created to prove those results are
problematic. These consequences include short-termism and a desire to fund
quick wins over long-term institution-building and transformational engagement
(Bain, Booth, and Wilde, 2016, p. 21).
Within World Vision, this emerging trend found expression in the creation of
Child Well-Being Targets (later termed Child Well-Being Objectives and Aspirations),
by means of which the organization as well as its donors would be able to track its
success in fulfilling its core mission of improving child well-being – a mission expressed
in the motto, “Our vision for every child, life in all its fullness. Our prayer for every
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heart, the will to make it so” – itself derived from the Biblical verse, “I am come that they
may have life, and have it abundantly,” John 10:10.
In addition, like many INGOs during this period, World Vision had embraced
organizational learning as a broader and more holistic approach to the monitoring and
evaluation of projects (M & E), ultimately moving to the practice of monitoring,
evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL). The tool that World Vision began using
for implementing MEAL was termed LEAP, for Learning through Evaluation in
Accountability and Planning. The purpose of LEAP was to “align strategy and
programming” by setting forth the ways in which technical programs both support and
inform national strategies, and, ideally, “[bring] quality, consistency, and scale to
programming” (World Vision (d), p. 4). In doing so, World Vision hoped to bring
adaptive learning through iteration to its work (World Vision senior staffer in
development).
Doing Development Differently
World Vision’s Transformational Development approach, which had entered
something of a lull upon the arrival of the results agenda within the development
community, found new energy when bilateral and multilateral donors as well as
development academics launched the Doing Development Differently (DDD) community
in 2014 (according to a World Vision accountability specialist and a World Vision senior
staffer specializing in development). DDD then issued a manifesto that encompassed, in
the first place, concepts and practices familiar to advocates of grassroots development
approaches going back decades (consultation, participation, local ownership,
empowerment, stakeholder mobilization). However, its novelty – and therefore added
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value – seemed to consist principally in two elements: first, in its being espoused not
only (or even principally) by NGOs or civil society organizations (CSOs), but rather by
government donors, who by definition are in a position to support approaches that human
rights-minded NGOs and CSOs have long championed; and secondly, in combining
grassroots approaches with distinctly 21st-century concepts of iterative learning via “rapid
cycles of planning, action, reflection and revision,” with the aim of delivering better
impact (Overseas Development Institute). Thus, at the present time, World Vision’s
Transformational Development approach has found new support and energy from DDD,
while the evidence-based inclination of the Child Well-Being Objectives remains
essential, and likewise finds support in DDD.
Moreover, in 2014, World Vision undertook a review of its performance in doing
development differently. The resulting report concluded that World Vision’s existing
focus on transformational development aligned with a number of DDD principles,
principally those revolving around iteration and adaptation. Importantly, the review
recognized the importance of a long-term perspective: “It often takes years, rather than
months, before trust reaches a level where taboos are uncovered, and traditional beliefs of
world-views can be identified and openly discussed.” (World Vision (f), p. 14). Yet
donor pressures for timely reporting can undermine commitment to long-term change.
The twin donor mandates for long-term, sustainable results and “significant agility in
producing them,” on the one hand, and the equally exacting – or even more so – donor
demands for the grantee “to deliver projects as agreed, on time and under budget”
resulted in an all-too-familiar dilemma. (World Vision (f), p. 35). In addition, the
division between professional staff formally tasked with carrying out design, evaluation
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and monitoring, and field staff expected to engage the same tasks but without the same
level of formal training, was found to result all too frequently in a “tick-the-box”
mentality that ran counter to the flexible and iterative approach expected to be embedded
in transformational development no less than in “doing development differently.” (World
Vision, p. 35; World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist).
Perhaps most important, the review concluded by signaling three areas of concern
going forward – developments that constitute challenges facing the international
development sector as a whole. First of all is the increasing need to work in what are
termed “fragile contexts;” or rather perhaps the increasing fragility (due to armed
conflict or natural or human-caused disasters) of the contexts in which NGOs work.
Second is the increasing pressure, discussed above, exerted by donors on NGOs to
deliver evidence of impact, all the while minimizing risk. Here, the review candidly
asserts, “we are challenged by the pressure to reduce risk and implement prescribed
activities in a linear mode. This works against our desire to allow for complexity, to be
flexible and responsive, and to empower local stakeholders” (World Vision (f) p. 43).
Finally, and relatedly, the review acknowledges the challenges posed by the increasing
need to rely on short-term funding (arguably owing to the trend in decreasing child
sponsorship funds in recent years.). One proposed solution would be for various NGOs
to work in one community so that that community’s vision for the changes it wants to see
happen can be realized (World Vision (f), p. 43). Presumably this would not take place
in the context of humanitarian emergencies, where the cluster approach, in which
different international NGOs take on different areas, is increasingly adopted by
humanitarian aid funding agencies.
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The four trends discussed above – the focus on results, also thought of as the
evidence-based revolution; transformational development; organizational learning; and
Doing Development Differently – are summarized in Table 2-3, below.
Table 2-3: Trends Affecting Downward Accountability in World Vision
Trend

Characteristics

Organizational
learning

Double-loop
learning (Argyris
and Schon, 1977).
Problem-driven
iterative adaptation
(PDIA) (Andrews,
Pritchett and
Woolcock, 2013).
Measurable,
quantifiable results;
randomized
controlled trials.

Evidence-based
revolution

Transformational
development
Doing
Development
Differently

“Changed people
and just and human
relationships”
(Myers, 1998)
Local ownership;
stakeholder
mobilization; rapid
cycles of planning,
action, reflection
and revision; real
results (DDD
Manifesto)

Protagonists

Time span
affected

Impact on WV
work (actual or
projected)

Corporations;
bilateral and
multilateral
donors; thinktanks and
academics

Early 2000s –
present day

Monitoring and
evaluation (M&E)
gives way to LEAP
(Learning through
Evaluation with
Accountability and
Planning).

Donors (e.g.,
World Bank),
development
think-tanks (e.g.,
Center for Global
Development)
World Vision

Early 2000s –
present day

Child Well-Being
Targets are
prioritized, then
Child Well-Being
Objectives

Early 1980s –
early 2000s;
and, 2014 –
present day
2013 – present
day

Transformational
Development
endorsed by Board in
1995.
May lead to higher
profile, greater
influence, and
increased funding for
WVI.

Donors, think
tanks, academics,
international
NGOs.

Of the four, it will suffice to select one – Doing Development Differently – as an
example of how the trend is manifested. The review that World Vision conducted of how
it has applied Doing Development Differently contains myriad examples of the DDD
approach. The need for contextualization is a common theme found in that publication,
and the rather blunt assessments in it attest to what a challenge it can often prove. For
example, the review states:
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World Vision is trying to carefully manage a risk of applying standard project
models… without appropriately adapting them for context. Each project model
now has clear guidance around which aspects can be contextualised and which
aspects need to be consistent with the design. We are learning that field staff need
continual assurances and reminders that communities and partners can influence
which technical programmes are introduced and how they are contextualised.
Without intentional communication, field staff perceive rigidity and do not have
the confidence to adapt in response to local realities (World Vision (f), p. 19).
Nevertheless, there are cases of successful contextualization. Self-evident as
it may seem that projects and plans should be adapted to the local context, implementing
this in practice is challenging, and demands taking seriously local priorities in ways that
Western observers might not at first expect, as the following example attests:
[I]n Burundi, every community identified and adapted the technical programmes
that were relevant to their priorities. In this process, many communities identified
that the programs were unlikely to be successful because they were not designed
to work in a context where alcoholism and witchcraft undermine any progress
made. As a result, the technical programs were re-designed to address these
issues. (World Vision (f), p. 19).
Who Will Pay? Development, Humanitarian, and Advocacy Work at World Vision
Development Programming: Child Sponsorship and Stability of Funding
Before going further into a description and analysis of the development
effectiveness tools that World Vision uses for tracking whether it is attaining success at
its stated goals and objectives, a further overview of the organization’s work is necessary,
this time with a view to its operations.
As noted earlier, World Vision carries out work in the following three broad
areas: development programming, humanitarian relief, and advocacy. In 2016, the
agency operated in 99 countries with a budget of $2.72 billion dollars (this includes cash,
food aid, and gifts-in-kind), sponsored 3.2 million children, and calculated that 41 million
children worldwide benefited from its work (World Vision 2016 Annual Review, p. 4).
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Of this, grant funding comprised $460.49 million (World Vision 2016 Annual Review, p.
35).
World Vision’s Development Program Approach shapes its work in the area of
development and is set out in a handbook published in 2011. It is elaborated further in a
100-page handbook of “good practices.” Development Programming Areas (DPAs) are
the basic unit in which such work unfolds. A DPA comprises a geographic area with a
population density ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 persons in the case of programs funded
through child sponsorship, and up to 100,000 in grant-funded programs (World Vision
(g), p. 21). A still further handbook provides guidance to national offices on how to
conduct annual review and programming meetings, and it is these meetings that figure
prominently in the reporting on how well downward accountability is being implemented
(World Vision (h)).
However, the Development Program Approach is not implemented in all
Development Programming Areas. Instead, the review referenced above (Doing
Development Differently: What Have We Learned?) found that “of those area programs
practicing our Development Program Approach, 73 percent were stimulating
transformational development. Of those not practicing our approach, 53 percent were
stimulating transformational change” – presumably prompting an inclination to
disseminate the DPA to the remaining area programs. (World Vision (f), p. 38).
The distinction between child sponsorship funding and grant funding is key for at
least two reasons: child sponsorship provides a steady stream of funding that enables
DPAs to implement programs with, ideally, a 15-year timeframe. This is in contrast to
grant-funded or contractual work, which typically has a much shorter timeframe (World
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Vision accountability specialist). In addition, child sponsors do not impose the exacting
reporting requirements with respect to outcome measurements that official donors do. In
contrast, bilateral agencies such as the UK’s Department for International Development
(DFID), multilateral donors such as the World Bank, or large private foundations such as,
famously, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation all bring with them an emphasis on
outcomes measurement as a condition of aid. Individual donors, on the other hand, give
for expressive reasons – i.e., giving is an expression of their values and identity – and
because they trust the object of their benevolence to do the right thing (academic expert
interviewee). Child sponsorship could in this way be considered a way of reconciling the
personal and/or religious impulses behind charity with the large scale and technocratic
aspirations of philanthropy (Gross, 2003).
It could be argued that in providing the child sponsors with regular reports on the
progress experienced by the recipients of their benevolence, the agency provides a
“good” in exchange for funds. Where Krause’s conception of “the good project” posits
the development or humanitarian relief project itself as the good being provided by
NGOs and consumed by donors, in the case of child sponsorship it is arguably the
relationship between sponsor and child that constitutes such a good (Krause, 2014).
Bornstein and others have conceptualized this practice as constituting the potential
commodification of children, of their innocence and vulnerability (Bornstein, 2001, p.
597; Li, 2017; Noh, 2018, p. 3). Whether or not one wholly accepts this analysis, child
sponsorship, in providing stability of unrestricted income, may be thought of as a type of
income-generating activity that helps to partially free the child sponsorship agency from
reliance on grants and contracts (Noh, 2018, p. 3). At World Vision, it also typically
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funds long-term development programming as distinct from emergency humanitarian
relief (World Vision accountability specialist).
Additionally, in a development that perhaps typifies the changes in the
international development sector more generally, the rise of middle-income countries,
with a concomitant rise in the proportion of middle-class citizens, has also led to an
increase in the number of persons in those countries willing to sponsor children. As an
example, the number of child sponsors in India is growing at 25 per year on average, and
25 percent of World Vision’s global revenues are raised in Asian nations, compared with
10 percent only 10 years ago (World Vision Annual Report 2013, p. 96).
Humanitarian Relief: Reliance on Grants and Contracts
Humanitarian relief, in contrast, is more typically funded by government and
foundation grants and contracts. As noted above, these entail much more stringent
reporting requirements and outcomes measurement (World Vision accountability
specialist). The implications for the efficacy of downward accountability mechanisms of
these contrasting funding models will be explored in the next chapter. But the
prominence of standard-setting in the realm of humanitarian action is especially clear. As
Calhoun has put it, “[H]umanitarian action has become the province of large-scale
organizations, donors with demands for evidence of efficacy and efficiency, and a
profession with its own standards of good performance” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 95).
There exists a staff perception that in recent years the balance between the funding stream
provided by child sponsorship funds and the stream provided by grants and contracts has
been changing, tipping increasingly in the direction of the latter. At this writing,
examination of the past ten years of annual reports, with their accompanying financial
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summaries, did not yield confirmation of this perception. It was possible however to
review the Form 990 tax forms of World Vision U.S. While its experience does not
necessarily reflect the experience of the entire federation (although its revenues comprise
somewhat more than one third of the federation’s total), the five years between 2011 and
2017, inclusive, demonstrated a slight upward trend, as reflected in Table 2-4, below.
Table 2-4: Government Grants as Proportion of Total Revenue, in millions of dollars
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011

Government Grants
$ 303
$ 220
$ 220
$ 172
$ 195
$ 179
$ 175

Total Revenue
$ 1,044
$ 1,014
$ 1,006
$ 998
$ 1,027
$ 975
$ 1,000

Percentage
29%
23%
22%
17%
19%
18%
17%

Note: Percentages are inexact due to rounding. Sources: World Vision, Annual Reports.
Reports for 2016 and 2017 are found in brochure form, a format different from that used in
previous years.

If this trend is borne out across World Vision, it can be expected that grant
donors’ expectations of demonstrable effectiveness will increasingly affect programming
across both humanitarian and development work. World Vision UK, at least, in its 2017
annual report candidly addresses the decline in sponsorship funding, pointing to the need
to increase such funding as a challenge, and also acknowledging the increased
importance of grant funding (World Vision UK, 2017, p. 2). With a budget at nearly the
equivalent of $104 million in 2017, it comprises a not insignificant part of the federation;
as importantly, the influential nature of its government donor, DFID, has larger
implications for the organization as a whole (as well as the INGO sector more generally).
The proportion of funding going toward humanitarian work, as reflected in World
Vision’s annual reports, not unnaturally fluctuates from year to year, oftentimes as a
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result of large humanitarian disasters on a given year. Thus, no clear trends emerged
from the time that these reports started disaggregating funding for humanitarian work in
2008, through 2017.
However, the areas covered by grant funding go beyond the context of immediate
humanitarian emergencies. Instead, grants typically go to fund work in “the most
vulnerable communities, including fragile, urban, remote or nomadic populations”
(World Vision (g), p. 24).
Advocacy: Transferring Responsibility for Service Provision to the Duty-Bearers?
Finally, the advocacy arm of World Vision’s work encompasses advocacy at the
global, national, subnational and local levels. For example, global advocacy included, in
2017, the completion of a seven-year campaign promoting child and maternal health,
entitled Child Health Now, and another campaign against violence against children – the
Global Partnership to End Violence against Children, alluded to on page 1. As for the
other levels, in the interests of promoting the sustainability of their interventions after the
conclusion of World Vision involvement, the organization developed the program of
social accountability work, Citizen Voice and Action, referenced earlier. The purpose of
this area of work, originally entitled Community-Based Performance Management, was
to coach community members to demand greater accountability on the part of
government service providers. In this way, rather than remaining dependent on World
Vision for service provision the community could come to rely on government, the
official duty-bearer. (World Vision senior development researcher; World Vision social
accountability specialist; Walker, 2018).
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The distinction between development work on the one hand, and humanitarian
relief on the other, is not necessarily always precise. This is more and more the case in a
world in which humanitarian emergencies are increasing not only in number but also in
the length of the recovery period (Barnett, 2008). This has implications not only for the
relationship between humanitarian and development work, but also for the relationship
between each of them and advocacy work, at least at the local and subnational levels.
One interviewee, specializing in social accountability work, explained it as follows. In
the immediate aftermath of an emergency, priority is placed quite naturally on saving
lives, and in such a context it is infeasible to simultaneously train people to advocate for
better service provision. As a community transitions from the disaster, however,
government agencies are expected to incrementally take on greater responsibility for
service provision, and thus social accountability begins to take on importance. Once
stability has been reached, ideally government can be held one hundred percent
accountable for service provision (World Vision social accountability specialist). This,
of course, begs the question of how often such a situation occurs.
Conclusion
This chapter has set out the history of World Vision’s evolution from a
missionary and relief organization, fueled by one man’s passionate if sometimes
unorthodox zeal, into a multibillion-dollar global federation and industry leader. It has
also situated that evolution within the broader trends shaping the international
development and humanitarian relief sectors, trends themselves shaped by changes in
philanthropy as well as in foreign aid (i.e., government aid) more generally. That
evolution took place also within broader trends within U.S. society, where World Vision
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originated: “fascination with technology, especially with the almost magical force of
mass media, and an uncritical patriotism that saw the American Way of Life as a cure for
the ills of the world” (VanderPol, 2010, pp. 87-88).
The story of World Vision’s spectacular growth is in many ways the story of postSecond World War growth experienced by many of the other international NGOs. The
story of its (partial) secularization is, however, different from the experience of
mainstream NGOs. Organizations such as Church World Service or Catholic Relief
Services, which likewise flourished in the postwar context and subsequently
professionalized by adopting mainstream international development thinking and
practices, seem to have exerted little influence on World Vision (VanderPol, 2010, p. 90,
p. 345; Gerstbauer, 2010, p. 854). For example, as long ago as 1967, Catholic Relief
Services could see fit to find inspiration in the motto, “Development is the new name for
peace,” from the papal encyclical Populorum Progressio (Paul VI, 1967). In contrast,
World Vision’s own turn toward development did not begin until the next decade.
In sum, World Vision’s response and adaptation to the same forces that shaped
the evolution of other international NGOs during the Cold War was indeed sui generis.
Arguably, World Vision’s strong sense of itself as an evangelical organization allowed it
to continue to identify itself as such, even as it increasingly took up a philanthropic
approach to its work in the decades that followed the transition from its original
leadership.
In similar fashion, World Vision’s response to the trends prevailing in the postCold War period was also shaped by its own internal priorities. While the emergence of
the results agenda exerted, and continues to exert, a strong external influence, the
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agency’s very public commitment to a transformational approach to development and
humanitarian work constitutes a not insignificant countervailing internal force
(Gerstbauer, 2010). Nonetheless, the evidence-based revolution in the development and
humanitarian sectors in general, and with respect to downward accountability
specifically, has led to the establishment of a host of tools and processes within World
Vision that are intended to enable it to meet donor requirements. The next chapter will
consider these artefacts in some detail. The description of these will serve to set the
context within which to then discuss findings from a review of the evidence from the
documentary record and from the field, as reflected in selected Child Well-Being
Reports; annual accountability reports; and semi-structured interviews of past and
present World Vision staff members and academic experts. The findings from those
sources, and the interpretation of those findings, comprise the content of that chapter and
the ones that follow.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Research Questions
This dissertation poses the following research questions: How did World Vision
come to decide to adopt downward accountability? How is downward accountability
being implemented at World Vision? What challenges – if any – is the organization
encountering in the course of implementation, and how is it addressing them? It is
anticipated that by shedding light on these questions, it may be possible to draw broader
implications regarding the still comparatively nascent field of downward accountability.
Research Design
The dissertation comprises a within-case comparison of experiences in downward
accountability within World Vision across countries and over time. Thus, data were
collected from internal reports produced by 64 country offices, and from publications
spanning 18 years. The rationale for case selection was described in Chapter One and
thus will be only briefly recapitulated here.
World Vision is a self-described “Christian relief, development and advocacy
organization dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome
poverty and injustice” (World Vision ). Its federated system has been in place
significantly longer than those of many of its peer INGOs, having been established in
1978. Its annual budget of nearly $3 billion makes it the largest INGO.
Whaites (1999) has chronicled how World Vision’s ideological differences with
INGOs such as Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Plan
International – it is generally, even today, considered more conservative than these – are

62
contrasted with its somewhat paradoxical position as one of the first INGOs to
decentralize and thus ostensibly devolve power back to its Southern offices. Thus,
writing as early as 1999, he captured its complex and sometimes contradictory nature in
this way:
a partnership of development NGOs that is Christian, but free from church
sectarianism; an agency which is large, but whose Southern partners wield
enormous influence within its corporate structures; an NGO which has moved
from political conservatism to being criticized by the Christian right for its
advocacy work and partnership with Marxist regimes; an organization which has
become global, with some 17 industrialized-country partners and over 80 in the
South (Whaites, 1999, pp. 411-412).
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that World Vision constitutes, despite its
large size and prominent position, something of an outlier case. It is, in any event, an
exemplar of the concept of downward accountability, not necessarily because of having
achieved success in that area – the question of its success or not is, after all, the focus of
this inquiry. Rather, it is because of having undertaken downward accountability in an
explicit and carefully planned way; having tracked these efforts in an ongoing manner;
and having taken the efforts seriously enough to commission an external study on the
subject.4
This dissertation employs purposive sampling, using exemplars sampling since it
is expected to illuminate the sensitizing concepts discussed on page 65, below (Charmaz
and Belgrave, 2007; Patton, 2014, pp. 264 and 269)
Positionality
The researcher’s own positionality should be noted, as she was for some years a
staff person at the association of U.S.-based NGOs that engage in international relief and

4

The study, by Gillian Westhorp and Emma Williams, is cited under the References.
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development, the Association for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), and had
worked for some of its members – although not World Vision – in previous years.
Indeed, professional contacts made during those years facilitated the initial access to
World Vision for purposes of this research. Also worth noting are the researcher’s
undergraduate and graduate degrees in international development and a history of policy
advocacy and activism in support of issues that might be loosely classed under
“transformational development,” such as improved food security policies and poorcountry debt relief.
All of the above informed the researcher’s understanding of the issues being
discussed by the interviews, as well as her review of the extant literature on development
and humanitarian relief. In these ways, positionality can be understood to have been an
asset to the research. Conversely, of course, this positionality also potentially introduces
bias. Even more conducive to bias is the experience of having been a participant in, and
observer of, INGO advocacy and countless debates with multilateral donor agency staff
precisely during the years that INGO ascendancy was reaching its peak, followed by
INGOs rapidly coming under heavy criticism and the questioning of their own
accountability. Thus, efforts were made to mitigate any bias through the following
means: member-checking of the interviews; the writing of analytic memos; the use of
diverse types of data – interviews as well as published and unpublished reports; and
review of the extant literature, including and importantly literature critical of NGOs.
Population, Participants, and Sampling Technique
In the first phase, twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted,
principally via Skype, of a variety of current and past World Vision staff, as well as of
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selected academic experts. Institutional Review Board approval was sought on an
expedited basis, as no harm was anticipated to the interviewees from the process. Written
permission from them was waived, as oral permission was deemed sufficient. The
interview guide can be found in Appendix I.
The interviewees were selected using purposive sampling – specifically, snowball
sampling (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, pp. 97 – 98; Patton, 2015, p. 289. They included
staff members from the three different program areas of the organization: development,
humanitarian relief, and advocacy; across various levels within the organizational
hierarchy, from program officers in the field to senior management at global
headquarters; and across nine countries on five continents.
The nature of the interviewees’ positions as development and humanitarian
experts, both within and outside World Vision, is similar to that of elites. In elite
interviewing, snowball sampling is preferred to random sampling for the reason that it
makes it possible to reach interviewees to whom the researcher might not otherwise have
access (Noy, 2007, p. 331; Tansey, 2007). In addition, when the researcher selects the
initial set of interviewees based on their positions, snowball sampling makes it possible to
then select further interviewees based on their reputations for being knowledgeable about
the subject under study (Tansey, 2007, pp. 18 – 21). This was in fact the process
followed in this dissertation: an initial list of ten interviewees generated after the first
interview with an acknowledged expert in the organization led to further interviews of
those recommended by the first interviewees.
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A total of 22 interviews were conducted. Interviews averaged one hour in length,
were audio recorded and transcribed, and then sent to the interviewees for memberchecking. Twelve of the interviewees availed themselves of the opportunity to return
either comments or their affirmation that they had reviewed the transcript of their
interview and had no comments. The semi-structured interviews were supplemented by
five informal interviews conducted with current and past staff and academic experts, the
content of which was captured in written notes. The lists of interviews are found in
Appendix B.
Data Collection
Data were collected in roughly three phases and from three principal sources.
First, the interviews referenced above, both informal and semi-structured, were
conducted with key World Vision staff members and other experts. Secondly, data were
extracted from the annual reports and annual accountability reports published by World
Vision. Thirdly, internal datasets summarizing accountability results were provided by
World Vision. The data from these three sets of sources were analyzed in the manner to
be discussed starting on page 73, below.
In addition, a range of specialized publications (located on the World Vision
website) and internal documents (provided by the agency), and comprising a toolkit, a
pilot study, and other documents relating to transformational development and to
downward accountability, were reviewed prior to conducting the interviews.
The sensitizing concepts initially used to guide data collection were as follows:
downward accountability, social accountability, humanitarian relief, and development.
As interviews proceeded, however, the following sensitizing concepts emerged and were
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also used to guide the inquiry: power, transformation, and organizational learning
(Patton 2014, pp. 358-363).
Sensitizing concepts by their very nature are not intended to be definitive, but are
instead intended to be suggestive, in that way eliciting ideas (Bowen 2006). Indeed,
[a] sensitizing concept lacks … specification of attributes or benchmarks and
consequently it does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its
relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and
guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts
provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest
directions along which to look (Blumer, 1954, p. 7).
The sensitizing concepts listed above, therefore, are used in the following manner.
Downward accountability, to reiterate the description in the introduction to this
dissertation, refers here to those policies and practices, undertaken by a nongovernmental
organization, and the procedures used to promote and enforce them, designed to collect
and act upon beneficiary feedback and complaints. This description, devised for the
purposes of this dissertation, is informed by existing definitions of downward
accountability in the literature (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Bendell 2006;
Kilby 2006; Lloyd, Warren, and Hammer 2008).
Social accountability, reiterating the discussion in the introduction, refers here to
the practice of holding the providers of public services accountable to those who use
those services (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Fox, 2015; Walker, 2018).
Humanitarian relief indicates humanitarian action to ensure crisis-affected people
receive the assistance and protection they need (UN OCHA).
Development is used here to refer to INGO efforts to promote a better quality of
life among project-affected persons by means of technical and social interventions in any

67
number of sectors such as: health; education; water, sanitation and hygiene; livelihoods;
agriculture; forestry; and others. It is used in contradistinction to humanitarian relief.
Power is used to refer to “the ability to act or produce an effect,” as well as
“possession of control, authority or influence over others” (Merriam-Webster). It also is
meant to evoke Amartya Sen’s concept of capabilities, which is to say, the freedoms
enjoyed by persons to secure lives they find beneficial in some meaningful way (Sen,
1999).
Transformational development evokes the approach to development espoused by
World Vision starting in the 1970s, one “reflect[ing a] concern for seeking positive
change in the whole of human life, materially, socially, psychologically and spiritually”
(Myers, 2011, p. 3). It is distinguished from, simply, development by its holistic
approach as well as by its emancipatory aspirations as described in Chapter Two.
Finally, with respect to organizational learning, Fiol and Lyle’s definition
provides a good starting point: “the process of improving actions through better
knowledge and understanding” (Fiol and Lyle, 1985, p. 803). In the context of this
dissertation, the concept is used to designate the organizational tools developed and used
by World Vision to do just that: improve its effectiveness in development and
humanitarian work by gathering data and ultimately increasing knowledge about its
performance generally and in particular with respect to downward accountability.
In addition, several interviews made reference to data from 64 annual, nationallevel reports on the state of child well-being. The Child Well-Being Report is a document
pulling together information on program performance of World Vision in each country
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(or field office) as measured by the Child Well-Being Indicators.5 As will be discussed in
Chapter Five, a planning tool called the Performance Effectiveness Self-Review Tool
(PE-SRT) is used to track progress toward the indicators, and staff are expected to
include in each Child Well-Being Report a discussion of the use of the PE-SRT. Each
report is also expected to include data on the degree to which downward accountability
measures are being implemented according to another planning tool called the Program
Accountability Framework (PAF), which is embedded within the PE-SRT. The Child
Well-Being Report is therefore the single tool available to the organizational learning and
accountability staff at global headquarters that enables them to capture effectiveness data,
including downward accountability effectiveness data (former World Vision staffer
specializing in accountability training). Country programs differ across a relatively broad
range not only in terms of the degree to which they are downwardly accountable, but
even as to whether they report on downward accountability at all. Chapter Four draws on
the data from the 64 Child Well-Being reports to extend the analysis developed from
coding of the annual reports and accountability reports. Typically only one or two pages
if any (out of, generally, 30 pages or slightly more) at the end of each Child Well-Being
report are dedicated to discussing downward accountability. This content is then
abstracted by World Vision staff and organized into spreadsheets. It is the resulting
datasets, comprising data compiled from the Child Well-Being reports for the years 20162017, that were analyzed during research for this dissertation.

5

Although in most cases a field office, and its corresponding Child Well-Being Report,
corresponds to a country, there are a few exceptions. For example, Albania and Kosovo are
served by a single office which produces a single report. The same is true of Jerusalem/West
Bank/Gaza.
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The sections below describe how the data were analyzed. Instead of being
organized chronologically, which would place the interviews first, the sections are
organized thematically. Thus, the first section addresses the data from the accountability
reports, correspondence with Accountable Now, and Child Well-Being reports; while the
second section focuses on the interview data.
Data Analysis
The Accountability Reports
The accountability reports were coded thematically using the codebook
constructed for use with a subset of the interviews, which will be described below. The
initial number of 137 codes in that book was reduced after thorough readings and rereadings of the interviews (Saldaña, 2016). Codes assigned to phenomena identified by
the interviewees and unlikely to be found in a public document such as the
Accountability Report were excluded from the initial 137, to arrive at 74 codes, which
were deemed to be useful for coding those publications.
The codebook constructed for purposes of the Accountability Reports was thus
limited to codes designating broad concepts such as objectives, results, consultation or
transformation; or the names of organizational learning tools such as LEAP 3 or Design,
Monitoring and Evaluation. Because of the voluminous nature of the data, the 74 codes
thus generated were assigned through a combination of automatic and manual methods.
Correspondence with Accountable Now
Since the publication of its 2009 Accountability Report, World Vision has been in
correspondence with the peer-review mechanism, or accountability club, Accountable
Now (Deloffre, 2010; 2016). Accountable Now reviews its members’ annual
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accountability reports and responds to them with acknowledgements of what it deems to
be good practice; requests for further information; and suggestions on how to improve
accountability practices and reporting. World Vision in turns responds to this feedback.
In this way, the years from 2009 until the present have yielded a trove of additional data
that were used to supplement the sources above.
The correspondence between World Vision and Accountable Now was therefore
also coded using the 74 codes referenced above. As not all of the 74 codes corresponded
to the data, they were reduced to 57. These 57 codes were then used to code the data, and
the results are, as with the results from coding the other data sources, reported in Chapter
Three.
Finally, data were obtained from the annual Child Well-Being reports. These data
consisted of text previously extracted (by World Vision) from the reports, organized into
spreadsheets, and subdivided into four categories corresponding to World Vision’s four
pillars of downward accountability: Consultation, Participation, Information Provision,
and Feedback-and Complaint mechanisms and systems. Thus, there was a cell for each
of the four pillars with respect to each country (of those whose reports contained
downward accountability data).
However, not all of the 64 countries produced data in every one of the four pillars.
Instead, as can be seen in Table 7 below, within Information Provision, only 37 countries,
or 58 percent, were represented; for Consultation, the figures were 36 countries (56
percent); and for Feedback and Complaint, 35 countries (55 percent). Only within
Participation were a substantial majority of countries represented: 47, or 73 percent.
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Table 3-1: Child Well-Being Reports that Contain Downward Accountability Data
Downward
Accountability Pillar
Feedback and Complaint

Number of Country Child
Well-Being Reports
35

Percentage of Country Child
Well-Being Reports
55%

Information Provision

37

58%

Consultation

36

56%

Participation

47

73%

Of the 64 field offices, 58 produced within their Child Well-Being reports data on
any one (or more) of the downward accountability pillars. Thus, six field offices
produced no such data at all (the 58 field offices are listed in Appendix G). This is not so
surprising when we consider that, as described by some of the interviewees in Chapter
Five, the introduction of the Programme Accountability Framework intended to structure
reporting of downward accountability implementation was still unevenly adopted across
the countries, and that downward accountability reporting was frequently experienced as
an additional burden emanating from the federation’s headquarters rather than necessarily
an intrinsic part of relief and development programs.
Text describing downward accountability experiences for each of countries in
each of the four pillars was coded separately by country, in order to enable cross-country
comparisons (the codebooks for these data are found in Appendix G). Coding then
proceeded as follows: the 137 codes derived from the analysis of the interview data
described in Chapter Five were applied to the Child Well-Being data in first-cycle coding
(Saldaña, 2016, p. 55). In the second cycle, new codes were added, principally
evaluative codes. All the codes were then grouped into eight categories, as follows: 1)
children's empowerment; 2) closing the feedback loop and getting results; 3) community
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engagement; 4) evaluative comments; 5) feedback and complaint mechanisms and
systems; 6) humanitarian practice influence; 7) management issues; and 8) metrics and
quantification.
These eight categories were used to organize the data in each of the four pillars.
Feedback and complaint mechanisms and systems, while constituting one of the pillars in
itself, was applied to the data for each of the four pillars, due to its importance for
downward accountability. For the same reason, closing the feedback loop and getting
results was also used.
The Interviews
The 22 semi-structured interviews were divided into three categories: nine
interviews of humanitarian programming staff; 10 interviews of development
programming staff; and three interviews, classed in a third category comprised of outside
experts and staff working in administration, fundraising, or other areas not directly
connected to program and project work. A word frequency count was then conducted of
the two first sets of interviews. Based on the words appearing most frequently, keywords
were selected that were then subsumed into the following themes: effectiveness and
metrics; emancipation or transformation; funding from grants and contracts;
management; organizational learning; and technology. These inductively derived themes
were used to inform the first round of coding.
In this first round of coding, in vivo codes and some descriptive codes were used
(Glesne, 2016; p. 197; Saldaña, 2016, p. 55). These first-cycle methods were selected as
a “method of attuning [oneself] to participant perspectives and actions,” since the
interviewees were almost without exception participants (as distinct from observers) in
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the phenomenon being studied, and their actions constituted the phenomenon itself
(Saldaña, 2016, p. 73).
In addition, process codes were used, as they are both more vivid than descriptive
codes and also help to build a narrative of the process of change being studied – i.e., the
adoption and implementation of downward accountability over time (Saldaña, 2016, p.
78). The 10 interviews of development staff yielded, as noted, 137, to which new codes
were added for a total of 140 codes. The nine interviews of humanitarian staff yielded
166 codes. Each set of codes was then grouped into a set of categories, which overlapped
to a certain extent between the two sets of interviews. For the development staff
interviews, the categories were as follows: 1) culture of compliance; 2) consultation; 3)
funding and resources; 4) humanitarian sector; 5) information provision; 6) management
issues; 7) power; 8) results orientation; 9) safeguarding; and 10) training. For the
interviews with humanitarian staff, the codes were distilled into the following themes: 1)
complaint and feedback mechanisms; 2) complaint and feedback more generally
considered; 3) culture of compliance; 4) consultation; 5) funding and resources; 6)
humanitarian sector; 7) information provision; 8) management issues; 9) organizational
learning; 10) participation; 11) power; 12) results orientation; 13) safeguarding; and, 14)
training. Finally, the themes that emerged from the categories were: culture of
compliance; funding; humanitarian aid; organizational learning; power; and results.
These appear in Table 3-2 – the categories disaggregated by type of interview, as
described above, and the themes in capital letters.
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Table 3-2: Themes and Categories Derived from Interviews
Development Staff Interviews

Humanitarian Staff Interviews

CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE

Complaint and feedback mechanisms

Consultation

Complaint and feedback generally

FUNDING AND RESOURCES

Culture of compliance

HUMANITARIAN SECTOR

Consultation

Information provision

FUNDING AND RESOURCES

Management issues

HUMANITARIAN SECTOR

POWER

Information provision

RESULTS ORIENTATION

Management issues

Safeguarding

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Training

Management issues

Safeguarding

Participation

RESULTS ORIENTATION

POWER
RESULTS ORIENTATION
Training

Quality Assurance
The following methods were employed to help ensure quality: the writing of
analytic memos and the member-checking of transcripts. Four of the interviewees took
the opportunity to return edits for accuracy, which were subsequently taken into account
in finalizing the interview transcripts. An additional eight took the opportunity to respond
that they had no edits to make. The remaining ten did not respond (the opportunity to
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respond had been presented to them as optional in any case). In addition, selected World
Vision staff were invited to read and comment on a draft of the first four chapters of the
dissertation manuscript. The methods described above were used to support the
credibility of the research, which is – very broadly speaking – situated within the
constructivist paradigm (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 24).
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS FROM SECONDARY DATA
Enhanced Attention to Feedback Mechanisms, but at What Cost?
This chapter will summarize findings based on data gathered from three sources:
first, from two series of annual reports published by the agency: its overall annual report
(2000-2017), and its annual accountability report (2010-2017). Secondly, from the 64
annual country reports on Child Well-Being, as summarized in internal datasets. And
thirdly, from correspondence between World Vision and the peer review organization,
Accountable Now. In Chapter Five, these findings will be triangulated with those from
the interview data.
The data were richest with respect to feedback and complaints. It is in this pillar
that the Child Well-Being Report data showed the greatest self-reflection on effectiveness
and on what was and was not being achieved, and why. However, in a perhaps
unexpected development, participation was found to not be necessarily confined to later
stages of programming, i.e., only to implementation, but apparently just as often took
place at the initial, visioning stage (although not at the technical design stage).
Although the greatest volume of data relevant to the research questions were those
from the Child Well-Being reports, a review of findings from the annual reports, the
accountability reports, and the correspondence with Accountable Now will serve to set
the stage for discussion
The Role of Annual Reports in Relation to Nonprofit Accountability
If the public at large is to be considered a stakeholder with respect to nonprofits,
then the annual organizational report becomes a key component with respect to nonprofit
accountability (Lee, 2004, pages 177-179). Since the early part of this century, the
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availability of financial information online via 990 tax forms has arguably put a greater
onus on the organizational – as opposed to financial – annual report to convey substantive
information that can be easily understood by the public: “Organizations seeking to
enhance their public reporting should not view the release or even widespread
dissemination of their 990s as fulfilling the purpose of public reporting. For the lay
public, columns of numbers do not present useful information” (Lee 2004, p. 178).
The purpose of annual reports is, on the face of it, to fulfill a duty, if not to
absolute transparency, then at least – in one memorable formulation – to “translucency,”
or the idea that “nonprofit organizations can partially implement their accountability to
the citizenry through public reporting, albeit at levels lower than expected of government
agencies” (Lee 2004, p. 178). Implied in some descriptions of such annual reports is the
idea that they exist to convey a favorable impression of the organization and thus garner
support for it (Lee 2004, p. 179). Too often, “reports are… focused on the user needs of
powerful funders, influenced by media attention, sometimes misleading or more in line
with an [sic] impression management than providing an overall, unbiased picture of
NGOs’ performance” (Traxler, Greiling, Hebesberger 2018, page not numbered).
In terms of how to approach the content of annual reports, while a high volume of
“organizational annual reports, CEO speeches, corporate press releases, advertisements,
and stand-alone environmental, triple bottom line and sustainability reports” is now
extant, much of the analysis of such reports “is still dominated by rather mechanistic and
somewhat reductionist analyses of texts which often fail to adequately consider issues of
quality, meaning and accountability” (Tregidga, Milne, and Lehman, 2012). The
increasing acceptance of sustainability as an important criterion by which NGOs should
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be evaluated is therefore an important new development, and opens up a potentially
fruitful avenue for exploration.
The use of sustainability reporting by nonprofits has been recommended since
some time ago (Lee, 2004, p. 179-180). In the latter part of the last century, the Coalition
for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) Principles came into effect as a
voluntary mechanism for corporations to monitor their own performance with respect to
environmental protection and sustainability (International Institute for Sustainable
Development; Smith III, J.A., 1993). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) later
emerged from that organization as a stand-alone entity, in a process described as being
shaped by “institutional entrepreneurs” who leveraged their strong networks into the
creation of the GRI (Levy, Brown and DeJong, 2010). Today, the GRI principles are
employed by AccountableNow, the peer review mechanism of which World Vision is a
member, and which will be described below.
Sustainability reporting raises the stakes of the reporting process, since rather than
controlling the narrative exclusively by limiting itself to the production of its own annual
reports, an organization hands over at least partial control to the rating entity. Moreover,
a tension may be found to exist between the desire to envision accounting as a purely
rational activity, steeped in the ethos of the modernizing project, and a postmodern
approach that is willing to consider multiple interpretations of the activities being
reported (Oakes and Oakes, 2012).
The evenness of annual reports varies across organizations and across time.
World Vision’s annual reports, as will be seen below, began to refer explicitly to
accountability only after several years of being published online.
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Accountability Emerging, Part One: The Annual Review
Like most international NGOs and indeed most nonprofit organizations, World
Vision publishes an annual report of its activities, outlining goals, detailing outcomes
attained, and providing financial reporting on the fiscal year recently concluded. This
report, called the Annual Review, is available online starting from the year 2000. Thus
18 such reports are now available (from the year 2000 through the year 2017, inclusive),
allowing a glimpse of how accountability has emerged alongside the results agenda as
salient within the broader development community.
Viewed first simply on the basis of length, the Annual Reviews were of a standard
length – 20 pages – for the first five years of their publication (years 2000 – 2004,
inclusive). Subsequently they began to vary in length and format, peaking at 71 pages
with the 2014 review; with later reports subsiding back to shorter lengths, and the latest
one (from 2017) comprising only eight pages. A word frequency count revealed that the
word “accountability” was not used at all for the first five years of the report’s
publication (despite, of course, being implicit in the report’s existence), but started to
appear in 2005. After that point, accountability was mentioned generally more and more
frequently in successive reports, although increasing in some years while declining in
others.
Because the reports varied in length, Table 4-1 presents the word frequency count
numbers both in absolute numbers and proportionately by page. Figures 4-1 and 4-2
present these same data in graphical form. At first glance, it is apparent that there is a
significant spike, in both absolute terms and also in per-page terms, occurring in the
review for the year 2012. One other observation is that while the mentions decrease
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significantly in absolute terms in the year 2017, they increase proportionately quite
markedly.
The sheer number of mentions of the word “accountability” is, of course, only a
rough proxy for the level of attention paid, and importantly does not distinguish among
upward, downward, and lateral accountability – lateral accountability being
accountability to other stakeholders such as staff, board, and volunteers (Christensen and
Ebrahim, 2006, p. 8). Nevertheless, it serves for the purpose here, which is to highlight
the emergence of accountability, broadly understood, as a topic worth singling out in
World Vision’s external communications. This in turn implies an awareness of the value
placed upon it by its constituents in the public and among donors.
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Table 4-1: Mentions of “Accountability” in World Vision Annual Reviews,
2000 – 2017
Annual Review Year
2000

Mentions of
“Accountability”
0

Number
of pages
20

Mentions
Per page
0

2001

0

20

0.00

2002

0

20

0.00

2003

0

20

0.00

2004

0

20

0.00

2005

3

12

0.25

2006

0

28

0.00

2007

2

8

0.25

2008

0

20

0.00

2009

3

6

0.50

2010

2

6

0.33

2011

1

30

0.03

2012

27

59

0.46

2013

19

15

1.27

2014

18

71

0.25

2015

9

18

0.50

2016

9

25

0.36

2017

8

8

1.00
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Figure 4-1: Mentions of “Accountability” per page, Annual Reviews, 2000-2017
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For comparison, Figure 4-3 demonstrates the number of mentions of
“accountability” in the annual report of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
organization comprising 36 wealthy donor countries, for the years 2000 – 2017. The
DAC was selected as a proxy for donor thinking in order to illuminate parallels between
World Vision and the community of official donors with respect to their views of the
importance of accountability, and the evolution of those views over the first two decades
of the 21st century. As Eyben has observed:
the DAC, as a constituent part of the OECD, seeks to influence how the world
thinks and acts by identifying and finding good practice solutions to problems;
these become standards against which member states’ actions are scrutinized
through peer review (Eyben and Savage, 2013, p. 80).
Figure 4-3 also shows the number of times per page that “accountability” is
mentioned in the annual World Vision reports for the same time span. It is evident from
the chart that the two series of data points track relatively closely for the years 2000 –
2011. After that point they diverge significantly, with World Vision increasing its
attention to accountability markedly starting in 2012, and the DAC doing so in 2015.
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Figure 2-3: Mentions of “Accountability” per page, DAC and WV annual reports
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It perhaps should not be surprising that mentions of accountability in World
Vision’s Annual Review increased significantly starting in 2012. As discussed in
Chapter One, the late 2000s and early 2010s saw an increase in public interest in the
accountability of institutions generally, and nonprofit organizations and NGOs in
particular. This was also the period that saw the emergence of the results agenda that will
be discussed in Chapter Five. Accordingly, in 2009, World Vision began publishing for
the first time, in addition to its Annual Review, an annual report dedicated exclusively to
accountability.
Besides taking place in the broader context of increased calls for accountability
and evidence of effectiveness within the development enterprise generally, the year 2010
was significant for a number of reasons particular to World Vision. Firstly, 2010 was the
year that World Vision adopted its Child Well-Being Indicators. The foreword to the
2010 Accountability Report makes this explicit, and also points the way to an intention to
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contribute, as a leading NGO, to efforts within the development community towards an
evidence-based approach:
During 2010, we endorsed targets related to our child well-being aspirations and
outcomes. In the years ahead, we will measure the impact of our programmes
towards these targets. We intend to play our part in contributing to enhanced
standards across the relief and development sector (World Vision (s), p. 1).
Secondly, by that time World Vision had joined the INGO Accountability Charter
(since 2016 renamed “Accountable Now.”). Joining meant a commitment to the 10
Accountability Commitments listed on page 24, expressed in measurement across a range
of indicators. These indicators addressed the areas of: 1) governance; 2) stakeholder
engagement; and 3) performance. Performance was measured across program
effectiveness, economic resources, environmental and social impacts, labor relations, and
a category termed “product responsibility,” related to “ethical marketing and
communications” (World Vision (s), pages 63-66). Joining meant a commitment on the
part of World Vision to holding itself accountable to its own principles and thus was
itself an example of internal accountability (Ebrahim 2003, p. 194).
As to the DAC, 2010 saw preparations for the High-Level Forum on
Effectiveness that took place the subsequent year in Busan, South Korea. The HighLevel Forum was the fourth in a series of such fora, and represented the culmination of
an intergovernmental process for increased aid effectiveness begun at the OECD in Paris
in 2005. In short, those years represented arguably a high-water mark for the
development effectiveness agenda. But for the DAC, evidently 2015, the target year for
completion of the Millennium Development Goals, was the watershed year for attention
to accountability – at least, for attention to accountability as reflected in its annual report.
As can be seen in Figure 4, in that year mentions of “accountability” spiked (before
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declining in the next year). As to World Vision, mentions of “accountability” remained
high in the years after 2012, although not as high as in that peak year.
The above exercise suggests the influence of mimetic isomorphism on World
Vision’s attention to accountability as reflected in a key external document such as the
annual review. As the DAC, a principal driver of donor thinking and practice, increased
its attention to accountability, so did World Vision (and presumably other major INGOs).
It is always possible that both World Vision and the DAC alike were themselves being
influenced by a third actor, but in either case, the main point holds: the prioritization of
accountability in development aid increased in the second decade of this century.
Accountability Emerging, Part Two: The Accountability Report
At the same time, the foreword to this first Accountability Report also evinced an
awareness of the need to make greater strides in downward accountability:
We pay special attention to our accountability to this community, but the degree
to which children, community members and local partners can set the direction of
programmes, monitor progress and evaluate our work varies. The report
highlights areas in which we intend to improve practices which promote child and
community participation and enhance community feedback and complaint
mechanisms (World Vision, 2011, page 1, emphasis supplied).
Thus, encapsulated within the same document are the twin impulses that this
dissertation maintains have been driving World Vision’s work in (downward)
accountability: the determination to prove effective development outcomes, coupled with
the espoused intention of transferring power to the most vulnerable by instituting, in
particular, practices of gathering and responding to feedback and complaints.
The next section explores the prevalence of attention to those two aspects of
downward accountability within the annual Accountability Reports.
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Transformational Development and Results Agenda in Accountability Reports
The categories that emerged most often across the accountability reports for 2000
– 2017 to explain the ways in which World Vision understands accountability were the
following: transformational development, closely followed by the results agenda, then
organizational learning. The first of these, transformational development, owed its
prominent place almost exclusively to the salience of the concept of advocacy across the
reports. Very often the mention of advocacy was merely descriptive (as when citing the
existence of advocacy campaigns, or explaining that Citizen Voice and Action is a social
accountability program that consists of advocacy). Nonetheless, evaluative comments
regarding the desirability of improving advocacy practice include the following:
Collaboration with NGOs, governments, universities are perceived by staff as
more consistent across [emergency assistance programs]. However more work is
needed in prepositioning partners, and strengthening our level of advocacy and
policy influence should better reflect our investment in those areas.
(Accountability Report 2010).
What is telling, however, is that participation was also particularly salient, and yet
its categorization within transformational development is not as uncomplicated as that of
advocacy. As we have already noted, participation can oftentimes be limited only to
participating in implementing a project that has already been designed by agency staff,
and based on priorities other than those that might have been chosen by the most
vulnerable within the community of project-affected persons. The Accountability
Reports referenced Citizen Voice and Action, World Vision’s social accountability
program, numerous times. These included reflection on CVA’s relationship to other
aspects of World Vision’s work and to the agency’s incorporation of the concept of
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power into its program decisions, albeit within the context of relations with government
service providers rather than with the agency itself.
National offices are also intentionally building social accountability approaches
such as CVA into the programming work, as it may be an effective way of building an
enabling environment, holding power-holders accountable for basic services, and
promoting inclusion of vulnerable groups in policy and decision- making processes.
Recent studies that include CVA also indicate sustainability of child well-being outcomes
because it builds local skills and capacity for collective action that will remain after
World Vision’s contribution to the programmed has ended.
This joint analysis and exploration process is intended to enable WV staff to build
strong relationships with all key stakeholders. In the process staffs develop a good
understanding of the activities, power dynamics and linkages that exist in the
local area. (World Vision (n), p. 14).
Nevertheless, the significant level of attention paid to advocacy is in striking
contrast to the proportion of the budget dedicated to it, which in the 2017 report, at 22
million out of 2.7 billion, constituted 1 percent of the budget (World Vision (o), page 8).
Finally, one extended passage in the 2010 Accountability Report was particularly
intriguing for what it revealed regarding either the organization’s propensity for
remarkable candor, or adroitness at pre-empting public criticism, or perhaps an
understandable combination of both. The passage described a process whereby, in the
context of the humanitarian emergency response in Haiti in the wake of the devastating
2010 earthquake, camp management committees had sprung up more or less
spontaneously. World Vision, in keeping with its approach in other contexts, seems to
have initially allowed or even supported this rather organic development of local
leadership. Unfortunately, the local leaders soon enough were alleged to be perpetuating
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various kinds of abuse, both financial and sexual, of those within the camp. In response,
World Vision brought in a team of experts in humanitarian emergency accountability and
set up a series of corrective actions, with this result:
By the end of 2010, World Vision had embedded specific Humanitarian
Accountability Officers into each of the programs and projects that comprised the
overall earthquake response. [They were] charged with operationalizing standards
for humanitarian response, especially those established by the Humanitarian
Accountability Partnership. (World Vision (p), pages 42 – 43).
The standards were the (by now familiar) four pillars that have been under
discussion throughout this dissertation: information provision, feedback and complaints
mechanisms, consultation, and participation. The discussion of the incident concludes
thus:
Independent evaluation found that World Vision’s efforts to mitigate challenges
to beneficiary processes were implemented across several or all of the specific
individual programs and projects that comprised the overall earthquake response.
In this sense, this can be thought of as a “systemic” approach (as opposed to a
case-by-case approach) by the agency to mitigating challenges. Together, these
systems appear to have significantly mitigated the challenges that arose in the
aftermath of the earthquake. (World Vision (p), page 44).
As for the results agenda, it was, if anything, even more salient. The
accountability report made frequent references to evidence; indicators; results and
outcomes; incentives; efficiency; and benchmarks. The references to these concepts
began with the 2010 report and continued throughout the years. For example, the 2010
report states:
A focus on fostering timely, scaleable local capacity has often brought measurable
results. (Although it was also found that several offices continue to face
challenges of transition from response.) A consistent recommendation for offices
is to enhance disaster risk reduction and community resilience alongside response
capacity (World Vision (s), p. 24))
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This quote illustrates the importance of a results orientation within humanitarian
emergency response, but also shows evidence of the importance of a broader
understanding of disaster relief, extending it to include long-term recovery as well as the
capacity to withstand disasters. Processes of recovery and reconstruction in turn place
emergency response along a continuum that extends to include development work at the
other end.
Before moving on to an extended discussion of findings from the Child WellBeing reports, it is necessary to delve into the tools that World Vision has devised for
measuring performance and diffusing organizational learning. The tracking of downward
accountability practices is carried out through tools embedded within the tools of
performance measurement and of the diffusion of organizational learning, and obeys the
same logic of fidelity to metrics. Performance measurement is a part of the larger
phenomenon called the evidence-based revolution, while organizational learning, as it
appears to be practiced at World Vision, constitutes a practice that ensures that learning
from evidence helps the agency to improve its performance.
What are the Results? The Evidence-Based Revolution
The researcher who seeks to understand how World Vision came to undertake
downward accountability, and the reasons why, soon enough encounters a paradox. This
paradox consists of the coexistence of the Transformational Development approach with
the effectiveness imperative, both described in the preceding chapter. Furthermore, the
paradox extends beyond one organization to affect the entire INGO sector, as exemplified
in the following quote:
The number of agencies, particularly international NGOs, using rights language
has continued to increase, but the contradiction between rights-based approaches
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and their political and process approach to intangible goals such as empowerment
and the increasing popularity of results-based management has become very
apparent. It is harder to manage support for transformation approaches when
one is required to report tangible, easy-to-measure changes… (Eyben, Guijt,
Roche and Shutt, eds., 2015, p. 9, emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, an exploration of the reasons for this paradox leads us to consider
the very different ways of knowing at the heart of the contradiction. Put simply, those
development thinkers and practitioners who espouse an approach that seeks to transform
relationships – an approach, emancipatory at its core, that seeks human empowerment –
also tend to embrace a conception of knowledge that regards explanations as contingent.
This epistemology takes into account the impact that power differentials have on which
groups’ knowledge is considered valid and therefore used to inform future practice. In
contrast, “ ‘[e]vidence’ and ‘results’ have a common intellectual heritage of
‘methodological individualism’ that economics shares with medicine; in this they differ
from the holistic social sciences, which are concerned with relations between people and
the culture and history that shape them.” (Eyben, Guijt, Roche and Shutt, eds., 2015, p.
25).
In light of the tension between these two epistemological approaches, this
dissertation is, in part, inspired by the critical realist approach as it seeks to explain the
paradox identified above: an organization that has endorsed at its highest level a
commitment to an emancipatory agenda (Transformational Development) simultaneously
embraces the evidence-based revolution by developing the indicators and objectives, and
tools and systems to measure them, that are so characteristic of the positivist approach
undergirding the evidence-based turn (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 139). Critical
realism attempts to bridge the divide between post-positivism and constructivism by
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positing that an external reality exists and is knowable. However, the ways of
apprehending this reality are themselves shaped by social relationships, as “[s]cience or
the production of any kind of knowledge is a social practice” (Easton, 2010, p. 120).
Tools for Performance Measurement
Child Well-Being: From Targets to Objectives, From Evidence to Reporting
In approximately 2007, World Vision established an Office of Global Knowledge
Management, tasked with “bring[ing] together people, processes and technology to
enable World Vision to change data into information, information into knowledge, and
knowledge into learning” (World Vision Annual Review (t), p. 110). This was prompted
perhaps in part by the reflection that in 61 years of operating, the organization had
accumulated 1,800 databases and tens of thousands of documents – most of them
inaccessible to the organization as a whole, and therefore unusable as a source of
knowledge and capabilities for improving effectiveness. (World Vision (t) , p. 110).
By 2012, the organization had set itself the goal that by 2014 each Regional
Office would be regularly reporting on its contributions to Child Well-Being Targets
(World Vision, p. 111). By 2014, far beyond only the Regional Offices, enough National
Offices had begun producing Child Well-Being Reports that it was possible for World
Vision to begin compiling them into one global report which it then began to publish
annually.
In taking up the use of Child Well-Being Targets, World Vision was reflecting the
movement within the aid community toward greater aid effectiveness and more “effective
development cooperation,” articulated at high-level fora of the OECD, held in Rome in
2003, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011, and later in Nairobi in 2016,
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through the Global Partnership for Effective Cooperation (OECD/DAC). The Global
Partnership, a joint platform of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and
the OECD, had been formed after the arrival of the 2015 target for meeting the
Millennium Development Goals gave way to the Sustainable Development Goals and a
new target date of 2030 (UNDP).
However, World Vision eventually concluded that targets themselves were too
limiting, and ought to give way to objectives and, even more, to aspirations: “There was a
long conversation in the mid-2000s about how World Vision should articulate its focus,
and are we a rights-based organization, or are we looking to aspire to something more
than that. So, not just fulfill children’s rights, but actually pushing more toward a vision
or a dream, of child well-being in fullness” (World Vision senior development staffer). A
focus on objectives, however, was still important as it would clarify whether it was only
output targets that were being achieved, or the results which those outputs were intended
to support: “I was in some of the meetings where they said, ‘Well, what should we aim
for? Should it be the number of children in school, or going beyond that, say, number of
children able to read? Because there’s no point putting them in school if the school is so
bad that they can’t read’” (World Vision senior development staffer).
The transition from Child Well-Being Targets to Child Well-Being Objectives
came within the context of a new strategic plan at World Vision, focusing on goals to be
achieved by 2030. The Targets are summarized in Table 1, and the Objectives, which are
more general than the Targets, are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 4-2: Child Well-Being Targets

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Target 1: Children report an increased level of well-being (12–18 years)
Target 2: Increase in children protected from infection and disease (0–5 years)
Target 3: Increase in children who are well nourished (0–5 years)
Target 4: Increase in children who can read (by age 11 or end of primary schooling)
Source: World Vision. Child Well-Being Reports, https://www.wvi.org/child-wellbeing-reports

Starting in 2010, World Vision began applying the targets to the work of its 65
field offices (i.e., offices in countries where programming takes place, as distinct from
offices, typically located in middle- or high-income countries, that are dedicated to
fundraising). Subsequently, World Vision required each one of those offices to report on
its progress toward Child Well-Being Objectives (World Vision (a)). The findings are
now summarized annually in one global report, first published in 2014, followed by
reports in 2015 and (most recently), 2016-2017 (World Vision (a)). Since 2017, a highly
detailed Child Well-Being Report Template outlines how each office is to complete the
report (World Vision accountability specialist; World Vision (b)).
Not all of the 65 national offices contribute to all of the eight Child Well-Being
Objectives. Objectives 5, 6 and 7, pertaining to nutrition, health care, and education, are
targeted by 75 percent, 78 percent, and 83 percent of national offices, respectively (World
Vision (a), p. 5). However, all of the eight Child Well-Being Outcomes are supported to
a greater or lesser extent by national offices.
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Table 4-3: Child Well-Being Objectives

1. Children report an increased awareness of God’s love (Target 1)
2. Increase in children who have positive and peaceful relationships in their families
and communities (Target 1)
3. Increase in girls and boys protected from violence (Target 1)
4. Children ages 12-18 report an increased level of well-being (Target 1)
5. Increase in children who are well-nourished (Target 2)
6. Increase in children protected from infection and disease (ages 0-5) (Target 3)
7. Increase in primary school children who can read (Target 4)
8. Increase in adolescents’ education and life skills (Target 1 & 4)

Source: World Vision. Child Well-Being Summary Report 2016-2017

Assessing Progress: The Program Accountability Framework
World Vision has also developed a tool to assess progress toward the effective
implementation of downward accountability, called the Program Effectiveness SelfReview Tool (PE-SRT), and developed within the past five or so years (World Vision
accountability specialist). The PE-SRT, applied to the national Child Well-Being reports
described above, generates a score for how well a country is performing with respect to
downward (i.e., program) accountability, by means of a metric called the Program
Accountability Framework, or PAF (World Vision accountability specialist). Applied to
a host of performance criteria, the PAF is used to measure whether a program is
emerging, that is, just beginning to meet the given criterion; growing, i.e., making good
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progress in meeting the criterion; or maturing, or consistently meeting the criterion
(World Vision (c) ). With respect to downward accountability – which is only one of the
many criteria evaluated by the PE-SERT – the PE-SRT measures performance in each of
four pillars: consultation; participation; information provision; and complaint and
feedback mechanisms and systems. World Vision, from staff experience and from an
external review conducted of its Program Accountability Framework, concluded that of
those four areas, two were strongest: consultation and participation – that is, the
practices of gathering input and opinion from project-affected persons; and of involving
them in project implementation, respectively. In contrast, World Vision further
concluded that with respect to information provision (i.e., the provision of information
not only about programs and projects but also about where and how to provide feedback
and/or register complaints about them); and in particular, those feedback and complaint
mechanisms, themselves, its projects and programs performed somewhat more weakly
(World Vision Accountability Report 2016). World Vision has compiled internal data by
collecting the Child Well-Being Objective reports from 64 of its field offices and
analyzing them for reference to the performance of each country office within each of
those four pillars of program accountability. While not all 64 Child Well-Being reports
are published, some are, and often constitute a point of pride for the national offices that
produce them (World Vision accountability and M&E specialist). Of the 64, a selected
12 full reports were available for inspection. These were the reports for programs in the
following twelve countries or areas: Afghanistan; Albania and Kosovo; Jordan;
Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza; Lebanon; Nepal; Romania; South Sudan; South Caucasus;
Uganda; Vietnam; and Zimbabwe. Data summarizing the downward accountability
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practices of 58 out of the 64 were made available, and a list of those countries is found in
Appendix C.
Guidelines for Planning: The Development Programming Approach
Like many INGOs, World Vision has developed a system of tools, guidelines, and
approaches for planning, learning, accountability, and measurement. They comprise
different types of constructs, but function in such a way that they can be viewed as parts
of a larger system, nested one within the other. Figure 4-5 on page 99 shows how these
different types of instruments and subsystems fit together. They culminate in the
Programme Accountability Framework, which is used for reporting progress in
downward accountability. What is interesting about these various elements is the way in
which they reflect the two influences shaping World Vision that have been discussed
earlier: they may be termed the technocratic and the transformational – to use a type of
shorthand.
To begin with, World Vision has developed what it calls the Development
Programme Approach, or DPA (formerly, the Integrated Programming Model) (World
Vision (h), p. 6). It comprises: i) principles; ii) approaches; and iii) aspirations and
outcomes, all of which are intended to promote the agency’s ultimate goal: “sustained
well-being of children within families and communities, especially the most vulnerable”
(World Vision (h), p. 5). These are set out in a 34-page handbook to be used in all aspects
of its programming. Although the name, Development Programme Approach, implies
that the approach refers only to development work, in fact the handbook covers disaster
management and advocacy as well as development. Reflecting its nature as a somewhat
technocratic document, the DPA contains detailed instructions on Child Well-Being
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Indicators, Aspirations and Outcomes; as well as on evidence-based practices. At the
same time, for example, it sets out World Vision’s Critical Path, a series of eight
questions to be asked over the course of program design and implementation and to be
used in working with local partners, which emphasizes the relational nature of the work
to be undertaken. This emphasis on relationships constitutes an important element of the
Transformational Development approach, as discussed earlier.
In addition, and again like many INGOs, World Vision has undertaken to expand
monitoring and evaluation into monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning, or
MEAL. Its particular framework for this, however, is termed LEAP, i.e., Learning
through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning. (The agency recently transitioned
from an earlier iteration of this framework to its third and current one, and so the data
often refer to LEAP 3, as well as to what has turned out to be an onerous process of
adjusting to it: “the LEAP 3 transition”).
The DPA shares an affinity not only with Transformational Development, but
also with elements of Doing Development Differently. For example, the Critical Path (see
Appendix F), is meant to be “iterative rather than linear” – thus reflecting a key principle
of DDD (World Vision (h), p. 25). With respect to program effectiveness, the DPA
handbook sets out thirteen standards (World Vision (h), p. 8). These standards in turn
serve as the inspiration for nine questions posed by the Program Effectiveness SelfReview Tool, which is used for calculating levels of downward accountability attained by
a program, as reported in the Program Accountability Framework. Again, Figure 4-5
illustrates the ways in which these documents and tools are intended to work together.
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Figure 4-4: Nested Systems of Tools for Planning, Learning, and Accountability
Measurement

Development Programming
Approach (DPA)

LEAP

Critical Path

Thirteen Standards

PE-SRT

PAF

Key:
LEAP = Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning
PE-SRT = Performance Evaluation Self-Review Tool
PAF = Program Accountability Framework
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The Journey to Downward Accountability Assessment
Despite the existence of a plethora of planning documents, tools, handbooks, and
processes, World Vision’s journey toward assessing its attainment of downward
accountability effectiveness has been circuitous. Between 2014 and 2016, the United
Kingdom’s foreign assistance agency, the Department for International Development
(DFID) commissioned a pilot study of downward accountability, led by World Vision
UK and carried out by seven NGOs, located in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, India, Tanzania,
Somaliland (an autonomous region of Somalia), India, and Pakistan. The pilot focused
specifically on complaint and feedback mechanisms, identified as the area facing the
greatest challenges, and concluded, among other things, that the need for
contextualization was both extremely important for judging the success of the pilot, and
also made it difficult to generalize observations. It is context that determines the type of
feedback mechanisms preferred by project-affected persons (e.g., not surprisingly, areas
of low literacy preferred focus-group discussions and other face-to-face interaction,
including phone calls).
In addition, it is important to “close the feedback loop,” by responding to
feedback and complaints, whether to resolve the issue presented, or at minimum, to
acknowledge that the feedback or complaint was received and explain why a further
response is not possible or warranted. The pilot study found that the feedback loop was
frequently closed at low levels in the staffing hierarchy, rather than having complaints
referred up the chain. It was not known whether this was due to complaints being
responded to at the lower levels, or to staff reluctance to refer them upward.
Furthermore, in contrast to traditional monitoring and evaluation (M&E), the beneficiary
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feedback mechanisms considered in the pilot study made possible “real-time adaptation,”
i.e., timely course corrections based on the feedback, for example in the areas of staff
accountability (INTRAC, n.d., pp. 74-81).
The Child Well-Being Reports: Wide Variety in Effectiveness Across
Four Accountability Pillars
Perhaps the most striking finding is that by far the richest results were found, as
noted earlier, in the data on feedback and complaints. One simple indicator of this is
immediately apparent in Table 8, which sets out the number of codes and number of
documents coded in each category and shows that feedback and complaints registered
118 codes, while the number of codes for the other three pillars ranged between 53 and
63.

Table 4-4: Codes Used in Four Pillars of Accountability6
Four Pillars
Participation
Consultation
Information
Provision
Feedback and
Complaint

Number of Child
Well-Being Reports
46
35
37

Number of Codes

Codes per
document

63
58
53

1.37
1.66
1.43

35

118

3.37

In contrast, 46 Child Well-Being reports (recall that the downward accountability
data had been extracted from these reports) contained data on progress (or lack thereof) in
the area of Participation, while only 35 – 37 reported on their performance in the other

6

Recall that the number of documents for each pillar varies, because not all Child Well-Being
reports contained information for each of the pillars.
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three pillars. This may point to participation’s longevity as a programming goal, as will
be remarked on in Chapter Five; or to the wide range of activities that are counted as
participation, while performance in the other three categories is more difficult to attain.
To ascertain whether this is so, and to glean information about the nature of country
office attainment in all four pillars, the next section offers a more in-depth analysis of the
data, pillar by pillar.
Feedback and Complaints: Rich Data, Ample Self-Reflection on Effectiveness
The data on the Feedback and Complaints pillar yielded the richest results for
various reasons. First of all, it yielded a high volume of evaluative comments, that is,
observations on whether feedback and complaints were being effectively received and
acted upon. While it may seem obvious that data on all four pillars would be expected to
consist of such evaluative comments, in fact the data from the other pillars tended more
often to be descriptive rather than evaluative. This may owe something to the fact that
while feedback and complaints comprise a relatively new practice, consultation and
participation, in contrast, are practices of long standing and there is by now a wide
consensus on their desirability (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Therefore, it may be that
evaluative comments are not thought to be needed, or not needed as much as they are for
feedback and complaints. 7
Moreover, among the evaluative comments, very frequently observations were
found regarding plans to improve performance in the coming year, rather than reporting
on performance in the year just concluded. This was true in all four pillars, not just
Feedback and Complaints. One rather representative example (from Feedback and

7

I am indebted to Mieke Berghmans for this observation.
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Complaints) is as follows: “[This National Office] plans to set up complaint and
feedback boxes or hotlines in each [Area Programme] with clear response loops to ensure
confidentiality and prompt response” (emphasis supplied). Or again, “The next action
plan is to design feedback mechanism[s] integrated into [Area Programme] planning
according to its context” (emphasis supplied).
Some comments reporting on prospective changes, however, were more detailed
and set out specific plans for implementing changes that could help improve
performance, for example:
The greatest limitation in full application of [the Programme Accountability
Framework] is lack of mechanism[s] that enable regular community feedback.
Therefore, in [Fiscal Year 2017 this National Office] developed [the] Community
Feedback and Response System (CFRS) in order to strengthen accountability to
communities by providing a channel for children, community members and
partners to easily report Child Protection incidents, raise questions, suggestions
and concerns about [its] activities, outlining a process for action to be taken in
response. The application of this system will start in [Fiscal Year 2018].
There was considerable candor about areas where effectiveness in handling
feedback and complaints was lacking, for example: “[This National Office] … needs to
explore ways to enhance accountability by establishing community feedback mechanisms
(CFMs) to ensure community complaints are systematically collected, analyzed, feedback
provided, and action taken as this is currently not strong enough.” The degree of
sophistication regarding how to go about making such improvements varied across
countries. A minority – but a significant minority nonetheless – used the recommended
three-level rating system (Emerging, Growing and Maturing) and furthermore, quantified
the proportion of programs that attained each level, as in the following excerpt: “This has
been one of the standards that has [experienced] the least progress in recent years, only
14% of the programs have advanced to Level 2 and have not been able to reach Level 3.”
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Often, as in the first example cited above, it was the lack of feedback and
complaints mechanisms themselves that were pointed out as the reason for lack of
effectiveness: “Presence of functional community feedback mechanisms… were among
the lowest rated at 39%...” Where positive results were reported, there was an explicit
description of what is necessary in order to achieve effectiveness, as in the comment
below:
All 18 [Area Programmes] applied community feedback and response
mechanism[s]. Jointly with the communities [World Vision] defined and enforced
a context sensitive mechanism for feedback and complaints that is accessible, safe
and effective. It includes having a procedure in place for writing an e-mail, calling
or visiting the office in person for complaints, suggestions and recommendations,
including on staff behavior misconduct towards children.
A report from another country was even more detailed, and reflected that both
face-to-face and anonymous methods were used for delivering feedback and complaints:
[This National Office] deploys a variety of feedback collection approaches
including focus group discussions, key informant interviews, post distribution
monitoring, complaint and help desks, face to face forums and hotlines. All of
these approaches have helped to improve beneficiary participation and feedback
collection has improved to help inform more responsive, effective, efficient and
relevant interventions across the relief, recovery and development spectrum.
As may be surmised from the reference to “the relief, recovery and development
spectrum,” this particular program was located in what is known as a fragile country
context, indicating that, as will be discussed at length in Chapter Five, the presence of
humanitarian emergency response programming was likely responsible for the
implementation of effective feedback and complaint mechanisms and systems.
Several of the above examples point to another important characteristic of the
Feedback and Complaints data: the degree to which they incorporated quantitative data
supporting their conclusions about effectiveness or lack thereof; and the degree to which
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they reflected the use of organizational learning tools such as the Programme
Accountability Framework, or referred to important organization-wide processes such as
the transition to LEAP 3. One rather notable example of this is found in a “fragile
context,” where a humanitarian emergency response is being implemented:
As a result of this, 48 projects in [Fiscal Year 2017] (28 in the North & 20 in the
South) have complaints and feedback mechanisms which captured a total of 127
… actionable complaints (59% came through hotline, 22% through staff, 8%
through community help desks, 6% suggestion boxes), of which on average 77%
… were responded to on time.
These numerical data were further disaggregated by regions within the country.
Although this country’s report does not indicate whether the responses to the feedback
and complaints were found to be satisfactory by the complainants, that there are data on
timely responses at all is in itself remarkable. Where country reports concluded that
implementation of feedback and complaint mechanisms had been ineffective or
nonexistent, they gave various reasons, such as the lack of awareness of the Program
Accountability Framework; lack of application of the PAF where awareness exists; lack
of feedback and complaint mechanisms; and lack of collection of feedback and
complaints even where mechanisms do exist. This last was due to lack of
systematization, as in the below example:
Collecting feedback or complaints from the community is the area where
[National Office] staff identified the greatest need for improvement. This is
because we do not yet have a clearly established system, so any issues which arise
are dealt with as is deemed appropriate by the ADP manager and team. Stronger
support and guidelines for this will need to be developed within [the National
Office] (emphasis supplied).
The lack of systematization as a possible reason is left implicit in the following
example, which like many others points to prospective rather than actual improvement
(but also has a specific plan to achieve it): “[This National Office] developed a
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Community Feedback and Complaint Handling Policy and Procedures Manual. In [Fiscal
Year 2018], this will be applied and emphasized during Annual Community Review and
Planning process.
Most interesting of all were the findings categorized under “closing the feedback
loop, attaining results,” referring to the practice of responding to feedback, either by
incorporating the requested changes or at least explaining why further action could not be
taken. Several of the National Offices that reported progress in implementing feedback
and complaints mechanisms and systems referred explicitly to the closing of the feedback
loop, which is the final litmus test of whether the organization is indeed being held
accountable to the program-affected people whom it aspires to serve. Data from one
country report noted:
Claims and complaint[s] are responded [to] immediately and according to the
topics in question. When necessary, the person lodging the complaint is
approached directly. Some programs have designed communication pieces to
[help] children and their families express their opinion[s] about the processes
developed in their community.
Another also quantified the feedback received, at least in general terms, and was
able to address at least the binary question of whether complaints and feedback received a
response, even if not to indicate how many responses were deemed satisfactory by the
complainants: “As an illustration, the [Area Programme] received more than 156
feedback and comments from the communities and responded to all of them in 2017.”
Another country report was more precise: “More than 84% of the feedbacks received a
timely response. The remaining 16% required follow- ups.” This was from a country
which had recently experienced a disaster and where a humanitarian emergency response
had therefore been implemented.
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One country report, also from a fragile country context, stated, “Community
feedback and complaints received were quickly acted on and also used to inform program
adjustments where feasible.” Another country report, interestingly, quoted from
community members who both reflected the (problematic) tendency to use feedback
channels to express gratitude, yet simultaneously pointed to the practice of the
organization’s responding to their complaints: “We thank World Vision since they ask
us what we feel about what they do with us and when we complain, they hear us and give
us feedback.”
Finally, one country program reported that, “[c]hildren’s complaints helped
[Name] primary school in [Name] Area Programme to get new roofs and storage tanks” –
an impressive account of success not only in responding to complaints and feedback, but
also of including children in decision-making, a stated World Vision goal.
It must, however, be borne in mind that examples such as the ones above still
constituted the minority. The majority reported only prospective improvements, and/or
flatly reported a lack of feedback and complaints mechanisms and systems.
Nevertheless, the apparent connection between effectiveness in feedback and complaints
implementation, and the application of organizational learning tools as well as the
presence of humanitarian emergency response, is worth noting as it suggests that
diffusion of such tools leads to effectiveness.
Information Provision: More Information Provided about Programs than about
How to Give Feedback and Lodge Complaints
With respect to the Information Provision pillar, the country report data were not
as rich, nor did they evidence the same degree of self-awareness as was the case with
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Feedback and Complaints. Nevertheless, there were comparatively plentiful comments
regarding the provision of information; the inclusion of the most vulnerable, especially
children; and the prevalence of consultation. In addition, the use of organizational
learning tools was relatively pronounced, with numerous national offices reporting the
use of the Programme Accountability Framework, as well as quantifying their
information provision practices.
The chief trend, however, was the reporting on information provision without
specifying whether the information provided was on projects and programs generally, or
on how to register feedback and complaints specifically. This is not necessarily
inconsistent with the definition of information provision found in World Vision’s
accountability webpage, which states in part, that accountability includes “the
commitment of an organization to… provide information, listen and empower its diverse
stakeholders to actively participate and hold to account.” (World Vision (r)). That
definition assumes, not unreasonably, that an important first step to being able to hold the
organization accountable consists in knowing what programs and projects are planned to
begin with, what they hope to achieve, and what beneficiaries can expect from them. The
following excerpt illustrates this approach and also encapsulates a number of important
priorities, such as the diversity of stakeholders who are to be kept apprised; the
importance of traditional leaders; the role of partners (local NGOs) in validating data; and
the importance of inclusion of the most vulnerable:
[The National Office] reports to communities and donors through various
mechanisms that are put in place: sharing of information through program reports,
meeting with partners on the validation of program data, consultation with
administrative political authorities, consultation with religious leaders and other
opinion leaders, consultation with children and women’s groupings.
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However, access to information about what services or goods the organization has
committed to delivering is only one component of the type of information that
beneficiaries need in order to hold the organization accountable. Therefore, information
about how to give feedback and lodge complaints – and, ideally, what types of responses
to expect and in what timeframe – is at least a central part of the information provision
pillar and needs to be documented as thoroughly. As it happens, some of the Child WellBeing reports did make specific mention of the role of information provision in
facilitating feedback and complaints. The following quote details the various components
of programming of which beneficiaries need to be made aware:
Providing Information: Since 2013, [this National Office] has piloted
accountability in fragile context. Towards that end, we ensure that start-up
workshops are conducted at the inception of every project to: (i) keep all the
stakeholders aware of the project activities, implementation requirements, the
resources available; and (ii) solicit commitments of each stakeholder to the
implementation, project duration, target locations, beneficiary selection criteria,
key activities as well as beneficiary feedback and complaints mechanisms
(emphasis supplied).
This same country office reported:
[D]uring the distribution process, it is standard practice that at every distribution
(food, non-food items and vouchers) we give a pre-distribution address on the
entitlements and equally display the ration sizes/entitlements (ration boards,
posters, and banners) at the distribution sites for beneficiar[ies] to know what they
are supposed to receive.
Again, the nature of humanitarian emergency response, and the role of
humanitarian assistance in delivering detailed feedback and complaint mechanisms and
systems are here clearly evident.
Participation: Not Confined to Later Stages of Programming
Analysis of the participation data revealed that, as with the previous two pillars,
future plans for changes were more often discussed than current efforts. Additionally, the
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use of metrics and organizational learning tools was especially salient. Contrary to what
had been expected, it appeared that participation was not necessarily limited to
implementing projects and programs previously designed by World Vision. Descriptions
of that type of participation were no more frequent than descriptions of participation
more broadly understood as including helping to shape programming from its earliest
stages. For example, one country program – in a fragile context – reported: “At the
[Area Program] level, plans are developed on the basis of community shared vision and
[Child Well-Being] priorities with shared responsibilities in which [National Office] is
one of the local partners.” The following quote likewise illustrates the role of
humanitarian emergency response in a fragile context; in this case, it is a food assistance
program that provides the context for participatory processes at all stages:
[This National Office’s] projects involved beneficiaries in activity planning,
implementation, monitoring. A total of 1,326 beneficiaries are part of food
assistance project management committee practice that has been replicated in all
other programming across other sectors. In addition, use of participatory targeting
models that involved community members, partners, minority organizations,
government was critical in improving quality of targeting the most vulnerable
households and children…
However, there are instances where the limited nature of community participation
is tacitly acknowledged, as in the example below:
Community leaders, mothers, faith actors… often participate in activities as
active implementers, mobilizers or volunteers… [This National Office] plans to
organize quarterly meetings … to jointly monitor implementation progress in
order to further increase ownership and make participatory adjustments to the
plans as well as boost participation levels (emphasis supplied).
Consultation: The Role of Community Meetings is Key
Within the Consultation pillar, the most commonly reported experience was that
of community meetings – whether monthly, quarterly, or annual – used to garner
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stakeholder input that was subsequently used to shape programming. The following
example is perhaps fairly typical:
During the design of [technical programs] and contextualization of [Area
Program] plans, project stakeholders at local community level and national level
were consulted using [Development Programme Approach] approach to identity
and discuss community needs, the most vulnerable and the programme partners.
[Ghana]
The Annual Community Review, a principal if not the principal vehicle used
across the World Vision federation to solicit community input, was sometimes explicitly
referenced but just as often not. More often, only “community meetings” in general were
cited as an important consultation tool.
Furthermore, in the consultation data the use of organizational learning tools such
as the Programme Accountability Framework (PAF) and the third iteration of Learning
through Evaluation for Accountability and Planning (LEAP 3) was very salient. The
following excerpt illustrates this well:
For consulting with communities or adapting [technical programs] to the local
context, all of 25 [Area Programs] that will enter LEAP 3 in [Fiscal Year 2018]
have [technical program logframes] and relevant outcomes based on assessment
of community needs relevant to child well-being priorities. However, as shown in
Figure 5.2, 44% of APs still rated themselves as emerging in this criterion.
Even more important than showing awareness of the LEAP 3 transition was the
use of the three levels in the PAF– emerging, growing, and maturing – to assess the level
of quality of the consultation that was taking place. The use of that framework was
evidenced here:
At least 11 out of 28 ADPs rated themselves at level 1 that communities are
consulted on project activities through community meetings, program annual and
semiannual reviews. 5 ADPs were rated at level 2 that communities have regular
consults through [focus group discussion], reviews on program outcomes,
working committees of project model/approaches are involved in program/project
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implementation. 8 ADP rated at level 3 that they have regular consultation and
share outcomes with communities and beneficiaries (emphasis supplied).
Indeed, the use of organizational tools and of metrics and quantification used in
reporting consultation effectiveness occurred almost as frequently as did the descriptions
of consultation processes via community meetings. However, as the above example
indicates, quality of consultation varied. The annual and semiannual community review
meetings represent one end of the spectrum, that which may be considered the least
consultative. Nevertheless, the finding that consultation, even if of varying quality, was
taking place in numerous countries is consistent with the conclusion in World Vision’s
2016 Accountability Report that there were more examples of good practice in the areas
of consultation and participation than in the areas of information provision and feedback
and complaints.
Reporting to a Peer Review Mechanism: Accountable Now and
the Global Reporting Initiative
As has been noted before, World Vision is a member of Accountable Now, an
organization comprised of peer NGOs and tasked with what it terms “sustainability
reporting,” i.e., reporting on a range of NGO policies and practices. Since 2009, World
Vision has, like other members, provided the Independent Review Panel (IRP) of
Accountable Now with an annual accountability report. The IRP subsequently issues a
series of comments evaluating the content of that year’s report. The correspondence
between both bodies – World Vision’s senior accountability leadership and the members
of the IRP – is posted on the World Vision website as well as on the Accountable Now
website. This correspondence therefore constitutes a rich vein of data reflecting World
Vision accountability practices and how they have evolved over time. Moreover, World
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Vision’s 2016 Accountability Report even includes an appendix outlining how that report
aligns with Accountable Now’s reporting requirements (2016 Accountability Report,
page 33).
Accountable Now uses for its sustainability reporting standards the sustainability
reporting framework developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the body that
produces “principles and performance indicators” used by organizations of all types,
including corporations and governments (Accountable Now (b); Global Reporting
Initiative).
These GRI guidelines are arguably “the most widely accepted standard,” with
over 90 percent of the G250, the largest companies in the world, publishing a
sustainability report, and nearly 75 percent of those companies using the GRI guidelines
to do so (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010, page not numbered); and the GRI itself is
“commonly regarded as the world’s leading voluntary scheme for corporate non-financial
reporting” (Traxler, Greiling, and Hebesberger, 2018, page not numbered).
Notwithstanding, some analysts hold that the GRI ultimately “fails to empower”
(Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010, page 1); that its growth has plateaued in recent years
because of the inherent tensions in its institutional model, which rests on using
multistakeholder participation for developing its guidelines (Brown, DeJong and
Lessidrenska, undated); and that, importantly, it has failed to fulfill its early promise
because “its trajectory reflects the power relations among members of the field, their
strategic choices and compromises, their ability to mobilize alliances and resources, and
constraints imposed by the broader institutions of financial and capital markets” (Levy,
Szejnwald, and DeJong, 2010).
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Nevertheless, Accountable Now has chosen to use GRI indicators for its
members’ reporting. In 2008, Accountable Now commissioned GRI to develop reporting
guidelines specific to the NGO sector; and in 2010, GRI finalized the NGO Sector
Supplement, which Accountable Now members are required to use for their reporting.
The supplement is divided into “profile disclosures,” and “performance indicators.” The
profile disclosures are further subdivided into four categories, and consist of standards
regarding the organization’s strategic commitment to accountability; data about its
organizational profile; a description of the report’s parameters; and details regarding the
organization’s governance structure and key stakeholders. The performance indicators
cover the following areas: program effectiveness; financial management; environmental
management; human resource management; management of impacts on the wider
society; and ethical fundraising and communication. (Accountable Now (b)).
Finally, program effectiveness is subdivided into six sets of indicators. All six are
found in Appendix H. The first three of the six, which will receive here particular
attention, are as follows:
NGO1 – Involvement of affected stakeholder groups to inform the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs… NGO2 –
Mechanisms for stakeholder feedback and complaints to programmes and policies
and in response to policy breaches… NGO3 – System for programme monitoring,
evaluation and learning. (Accountable Now, p. 6)
NGO2, focusing on feedback and complaint mechanisms, will form the principal
focus of the following analysis of correspondence between World Vision and the
Independent Review Panel of Accountable Now. However, NGO1 – which can be seen
to correspond more or less closely to both the consultation and participation pillars – will
also be included, as will NGO3, due to the importance of monitoring, evaluation and
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learning in World Vision’s work. NGO4 refers to gender and diversity, and while these
themes do not constitute one of the four downward accountability pillars, they will also
be considered, as will the two remaining program effectiveness performance indicators
from the NGO Supplement, NGO5 (advocacy positions and awareness campaigns), and
NGO6 (coordination with other actors).
Correspondence between the Independent Review Panel and World Vision
The correspondence between Accountable Now’s Independent Review Panel and
World Vision was coded both inductively and deductively: the text was examined
closely, and new codes generated as appropriate; at the same time, codes used for
analysis of the data from the Child Well-Being reports, as described in Chapter Five,
were also used. In this way, 57 codes were generated. They were then grouped into the
eight categories used for the analysis of the data from the Child Well-Being reports, with
a few adjustments. From that original list of eight, the categories, “evaluative codes” and
“closing the feedback loop and getting results” were omitted, and two new ones added,
“transformational development,” and “safeguarding” and “consultation. Only the text
focusing on the six performance indicators – NGO1 through NGO6 – was considered.
Of the eight coding categories, the following yielded the richest data: metrics,
effectiveness and quantification; management issues; and transformational development.
Within management issues, the concept of stakeholders recurred as an extremely salient
one. It was categorized as a management issue because very often it was discussed in the
context of governance; it was also often frequently clear from the context that
“stakeholders” referred not only to program-affected persons and direct beneficiaries, but
stakeholders of all types, such as individual supporters, partner organizations, donors, and
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the like. Standardization was also considered important, and some of the most interesting
findings came, perhaps not surprisingly, from the most recent exchanges. For example,
the IRP noted that monitoring, evaluation and learning at World Vision were being
guided by the LEAP framework, “of which the latest iteration introduces more nationallevel standardisation into programming” (Feedback from IRP on 2016 Accountability
Report). Similarly, with regard to metrics and effectiveness, the panel paid significant
attention to evidence and outcomes. For example, it noted:
World Vision invests in their [Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning] systems and
uses a sound system of global measurements for programme progress and national
entity capacity improvement (see also page 28 or evidence of child- well- being
improvements on page 34). It will be important to report against the same
parameter in future years to compare developments over time. (Detailed
comments on IRP feedback on 2014 Accountability Report.)
Interestingly, Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) received quite a bit of attention, as
exemplified by the following comment:
Results from Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) showed positive results;
improvements in communities’ services and increased development outcomes.
Additionally, the Panel would be interested in other general feedback from
communities to World Vision – some of which was mentioned throughout the
report (e.g. external evaluation by communities). (Detailed comments on IRP
feedback on 2014 Accountability Report).
It seems natural that a social accountability program, especially one with the long
track record that CVA has, would elicit attention from a peer review mechanism set up to
monitor accountability. And indeed, the panel further observed that
Social accountability whereby citizens are given a voice versus their governments
but also World Vision as a service provider has been considerably widened in the
activities. Findings from baselines and evaluations are shared with communities,
partners and project staff to validate (or question) and discuss the findings
(Detailed comments on IRP feedback on 2014 Accountability Report).
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Consistent with this study’s observation that much of the data from the Child
Well-Being reports regarding downward accountability were prospective, rather than
documenting improvements that had already taken place, the panel commented, “Overall,
less information on processes and more on outcome / evidence is welcome in the next full
report” (Detailed comments on IRP feedback on 2014 Accountability Report).
Accordingly, by the time of the 2016 report, the panel could report with some
satisfaction progress on complaint and feedback mechanisms. Referring presumably to
the DFID-funded pilot project referenced earlier, the panel noted: “The results of a pilot
project on beneficiary feedback mechanisms indicated that feedback and complaints
mechanisms should be contextualised to each programme location, and complaints are
therefore handled on a programme basis,” before going on to observe,
However, the Panel requests more information on the different channels available
to submit feedback and complaints – e.g. online forms, surveys, face to face
consultations – as well as evidence that these are well known and lead to positive
management response. There are some commendable examples provided of how
World Vision has been listening to communities and dealing with complaints and
feedback in Nepal, Somalia, Cambodia and Iraq and the Panel commends World
Vision for the additional information provided in addressing such issues.
(Feedback from IRP on 2016 Accountability Report).
The last accountability report for which panel feedback was available was the one
from 2017. The panel made no comments on NGO1 – 6 under performance indicators,
instead focusing on performance indicators in other areas: environmental management
and human resource management. From this it may be surmised that performance under
standards NGO1 – 6 was satisfactory. Because the 2017 report was produced in the
subsequent year, and the sexual abuse scandal in the humanitarian relief and development
sector came broadly to light in February 2018, the 2017 accountability report paid
significant attention to safeguarding against sexual exploitation and abuse, stating in its
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foreword: “[We are] aware that we have a vital part to play in helping to rebuild trust in
our sector following revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse in some quarters”
(Accountability Report 2017). The panel responded by urging that policies stated to be
available on request be made available proactively on the website.
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn on internal data and public artefacts to outline in some
detail the path that World Vision has taken to first institute and then improve its
accountability “downward” to the beneficiaries whom it seeks to serve. The finding that
feedback and complaint is the area that has generated the richest data and prompted the
most critical self-reflection will be seen to support the following chapter’s finding that it
is in feedback and complaint – typically within humanitarian emergency response
programs – that the most progress has been achieved, to the extent that it has been
achieved at all. This is partly in contradistinction to the conclusion found in World
Vision’s own 2016 accountability report, which concluded that the most progress had
been achieved in the areas of consultation and participation and therefore it is these
factors/pillars that account for improvement in downward accountability.
This dissertation contends that the reason for the discrepancy lies in a number of
factors. Chief among them is the greater difficulty of achieving long-term change through
processes of consultation and participation. Another is the greater role of government
funding in humanitarian relief as opposed to development programs, coupled with the
significant role of donor requirements in shaping downward accountability processes and
systems. These donor pressures have been found to potentially lead to a “tick-the-box”
mentality in which routine compliance substitutes for genuine accountability; and these
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findings comport with findings from the literature: “The danger of HAP’s model of
accountability, founded on routine verification, is that it may have the unintended
consequence of tempting its members to pursue tokenistic policies that can be portrayed
in written reports as examples of good practice” (Crack, 2016, p. 51).
In addition, through an examination of the series of annual reports and
accountability reports produced by World Vision over the years it has been possible to
trace the evolution of accountability as an explicitly articulated theme in the agency’s
external communications. This development tracks the almost simultaneous emergence
of accountability generally, and then downward accountability, within the field of
development and humanitarian relief.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS FROM PRIMARY DATA
The Distinction Between Humanitarian and Development Work
The first pattern to emerge from the data was as follows: there are significant
differences in the way that downward accountability takes place in the humanitarian and
development spheres. The interview data reveal a complex interplay between factors that
alternately constrain and promote World Vision’s ability to effectively implement
downward accountability mechanisms within each of the two areas.
Humanitarian emergency relief – known in the aid industry as “humanitarian
emergency response” – is different from ongoing development work in at least two
ways. After a natural disaster8, or in the context of violent conflict and/or refugee flows,
a large apparatus of foreign assistance frequently descends on the affected region. As
noted in Chapter Two, these humanitarian emergency responses are typically funded by
grants, rather than by the steady flow of child sponsorship funds (recall that World Vision
is a child sponsorship organization). Because donors impose strict conditions on reporting
and effectiveness, humanitarian staff give priority to using donor metrics, and this
includes collecting data on downward accountability – in particular, on the use of
complaint and feedback mechanisms.
In addition, the nature of humanitarian emergency aid, by focusing on tangible
deliverables like food aid, housing, and the like, simplifies the task of downward
accountability because accountability mechanisms can focus on concrete, discrete goods
and services. The accountability mechanisms used to collect feedback on the delivery of

8

Scholars have noted that many so-called natural disasters taking place in the global South
cannot be truly considered natural, in that they reflect societal choices that lead to fragility and
thus to more devastating impacts than they would in a more prosperous society (Cohen and
Werker, 2008).
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those goods and services include, for example, suggestion boxes, helpdesks, hotlines,
and even accountability officers who walk through the project area wearing special vests.
Those on the receiving end of humanitarian aid are more likely to speak up if for some
reason they fail to receive the emergency assistance on which they depend: for example,
a food ration card if their name was mistakenly left off a food aid distribution list.
Operational problems such as being left off of a list for the distribution of food aid are
susceptible to technical solutions (through post-distribution monitoring) and thus tend to
emerge more frequently in the organization’s internal data as complaint-and-feedback
loops. As one interviewee put it,
[Y]ou can send people with clipboards to elicit feedback when people are
receiving blankets or shelter, or something like that, I think more easily…
Whereas actually the long-term development stuff about participation and
empowerment, etc., that’s a slightly different thing (World Vision senior
development staffer).
Humanitarian Emergency Response Context
In the interviews with humanitarian staffers, the following six themes emerged
more strongly than they did in the development realm: complaint and feedback, with
particular attention to the mechanisms used for collecting and dealing with complaints
and feedback; funding and resources; organizational learning; management issues; and,
to a slightly lesser extent, information provision. In contrast, development staffers gave
greater attention to the three themes of compliance culture; power; and results
orientation. Consultation and safeguarding were of approximately equal salience in the
two areas. The residual category (interviews of outside experts and fundraising
managers) was chiefly interesting for the light it shed on issues of culture, language, and
governance/regulation.
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Complaint and Feedback
Complaint and feedback, and the mechanisms used for dealing with them, were
more salient, and the discussion of them significantly richer, on the humanitarian side.
This indicates that attention to complaint and feedback mechanisms and systems is more
fully developed in humanitarian work, arguably in part for the reason given above: the
nature of humanitarian aid lends itself to the use of those mechanisms more easily than
does long-term development work.
However, ultimately data were mixed on whether and to what extent complaint
and feedback mechanisms were effective in actually garnering beneficiaries’ viewpoints
and responding to those viewpoints effectively: some interviewees maintained that
complaint and feedback mechanisms were effective, while others asserted they were not.
Nonetheless the important point to note here is that, to reiterate, complaint and feedback
– the most crucial of the four pillars of downward accountability – was given significant
attention on the humanitarian side, more so than on the development side.
Interviewees expounded at length on the various types of complaint and feedback
mechanisms used, and on how to determine which ones were most appropriate – whether
suggestion boxes, helpdesks, cell phone technology, focus groups, face-to-face
discussion, community meetings, or others. Perhaps not surprisingly, the question of
which mechanisms to use for collecting complaints and feedback was identified as being
highly context-dependent.
It became apparent that seasoned accountability champions know to contextualize
the mechanisms that they use in order to collect complaints and feedback. They maintain
that the question is not so much whether one type of feedback mechanism works better

123
than another – for example, technology-dependent ones such as text messages or
telephone hotlines, rather than face-to-face meetings. Rather, it is knowing enough to
select which mechanisms to use based on what the community says it prefers. (Of
course, this begs the question of how to know whether consultations with communities to
determine the best mechanisms truly are accessing the perspectives of a broad range of
community members, and in particular, the most vulnerable). An early champion of
downward accountability, trained in the use of various mechanisms designed to collect
feedback over a decade ago when World Vision had recently begun its endeavors in that
area, describes the various types of feedback mechanisms in use and notes something
about the process involved in selecting which ones to use in a given community. This
interviewee’s observations are worth quoting at length because they indicate how that
person and their staff gather information, specifically feedback from the community
being served:
We have a basic rapid assessment tool that we use for the needs assessment...
Once we’ve done the assessment, we ask the communities, “How do you want to
file the complaints?”
[W]hat we’ve discovered to be mostly preferred – again, it’s not one-size-fits-all,
it has to be contextual – we find that people say, “Okay, we want to use” – maybe
it’s the traditional leaders.... [Others] will say, “No, traditional leaders we can’t
trust. We want to use [text messaging], because we have got the phones” ... Some
will say, “No, put the suggestion boxes at strategic points. Then, whenever we
have got an issue, [we’ll] write on a piece of paper and put it there” ... Or, some
will say, “Come, face-to-face.” When there are problems with distribution…
approach this person who’s wearing this type of a vest who is moving around,
who is collecting the feedback and complaints from the different stakeholders...
So…what I’ve been trying to do is to come up with complementary mechanisms,
knowing that one mechanism cannot save all. But key things, key principles: we
have to make sure that the mechanisms that we put in place are accessible. They
offer confidentiality. So that at least someone will not be victimized because
someone raised this complaint… [W]e always make sure that those principles are
in place (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).
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However, context was not necessarily all, and a particular complaint and feedback
mechanism might be found to be generally preferable. For example, there was a place for
suggestion boxes as they offered anonymity, particularly valuable in the case of sensitive
complaints:
And in [this country] context it’s primarily been the face to face interaction, that
is number one. Followed by number two, hotline, and number three is basically
suggestion box for any inputs. The reason why these suggestion boxes are very
effective in this context, in a fragile context, is that it’s anonymous. People prefer
to remain anonymous if they want to give anything in writing (World Vision
accountability specialist and trainer).
In addition, the agency’s experience of having participated in a massive
humanitarian emergency response was also shown to have informed the way in which
downward accountability was implemented in subsequent humanitarian emergency
responses . One interviewee stated, “[C]ombined with what came out of [the 2004
tsunami response in] Sri Lanka, what came out of the [Food Program Management
Group] globally, I think that really pushed the program accountability framework
development, and that’s where that came [out of] (Former World Vision humanitarian
staffer). Indeed, numerous interviewees named food assistance as a key context for
complaint and feedback mechanisms, usually one in which these were successful in
addressing complaints about food aid – particularly in contrast with one or more of the
other four pillars. For example, “[O]ur food assistance programs have some very clear
instructions and processes for setting up complaints mechanisms and for information
provision. But sometimes we might be weaker on the participation piece” (World Vision
humanitarian staffer).
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The use of face-to-face methods was the most salient of the feedback
mechanisms, with numerous interviewees pointing to the importance of in-person
feedback – as the following example rather vividly indicates:
[H]elpdesks are really, really, really good. That’s where you’ve got staff at a
helpdesk during a food distribution (or whatever the case may be), and people
love that. They love it. They can go up and talk and get information and
complain and chat and throw ideas around. They love it (Former World Vision
staffer and M&E specialist).
The most notable aspect of the data on complaint and feedback in the
humanitarian realm was, to repeat, its richness and depth – whereas discussion of
complaint and feedback in the development realm tended to be less voluminous and also
less detailed, and more prone to discuss the issue in abstract rather than specific terms.
Two apparent reasons – the concrete nature of humanitarian aid’s lending itself more
readily to complaint and feedback mechanisms, and in particular the nature of food aid
and the experience imparted by food assistance programs – have been cited above. A
third reason is the imposition of donor requirements, which will be discussed further
below.
Organizational Learning
Overwhelmingly, the theme of organizational learning was more salient in the
data from interviews of the humanitarian aid staff, than in interviews of development
staff. This theme was defined to comprise all of the organizational learning tools
discussed earlier – particularly PAF and LEAP 3, but also monitoring and evaluation
(M&E). These tools, designed to track progress toward objectives and also to
incorporate whether downward accountability efforts were effective, were referenced
significantly more frequently by the humanitarian staffers than by the development
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staffers. Chief among these tools to improve effectiveness, including World Vision’s
effectiveness at holding itself accountable, was M&E broadly understood (not only as
exemplified by World Vision’s tools). And within M&E, there was significant attention
to the recent emergence of MEAL – in other words, M&E has been evolving into
monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL). One of the earliest staffers
to be trained in downward accountability (starting in approximately 2007), subsequently
became a downward accountability champion. This interviewee explains his/her
observation:
Over time, what I’ve noticed is there is a, maybe, a huge improvement in the uptake
of accountability across the board, yes. And then, if we think in terms of expertise
within our organization, you know I have quite a lot of people that are now, one,
taking accountability as a career – whose role is accountability. But … what has
also been happening is the blending of accountability with monitoring, evaluation,
and learning (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).
This is consistent with the trend in the literature: accountability increasingly is folded
into monitoring and evaluation (Eyben and Gujit, 2015). Learning is added, with the
objective of feeding monitoring and evaluation into programming, so that agencies can be
held accountable – and in this way (ideally), the cycle is complete.
However, donor exigencies mean that not all the components of MEAL are given
equal weight, as another interviewee observes:
The person and the funds [for implementing downward accountability] may not be
included at the beginning, and if there isn’t one focal point it becomes one of many
things that need to be done by people who are already under severe pressure…
MEAL staff have many things to do. And the monitoring and evaluation part might
be prioritized, especially because they need that information to complete donor
reports – apart from anything else. And whereas donors do have accountability
requirements, maybe they would not be seen as high a priority, as getting the basic
M&E information in place to complete the reports (World Vision humanitarian
accountability specialist and trainer).
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Yet another interviewee also pointed to the challenges involved in putting all the
components together:
[E]nsuring that, whether it’s the country managers, or other folk, really think and
integrate accountability and M&E into the program, is, I think, a huge part of it.
Yes, and really ensuring that M&E and accountability are joined up, creating that
culture (former World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist).
In all of this, the power to enforce downward accountability implementation lies
only with the donors. To reiterate – and encapsulate the central dilemma at the heart of
this dissertation – because beneficiaries lack anything resembling the leverage that
donors have for enforcing downward accountability, its implementation depends on the
will of the organization as well as on donor imperatives or at least donor support.
It is perhaps slightly ironic that the organizational learning indicators, chief among
them MEAL, or LEAP in World Vision terminology, were discussed more frequently in
the humanitarian side, given that LEAP originated in the development side. As one
interviewee described it,
LEAP was put together not for humanitarian projects at all, it was put together for
the sponsorship programming. Because… those child sponsors were sending
money in, but… there was no structure around that. And so, they put together the
LEAP framework so that those sponsorship programs could have structure around
them. And so, then during the tsunami response they wanted to take that LEAP
structure and see if it would work in a humanitarian context. So, we… brought that
into the humanitarian part of the organization. Which was fine, but it wasn’t nearly
as necessary because grants basically come with a built-in structure (former World
Vision staffer and M&E specialist).
Another described it this way:
So, from grant-funded programs, we have always had, generally, a higher level of
accountability to donors, right? And I can remember when we first brought in
LEAP. And one of the key rationales for bringing in LEAP was, “We want to bring
the level of reporting within our non-grant-funded programs, up to the level of what
we’re doing in our grant-funded programs. How can we do that?” And that’s one of
the reasons that LEAP was established (World Vision humanitarian staffer).
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Both observations, then, point to the longevity of downward accountability
processes (embedded within LEAP) as an additional reason for their being betterdeveloped in humanitarian work than in development work. Lest this conclusion be
thought to merely reveal bias on the part of humanitarian staff’s recollections,
development staff also recognized the same chronology, for example: “I was involved in
some of the early stages when the question of [downward] accountability first came up…
And it originated with the Humanitarian Accountability Standards… and the need for
World Vision to be accountable to communities when it was involved in humanitarian
emergencies (World Vision humanitarian staffer).
Funding Structures and Donor Requirements
Second only to the importance of organizational learning in explaining why
downward accountability was better-implemented in the humanitarian side, were the
weight of donor expectations and, sometimes, the structure of funding – particularly with
respect to grants. Already noted previously is how humanitarian emergency responses
are more often funded through grants and contracts. This funding stream has a direct
impact on the level of accountability required from the agency: upward accountability,
but also downward accountability because donors also want the receiving agency to track
how well it is holding itself accountable to beneficiaries. One interviewee drew a contrast
between the effects of being funded by child sponsorship funds and external grant funds
in this way:
So, lots of trust, from [individuals] who give to the organization, and give their
money, trusting the organization to do the right thing… And so, you could work
in a place for ten years and know, instinctively and intuitively, from having seen
the changes that happen there; but maybe have very little capacity for
documenting that in tangible ways. If you did that in the humanitarian side, you
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wouldn’t get a grant again (World Vision humanitarian accountability and M&E
specialist).
This distinction has led to an interesting phenomenon whereby the development arm of
the organization found itself obliged to create organizational learning tools to capture
downward accountability and fold them into existing monitoring and evaluation
processes to create the panoply of organizational learning tools and processes described
in Figure 4-5 on page 99. Meanwhile, in humanitarian emergency responses, donor
grants and contracts come with their own pre-existing accountability frameworks that the
implementing NGOs are obligated to fulfill. In World Vision’s experience, LEAP
ultimately had to be incorporated across both arms of the agency, with the result that
reporting requirements grew burdensome and duplicative. One interviewee working in a
large humanitarian emergency response in a fragile context described the burdensome
nature of reporting in this way:
But what really struck me with the LEAP 3 transition is that it is just so – there was
so little space for contextualization that it was sometimes really hard to make the
designs work [here]. In [country] we are about 50 percent grant-funded and 50
percent sponsorship-funded... And so then, LEAP 3 becomes this really interesting
process where we have to kind of merge the two. And show how the grants are
contributing to our objectives in a more clear way, but a lot of the requirements of
the donor got left out of the framework. And so, it’s really difficult, it creates a
huge amount of work for the managers to cope with both systems (World Vision
program quality specialist).
Beyond the inefficiencies involved in merging systems – symptomatic of a broader
problem in development aid and pertaining to the onerousness of donor requirements
generally – there is the tension between the need to be cost-efficient in order to keep
grants and contracts flowing to the agency, and the desire to invest time and resources in
meaningful downward accountability. One interviewee expressed the tension this way:
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See, what has happened is [that] some of these agencies who are donors or semi
donors... they need to actually trust the system that we have in place. So, what has
happened is [the donor agency] has their own mechanism. And then it’s a challenge
for us…. they actually downplay the system that we have created, saying that we
are not cost-effective… [T]hey find [another] partner cost-effective, and we have
lost out on opportunities to take on programming. Because we have a high cost,
having all of this system in place… for us to be reasonably responsible to the
beneficiaries whom we serve, there is a cost that World Vision has paid
(World Vision humanitarian staffer and M&E specialist).
Management Issues
The data from the humanitarian sector were also distinguished from those of the
development sector by the degree to which management issues emerged as salient.
Management issues were selected as a theme that loosely grouped a number of categories
including, most importantly, 1) capacity-building; 2) leadership buy-in; 3)
systematization; and 4) the use of organizing tools such as logframes and the Area
Development Programs. Each of these connect to downward accountability, in the
following ways: 1) Interviewees regarded it as important to build the capacity of staff to
hold the agency accountable to its beneficiaries; 2) Support from senior leadership for
downward accountability was identified as a key factor in the success of such
accountability initiatives; 3) Systematization in downward accountability systems was
sometimes flagged as lacking; and 4) Organizing tools, as noted earlier, were used for
reporting on downward accountability and are hence important for tracking
accountability’s success or lack thereof.
The issue flagged by the interviewee above, who noted the burdensome nature of
downward accountability reporting, recurred as a broader management theme as well.
Interviewees spoke to both the perceived and actual burdens of implementing, and
reporting on, downward accountability.
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Inasmuch as the PAF is an instrument emerging from the central offices to track
not only downward accountability but program effectiveness in general, interviewees
indicate that it can be seen by country office staff as an additional burden on top of their
existing responsibilities, or even as something devised to “catch them out.” One
interviewee stated:
Design, monitoring, and evaluation – so, DME – and accountability [are] both
very similar in this regard... Neither one of those has overall, widespread buy-in.
DME especially is seen as burdensome, and as a big burden without a lot of value.
And accountability is kind of seen that way as well (former World Vision staffer
and accountability specialist).
The perceived burdensome nature of downward accountability was closely related
to the idea of downward accountability’s becoming part of a “culture of compliance,” or
a “tick-the-box” exercise, whereby staff members tasked with carrying it out were
incentivized to merely go through the motions rather than using it as a tool for authentic
engagement with project-affected persons. This observation was voiced repeatedly by
World Vision staff and former staff. The sense that downward accountability was
extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the mission – even going so far as to indicate that they
viewed downward accountability requirements as threatening – came through in the
words of one interviewer who said, “There’s a tendency of people to feel that this thing is
there to spy on what they’re doing, what they’ve been doing… there’s that feeling of
insecurity” (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer). For this reason, as the
same interviewee emphasized, proper training becomes all the more essential, so that the
value of downward accountability can be better understood as essential to the mission
rather than as an externally imposed bureaucratic requirement.
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Another challenge implied in tales of the burdensome nature of downward
accountability was the sheer number of other reporting requirements competing for staff
attention. As one interviewee put it,
If you’re just reporting and then you say, “Well, we have 30 percent coverage for
accountability,” and the Global Centre says, “Well, you’ve got to [increase] that to
80 percent,” who cares? They have a hundred things they have to [raise] up to 80
percent. So, accountability is not going to get the same level of attention [if] the
focus becomes a [mere] compliance mechanism for the Global Centre to say, “Ah,
you’re not doing this well enough” (Former World Vision humanitarian staffer).
At the heart of this dilemma lies the nature of incentives. In the view of the same
interviewee, the strongest incentive to implement downward accountability rests in
changing the perception of downward accountability as compliance to a necessity to the
accomplishment of effectiveness goals:
Because the value, I think, is in people’s self-critical reflection around what they’re
doing in their programming… If you’re the National Director, and you’re trying to
bring about child well-being outcomes and you find that there’s a big obstacle in
your way, which is that your DME system can’t even tell whether you’re doing
that; or you don’t have a functioning feedback and complaints mechanism, if that’s
something that becomes a big obstacle, then you want to change it (Former World
Vision humanitarian staffer).
However, another interviewee questioned whether downward accountability ought
to be valued principally for its (as yet, in their view, unproven) link to development
effectiveness:
I think that the relationship between [downward accountability and development
effectiveness] is so indirect and so complicated. It takes so much effort to try and
do that. That’s not why we set them up. We didn’t set up accountability
mechanisms so that children could read better, right? We set up accountability
mechanisms so that we could ensure that we were actually really – especially the
feedback and complaints – that we were actually really listening to people and
making our programs responsive to the kinds of issues that were affecting
communities (World Vision humanitarian accountability and M&E specialist).
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Another management issue related to downward accountability was the key role
that champions play. From the perspective of the interviewees’, when champions pushed
downward accountability forward, it was more likely to be undertaken successfully and
sustained.
Capacity-building was also was identified as a significant issue that management
needed to address if downward accountability was going to be viewed as essential.
Several interviewees described slow but essential processes of building capacity among
staff for designing and implementing downward accountability systems. Initially when
setting up such systems, capacity was low and the learning curve was steep, even among
the champions tasked with setting them up. For example, one interviewee described the
establishment of downward accountability for an emergency food program in this way:
We started in January 2018, and we started from scratch in [country]. I had to put
together a team, and then start off by saying that we start with information
provision, especially setting up of helpdesks, for people to raise complaints, to
give us feedback and suggestions, and also to give them a platform to ask
questions and inquire about the program… There were many examples of
improvising, innovating, and also seeing that we simplify and make ourselves
approachable for the beneficiaries whom we serve. And over a period of twelve
months we were able to do these accountability processes well (World Vision
humanitarian accountability specialist and trainer).
In short, the greater attention to capacity building and the role of management in
the humanitarian arm implies a greater tendency toward managerialism within this
section of the organization (Mitchell 2018) and it is possible to conclude that increased
managerialism may lead to greater efficacy in the implementation of feedback and
complaint mechanisms, if not in the deeper processes of beneficiary empowerment
expected to flow from participation and consultation.
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Within the issues loosely grouped under management, as noted above, the role of
senior leadership support for downward accountability was included. This pivotal role of
senior leadership support emerged repeatedly throughout the interviews. It is categorized
here within management – rather than as a separate leadership element – because senior
leadership support is understood as a complex interplay of influences being exercised
both by the field staff and those senior to them. As one interviewee noted,
Field staff might be really keen, but they don’t have the senior leadership-level
support. For example, in [country], I had so many – well, one in particular, just
wanting to do these. And we got so much pushback from the senior leadership.
But as soon as a new senior leader came in, who incidentally had a humanitarian
background, she was like, “Go ahead and do this.” And that’s [country], and
they’ve just done amazing things since then (Former World Vision staffer and
M&E specialist).
Senior leadership support went hand-in-hand with the prospects for implementing
the appropriate training (which, in turn, required sufficient resources). Again and again,
this was emphasized in those interviews that mentioned leadership support. For example,
When you see teams that are actually trained, and you see real resources put into
DME and accountability and you have buy-in from the leadership, you can really
heavily see a difference, a positive impact on the overall quality of the program.
(consultant, M&E specialist, and former World Vision humanitarian staffer).
Finally, as the same interviewee pointed out, the humanitarian emergency
response context brought those three elements – senior leadership support, staff training,
and resources – together in a way that made success possible:
In the [disaster] response, where indeed there was capacity, there was buy-in, and
there were resources, so all three of these things came together in the [disaster]
response. Leadership was very bought into it, into accountability and DME.
There was tons of money; and that [country] staff, we actually trained them. But
they already have strong capacity, they’re good, they’re strong. And they were
into it (consultant, M&E specialist, and former World Vision humanitarian
staffer).
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Development Programming Context
Data from the interviews of development staff overwhelmingly revealed an
interest in issues of power (including power imbalances) as it affected downward
accountability. This was followed by a markedly higher interest (relative to that of the
humanitarian staff) in the culture of compliance, and a slightly higher interest in a results
orientation. The category, culture of compliance was formulated to capture codes relating
to staff’s tendency to comply with reporting requirements in a rote manner, instead of
internalizing the reasons that downward accountability is desirable and aiming to
implement downward accountability measures in a more authentic manner. The
category, results orientation was formulated to capture codes relating to donor
requirements for results reporting, as well as to codes relating to results reporting for its
own sake. On the whole, it captures indications that the “results agenda” embraced by
the international development community has been internalized by World Vision staff
(Eyben, 2013).
Power
Interviewees from the development side of World Vision’s work raised the issue
of power and particularly power imbalances more frequently than did those involved in
humanitarian work. They situated downward accountability within a broader context
than that of results reporting. Instead, “doing” downward accountability effectively
meant, for them, having an awareness of the role of the power imbalance between World
Vision and its beneficiaries. This imbalance complicates the ability of the organization to
collect feedback that goes beyond rote expressions of thanks and that would instead
consist of constructive criticism that might help World Vision to improve its programs.
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Not surprisingly, then, the discussion of power and related themes brought in such
topics as World Vision’s embarking on Transformational Development as well as its
advocacy work; and in addition, its CVA program, the participatory budgeting work that
had preceded that program, and the broader social accountability work of which the
program is a part. Although interviewees paid most attention to those topics
(Transformational Development and CVA), they also pointed to the importance of
partnership, empowerment and sustainability – not only in relation to downward
accountability, but in general.
The question of power emerged from the very beginning in various discussions of
how to train World Vision staff in downward accountability practices. Interviewees
among the development staff emphasized that it was essential for staff to understand the
imbalance of power inherent in the relationship between the agency and its beneficiaries,
in order to appropriately design and implement downward accountability. To begin with,
cultural norms often led beneficiaries, when given the opportunity to provide feedback, to
express gratitude. This was coupled with the perceived need to keep the NGO happy and
engaged with the community, and thus overcoming the imbalance presented a
fundamental challenge: “The assumption of course is that you don’t bite the hand that
feeds you. [Beneficiaries fear that] the NGO is going to withdraw, so they don’t rock the
boat. We recognize in the sector there’s a long way to go” (World Vision accountability
specialist). Another interviewee stated,
I would say, the single most important thing [for World Vision to learn about
downward accountability], I think, would be that the practice of program
accountability needs to take the imbalance in power relations more seriously
because, you know, World Vision is a large international NGO, and so World
Vision needs to be more conscious of the imbalance in power relations. So, I think
that exposes a number of problems in this model of information provision,
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consultation, participation and feedback, that model is not sufficiently – well, I
think it’s partly been adapted, but it needs more work to take these power
relations seriously (World Vision researcher, development).
This interviewee shows an awareness of the disempowered position in which the
beneficiaries find themselves relative to World Vision. INGOs, being neither for-profit
corporations nor government agencies, are neither subject to the discipline of the market
nor are they accountable to voters. The persons meant to benefit from development and
humanitarian aid lack the leverage that ordinary consumers might (theoretically) have, as
they do not pay for goods or services; or that voters might have who (in principle) can
express their displeasure at the ballot box (Ronalds, 2010, p. 181).
This recognition of power imbalances extended to those existing within
communities as well, and to the concomitant responsibility of staff members, when
undertaking community consultation, to see to it that they reach the most vulnerable (and
typically less visible) members of the community as well as the more privileged ones
(Chambers, 1983). This had implications for how training in downward accountability is
done. It would be a simpler matter to rely on local community leaders for guidance as to
how to conduct consultation and especially whom to consult. However, the more
thorough approach to downward accountability implies finding out who, within a
community, is likely to be less visible, more vulnerable and generally more powerless,
and find ways to listen to them. As one interviewee described it:
I think that accountability covers so many different elements that it’s not
something that you just need to hire one technical specialist and they can get it
done. Or carry out a couple of trainings. It involves quite a varied skill set: people
who are very good at engaging with communities, listening to communities, being
very sensitive about cultural, gender, power dynamics at community level. (World
Vision accountability specialist).
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One interviewee expressed doubt as to whether the norms and standards that
govern work in the humanitarian sphere sufficiently engaged this need to grapple with
power imbalances between World Vision and beneficiaries:
[T]here’s a larger learning process that needs to happen because – I think the
constraint is this linkage to the [Humanitarian Accountability Partnership]
Standards that perhaps does not take seriously enough the unequal relations
between World Vision and beneficiaries, nor critique the very notion of
“beneficiaries,” with the dependency that often arises from it. While it comes out
of a genuine attempt to respond to beneficiaries in humanitarian emergencies
more adequately and more accountable, “who” has power to set and drive
agendas, especially those which raise deeper issues, seems not adequately
surfaced (World Vision senior researcher).
A similar concern was expressed by an interviewee who feared that a lack of
commitment to transferring power from the NGO to the beneficiaries would turn
downward accountability from a potentially transformational practice into the proverbial
“tick-the-box” exercise discussed earlier:
[U]nless you have trainers of trainers who are politically motivated and
emphasizing the aspects of the work that are explicitly designed to transform
power relationships at the local level and emphasize the empowerment of
individuals – marginalized individuals and communities – it can quickly
deteriorate when under time pressures and recruitment drives, to just go through
the motions of consultation, if you like – documenting, catching the results, and
getting them written up (former World Vision staff and social accountability
expert).
Interestingly, the question of giving “teeth” to accountability emerged repeatedly
among diverse interviewees. This was grouped under the theme of power, since the
power to hold duty-bearers (including NGOs) accountable was considered essential to
making downward accountability effective. Accessibility of feedback mechanisms was
identified as one part of the answer. This is why making such mechanisms accessible to
the most vulnerable – women, children, landless persons, internally displaced persons,
persons with disabilities, or otherwise marginalized persons depending on the context –
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recurred among a number of interviews as an important factor. Confidentiality of
reporting mechanisms was another factor that affected the effectiveness of downward
accountability:
[W]e see that accessible feedback mechanisms and giving people a range, so they
can find the one they’re most comfortable with, is critical to doing that, and I don’t
think we’ve cracked that. So that people feel comfortable reporting not just
exploitation and abuse, but also corruption. I would have thought, you know, being
realistic about what happens in the field, we should be getting more allegations of
fraud, or exploitation and abuse, and we don’t get them. So that’s probably the
biggest obstacle, failing, it’s where the feedback systems aren’t delivering on their
potential (World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist and trainer).
Social Accountability: Citizen Voice and Action
Related to, but distinct from, the discussion of power was World Vision’s work in
social accountability through the program called Citizen Voice and Action (CVA),
described earlier in pages 41 - 42. Briefly, this work, inspired by the participatory
budgeting work conducted in several countries in Asia and Latin America in the 1980s
and 1990s, entails training project beneficiaries in how to hold government officials
accountable for the provision of public services.
Three persons involved in CVA (one current staff person and two past staff
persons) were interviewed to gain their perspectives on downward accountability as
informed by their expertise in social accountability. While it might seem natural that
there would be a great deal of overlap between CVA and downward accountability work,
in fact this appeared not to be the case – as other interviewees, not only the past and
present CVA staffers, also revealed. Instead, the two seemed to be kept quite separate.
In part, this was due to the different purposes of each: CVA was designed to train
citizens in “project-affected areas” in how to, first, access information about the services
that were to be provided to them; and secondly, how to hold local public officials
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accountable in case of lapses. The constraint against applying similar training to the
relationship with World Vision was explained as follows: that the (unintended) effect
would inevitably be to transfer the obligation to provide such services from local
government to World Vision, thus inappropriately supplanting government in its role as
service provider.
Unfortunately, as one interviewee observed, “There seems to be a risk, in part, of
reinventing the wheel, when we actually have a lot of learning from CV and A, and we
haven’t adequately started applying it…” (World Vision senior development researcher).
In addition, there were similarities in terms of the drivers of success in social
accountability as well as downward accountability, as the following quote illustrates:
So, if you are working with Support Office champions, maybe they can find a
little bit of budget that then can help the National Offices to roll it out, so it works
well. But then with the Social Accountability Leadership Team, to have regional
champions, to be able to say, “Okay, you know what? That sounds like a great
idea, I’m going to take it up with the National Offices team and see if we can
scale it up.” That is also really, really useful for us as a model. Because the three
of us, the four of us, we can’t be everywhere, we just – practically, we can’t do it,
so to have that support is fantastic. (World Vision staffer and social accountability
specialist).
In other words, the Support Offices – those country offices located in the rich
countries and tasked with fundraising for work in the field – may be of some help in
promoting social accountability work, but support from leadership at the regional level is
just as, or more, important, in that it provides resources in the form of staffing. Once
again, as with downward accountability in the humanitarian arm of World Vision’s work,
the support of senior leadership is significant.
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A Culture of Compliance
Given the foregoing discussion of the importance of power and power imbalances
in the development staff’s analyses of downward accountability, it is not surprising that
interviewees among the development staff next pointed to the presence of a culture of
compliance as an obstacle to the effective implementation of downward accountability.
This phenomenon has already been touched on briefly. To elaborate further, in this
context, a “culture of compliance” connotes, not something desirable but rather a
tendency to prioritize complying with rules due to principal-agent pressures, rather than
from intrinsically valuing that which the rules seek to promote (Eyben and Gujit 2015,
Crack 2017). One interviewee, referring to the sexual abuse scandal that erupted at
Oxfam in February 2018, offered: “One thing those kinds of scandals tend to highlight is
the inadequacy of a compliance approach. Not that compliance isn’t important, but
compliance isn’t sufficient for accountability, and transparency isn’t sufficient for
accountability” (World Vision researcher, development). Instead, as scholars have noted,
it is necessary to move “from compliance to commitment,” if authentic organizational
learning is to take place (Hubbard, Mehan and Stein, 2006, p. 174).
Another interview connected this issue to the setting of international standards
and the need to prevent international standard-setting from supplanting local ownership
of downward accountability processes:
So, I think from where I sit, at the kind of international level… we are setting
policies, and we’re setting standards. But we don’t want to communicate those in
a way that compounds this kind of compliance mentality. We want to
communicate these things in a way that says, “We want you to be empowered to
analyze and think for yourself about how can you use these standards in a way
that’s going to help you to actually produce better results” (World Vision
development staffer).
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This same interviewee also observed:
[O]ne thing that I would say is that we actually struggle with compliance, in a
very negative way. So, across the organization, people tend to be… too concerned
about doing what they perceive to be the expected thing, rather than really
thinking creatively about, “How do we solve problems and how do we achieve the
outcomes and the results that we’re actually looking for?” (World Vision
development staffer)
Perhaps somewhat more positively, another interviewee pointed out that the
culture of compliance could be overcome, thus preventing it from inhibiting the
flexibility that might lead to more effective downward accountability practices: “We
need to incentivize staff to think outside the box of compliance, because quite often we
have this approach, we believe it works; therefore, we’re going to roll it out exactly in
this way. And we don’t want to promote that approach, we want to promote flexibility”
(World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).
A Results Orientation
An orientation toward achieving and measuring results – sometimes known as
“the results agenda” – was also more salient in the development data, although the
difference was not pronounced (Eyben and Gujit 2015; Vallejo and Wehn 2016) in
helping to explain why downward accountability might be less effective in development
work. The finding that the results agenda was more salient in development work was
somewhat counterintuitive. Interestingly, one of the more nuanced examples indicating
an interest in results was a description of the experience of collecting data using a
participatory method called popular benchmarks: “We could get collective readings, not
subject to statistical analysis but nevertheless of great value, and those were the kinds of
data that went into the [World Bank-mandated] Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy for
Sierra Leone: the popular benchmarks” (former World Vision staffer and social
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accountability expert). In another example, an interviewee reflected on the emphasis on
results as something mandated by donors and affecting the organization’s work as a
whole, not only its development programming: “I think the questions are being raised by
the donors who are less influenced by the Rights-Based Approach, and more think in
terms of development effectiveness and aid effectiveness” (World Vision accountability
specialist).
Another interviewee, speaking about the shift toward Child Well-Being
Outcomes, recalled the process whereby these had been adopted, in this way: “[W]e said
actually, well, outcomes, that’s a bit rigid, so we moved more toward Child Well-Being
aspirations, and so we said, ‘Okay, well, that’s the bigger goal,’ and we’re going to find
our way towards those, and always be pushing for those” (World Vision development
staffer).
In short, the above examples show that in most cases, the consideration given to a
results orientation in the development area was deeply contextual, and not necessarily
indicative of an attachment to what is more commonly understood as “the results agenda”
with its emphasis on quantitative and standardized metrics.
Partial Convergence in Two Thematic Areas: Safeguarding and Consultation
Finally, the difference between the development and the humanitarian areas in the
following two categories was almost negligible: safety and safeguarding, and
consultation. In the context of this dissertation, Safety and safeguarding is a category
developed to capture the concept of measures put in place to protect the vulnerable, and
particularly children, from abuse. The term “safeguarding,” originally developed as a
legal concept in the United Kingdom to refer to protections for children and vulnerable
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adults, has in recent years traveled into humanitarian discourse and received increased
attention in the wake of the sex-abuse scandal of 2018, referenced earlier (Sandvik,
2018). Consultation is used to refer to the process of conferring with beneficiaries in
order to garner their opinions as to how the development or humanitarian work in
question should be done (or is being done).9
Safety and Safeguarding
With respect to safety and safeguarding, the nature of the discussion on the
development side took place at a slightly more abstract level than on the humanitarian
side, suggesting that the development staffers discussing safety and safeguarding perhaps
regarded these concepts as referring to hypothetical situations rather than existing ones.
One interviewee did flag safeguarding as a crucial issue, asserting both its importance
and the likely underreporting of abuse cases:
[W]here I think we have some weakness is encouraging really frank feedback that
includes allegations of staff misconduct. And offices have got quite a lot of
feedback. It’s very rare for there to be these types of allegations. And that
underlines the wider issue: that underreporting of exploitation and abuse by
beneficiaries is the real issue (World Vision accountability specialist).
Another interviewee from that same professional area spoke to the issue of the
binding nature of safeguards as something that could be leveraged to enforce downward
accountability:
[A]t the end of the day, you know, your job if you’re a field-level manager is
everything from: keep your project running on time, on-quality and under budget;
keep the government and local stakeholders happy; make sure nothing terrible
happens… [S]o in that environment, which [issues] catch your attention? Well, if
it’s auditable, if it’s going to cause pain, or bring you great praise and

9

Interestingly, “consultation” seems to appear nowhere in Andrea Cornwall’s Buzzwords and
Fuzzwords, an article otherwise replete with explication and critique of bits of development
jargon such as “participation,” “empowerment,” and many others (Cornwall, 2007).
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encouragement, that is just a practical way we can use human nature to get people’s
attention. (World Vision safeguarding expert).
In contrast, the humanitarian staff spoke about safety and safeguarding in terms of
assuring the confidential and protected nature of complaint and feedback mechanisms:
“[W]e have to make sure that the mechanisms that we put in place are accessible. They
offer confidentiality. So that at least someone will not be victimized because someone
raised this complaint” (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer). This
conforms with the broader trend observed earlier, of humanitarian work being more
practically-focused than development work.
Consultation
With respect to consulting beneficiaries on their needs and desires regarding
development and humanitarian projects, there were similar levels of convergence
between the two sides of the organization. Interviewees from both sides emphasized the
importance of consulting communities before implementing projects or programs. One
interviewee from among the humanitarian staff illustrated this quite vividly. Interestingly,
this person also framed consultation in terms of power relationships, much as
development staff tended to do. Consultation, in this view, implies ceding some power to
the beneficiaries in order to design projects that more closely conform to their expressed
needs:
[H]ow can we transfer some of the power? Through consulting people on the key
decisions that affect them. So, before you design your [Water, Sanitation and
Hygiene - WASH] project; and before you decide, for example, where those pumps
will be located; where the latrines will be; what the latrines will look like; where
you put the shower cubicles, and what they will consist of… let us actually ask, the
men and the women separately, right? Before you sink a whole load of money into
that project – and it’s very difficult to actually make changes once the WASH
infrastructure is in place (World Vision accountability and M&E specialist).
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Notably, the above observation also emphasizes pragmatic reasons for consulting
and for doing so effectively: to help ensure that the projects that are put in place have a
chance to succeed precisely because they respond to needs articulated by those who are to
benefit from them. Carrying out a thorough consultation in the first place – one that is
gender-sensitive – obviates the need to retrofit a project afterward, which would be
difficult; or worse, to chalk up a failed project as a mere occasion for “lessons learned.”
Another interviewee (carrying out humanitarian work in a fragile context), pointed
to the need for consultation to ensure programming sustainability, saying, “Basically,
we’re based on the ladder of [the] sustainable development process and hence firstly [the]
community need[s] to [be] aware [of] the current condition and situation to be able to
reflect their own problems and needs” (World Vision field staffer).
On the development side, one interviewee highlighted the importance of
understanding consultation as going beyond the design phase of a project or program, to
include collaboration with local partners and government: “Yes, it’s broader than just
how we design. It’s really about how we engage the communities that we’re working
with… [W]e don’t implement just on our own, in isolation, but actually we work very
closely in collaboration, in partnership with local civil society organizations and host
governments” (World Vision safeguarding specialist).
Discussion
World Vision’s attempt to hold itself accountable to its beneficiaries has,
arguably, been shaped by the twin impulses toward adaptive management on the one
hand (shaped to a significant degree by having a results agenda), and transformational
development, on the other. The agency has developed a toolkit of sorts for development
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programming, which incorporates both of these. This toolkit – termed the “development
programming approach” – incorporates transformational thinking in that it seeks to base
the organization’s work on consultation with the affected communities. At the same time,
it also seeks to adjust and re-design its projects and programs continually, based on
reflection and evaluation on how programming is proceeding – thus also incorporating a
key principle of adaptive management, iteration. The development programming
approach also forms part of the results agenda in another way, by virtue of being centered
on a set of objectives devised about a decade and a half ago to measure child well- being.
Thus, on one hand, the modernizing project – understood broadly as the results
agenda and the technocratic aspects of development and humanitarian work carried out
by World Vision, as by so many other international NGOs – has in many respects been
positive, in that it holds the potential for applying downward accountability mechanisms
across the entire organization. It represents formalization of downward accountability and
continuity across sectors and programs. In the words of one interviewee,
[I]t grew... it was formalized as part and parcel of our programming. Where each
and every program or project had to have accountability processes in place. So, I
think that genuinely led to what we now have as an organization, which is:
accountability cuts across all sectors and programs (World Vision accountability
specialist and trainer).
On the other hand, this person added:
There are people who feel that it’s maybe an add-on to what they are doing. An
add-on to their KPIs [key performance indicators] and that kind of stuff (World
Vision accountability specialist and trainer).
However, according to the data, the instruments used to structure downward
accountability and collect data on downward accountability are not yet universally
adopted across all program countries. An initial analysis of the aggregate data from the
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64 Child Well-Being reports indicates that in too many countries, there is little to no
mention of the Program Accountability Framework, which, within the framework of the
child well-being reports, and as noted earlier, is the sole instrument for collecting global
data on how well downward accountability is being implemented. Even when staff are
aware of this toolkit, all too often they report that downward accountability is only
emerging, rather than growing or maturing (the three categories that the agency uses to
assess the strength of downward accountability implementation). Where countries do
report effective downward accountability practices, and report on them in some detail, it
is where humanitarian responses are taking place or have recently taken place. This is
chiefly in the areas of complaint and feedback mechanisms, and sometimes (although to a
lesser extent), in the area of information provision.
Also, in the development area as well as in the humanitarian, the role of senior
leadership support for effective downward accountability implementation is key. As one
interviewee noted,
So, the other thing that it depends on I think is the quality of leadership both at the
local program level but then also at the national office. So, if the program office
has strong leadership, is committed to quality programming, then they’re much
more competent and able to actually enter – or have a stance of – negotiation
with the funders, rather than just seeing themselves as being a conduit for funding
activities and so on. So, I think national leadership is a really key determinant,
really, as to whether or not logframes and plans become constrictive
(World Vision development staffer).
Performance in the areas of consultation and participation tends to lag these, by
and large. In the interview data, when participation is cited, all too often, it tends to be
“participation” in the sense of community members providing labor to a project, such as
in food-for-aid projects, rather than having been involved from the beginning in
designing the project.
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Finally, judging from the interviews and from the wealth of organizational
learning documents like the Development Programming Approach and others, there is no
lack of awareness, at least among middle to upper-level staffers, of the importance of
recognizing the power imbalance that World Vision has with respect to program-affected
persons. Nevertheless, ensuring the flow of candid feedback in the presence of that power
imbalance is something not easily accomplished: as noted earlier, respondents when
offering feedback have a tendency to express gratitude for the projects, and it is difficult
(although not impossible) for the agency to overcome that dynamic
Conclusion
These findings point to the limitations to implementing downward accountability
and suggest that the presence of champions among field staff is an important factor in its
success. World Vision has experienced some limited success, chiefly in the area of
feedback and complaints within humanitarian emergency aid. It is here that,
paradoxically, the role of outside donors both prods the organization to implement
feedback and complaint mechanisms, yet places constraints by imposing onerous
reporting requirements.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
A Tale of Two Impulses Redux
The story of World Vision’s adoption of downward accountability has been
shown to be one of complexity and some unexpected findings. As has been
demonstrated, somewhat contrary to expectation, it is with respect to feedback and
complaints mechanisms and systems – rather than information provision, consultation, or
participation – that there has been the most progress in downward accountability
implementation.
However, this progress toward downward accountability is relative, as the
majority of field offices reported only incompletely on downward accountability
performance. Many offices did not quantify the extent to which downward
accountability was being implemented, nor use World Vision’s rating system to evaluate
how successfully it was being implemented. Furthermore, where progress did occur, it
was found to a greater extent in humanitarian emergency responses than in development
programs. The data from this study indicate that this is not surprising given the following
influences that differentiate humanitarian work from development work. First of all, the
very nature of humanitarian work, being chiefly material in nature and short-to-medium
term in duration, lends itself to the use of downward accountability mechanisms more
easily than does development work, with its typically longer-term nature and aspirations
to transformational change. Secondly, humanitarian work is, to a greater degree, funded
by large donor agencies and thus subject to their reporting requirements, which
increasingly include the tracking of downward accountability. Thirdly, because
accountability broadly understood has a longer history of implementation within the
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humanitarian community, there is a larger formal community of practice therein to
support downward accountability practices, through peer-review mechanisms such as the
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and Accountable Now. Finally, the support
from senior leadership appears to be more prevalent in the humanitarian side, providing
further strengthening to the implementation of feedback and complaint mechanisms and
systems.
As organizational learning has become a higher priority for the agency – as
evidenced by the growing number of indicators, toolkits and training manuals designed to
systematize and diffuse such learning across the organization – World Vision has had
access to more tools with which to track and improve downward accountability practices.
Here, the influence of technocratic donor imperatives is keenly felt. Not coincidentally,
where donor pressures are greater – again, in humanitarian aid – feedback and complaint
mechanisms and systems are stronger. This may not, however, extend to the other pillars
of downward accountability.
The lack of definition of those other aspects of downward accountability – chiefly
consultation and participation – arguably puts them at a disadvantage with respect to
feedback and complaints (and perhaps to a lesser extent information provision). Briefly
put, it may be that staff were not always able to discern when participation was taking
place and thus did not report it as frequently. With feedback and complaints, it was more
often possible to know when these were taking place and to report on them, whether the
agency was responding to them or not (i.e., “closing the feedback loop”). Participation
and consultation have been part of the development “toolkit” for much longer than
downward accountability has been on the agenda. While it might be expected that this
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would lead to greater capability for their implementation, this seems largely not to have
been the case. The seeming paradox is resolved if we reflect that the more defined and
concrete nature of humanitarian aid makes possible – sometimes even requires – the use
of feedback and complaints.
Changes in the Foreign Aid System and in Philanthropy
The experience of World Vision as regards downward accountability in both
development and humanitarian work is embedded in a larger framework of changes in
both the foreign aid system and the philanthropic sector. The emergence of a new kind of
philanthropy over the past two decades has been notable. Here the term “new
philanthropy” is used to loosely denote trends in 21st-century philanthropy. It refers to
various phenomena known as “strategic philanthropy,” “outcome-oriented philanthropy,”
“impact investing,” and “venture philanthropy” (Porter and Kramer, 1999; Frumkin,
2003; Brest, 2010; Eikenberry and Mirabella, 2018). The development of this “new
philanthropy” has coincided with the shrinking of the state and the ascendancy of the
neoliberal model (Hay 2012), and that model’s ideological justification (Hall, 2013 p.
150). The resulting contraction in the provision of public goods and public services has in
turn been used to justify increased levels of philanthropic giving. It has also been put
forward as a rationale for why philanthropy must become better focused on efficiency
and effectiveness – in short, with results (Hay, 2012, p. 2).
The “culture of measuring outcomes” extended beyond the foreign assistance
sector and found a home in domestic philanthropy as well. In the United Kingdom,
social impact bonds, whereby governments contracting with nonprofit organizations
calibrate the amount they pay based on results attained, garnered attention; while
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philanthropy in the United States promptly followed suit with the spread of similar “pay
for success” models (Gugerty and Karlan, 2018, p. 8).
And yet, the advent of the results agenda has, if anything, complicated
organizations’ efforts to carry out greater accountability. This is so for a number of
reasons. First of all, it is important to distinguish between a results orientation and an
emphasis on outcomes. The distinction is straightforward enough. For example, donors
may request aggregate numbers on such results as:
[t]he number of educational curricula revised, the number of children completing
primary education, and the reduction of maternal deaths during childbirth, among
those at the individual level; and new or changed policies, practices, and working
routines at the organizational level. In other words, projects are evaluated based
on predetermined results through the use of quantified and aggregated indicators
(Eyben, 2011, and Green, 2010, cited in Vallejo and Wehn 2016, p. 3).
Yet these results, laudable though they may be, leave out those “non-planned” changes
that may nonetheless be attributed to the intervention being evaluated (Vallejo and Wehn,
2016, p. 4).
Secondly, while the advent of the data revolution has both whetted donor appetite
for reporting on results, and made it apparently more feasible to comply with those
requirements, there are a number of reasons why organizations still struggle to report
meaningfully on their performance. One is that an organization has collected too few
data. Another is that it has more data than it can possibly analyze given its resources –
recall here World Vision’s realization that it had 1,800 databases, accumulated over the
course of over sixty years, but not at that time meaningfully organized, let alone utilized.
Finally, without collecting the right data, an organization may not know whether to
attribute changes in outcomes to its interventions, or to other variables that might have
been present. Thus,
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[T]here is a time and place to measure impact. But in many situations, the best
questions to address may be ‘Did we do what we said we would do?’
(accountability) and ‘How can data help us learn and improve?’ (performance
management) instead of ‘Did we change the world in the way we set out to?’
(Gugerty and Karlan 2018, p. 9).
It is the contention of this dissertation that collecting feedback and complaint data
in humanitarian emergency responses, when done successfully (more on that is below),
makes it possible to address the question, “Did we do what we said we would do?” In the
case of World Vision, the organization is clearly using feedback and complaint processes
for that purpose, i.e., to determine, for example, whether the material aid distributed in
fact reached the intended beneficiaries and satisfied their needs according to their own
(self-reported) perceptions. Taking the analysis of feedback and complaint one step
further, the agency is also attempting to collect and use data about the feedback and
complaint processes to learn and improve the way it does downward accountability (the
second question in Gugerty and Karlan’s three-question list above). So far, so good.
And in some perspectives, it is in that limited sense that downward accountability data
should be used (World Vision accountability and M&E specialist). However, donor
pressures have led the agency to want to use the data on how downward accountability is
done to support the broader aim of improving development (or humanitarian relief)
performance – in short, for performance management, as the accountability and M&E
specialist observed. Yet it is not clear that there is necessarily a robust causal connection
between downward accountability and development effectiveness.
Recommendations for Future Research
The most fruitful direction for future research to take would be for case studies to
be undertaken of other and comparable INGOs – perhaps the eight or so largest global
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nongovernmental organizations. In this way a cross-case comparison would make it
possible to see whether the findings from this dissertation are generalizable across wider,
and possibly more varied, experiences.
In addition, future research could expand on the scope of this dissertation in a way
that could yield results amenable to a comparison with those from studies of downward
accountability practices at other INGOs. For example, a study undertaken of downward
accountability practices at Oxfam Australia found that “field staff display consistently
more favorable perceptions of the organization’s existing accountability practices than do
home office staff” (Davis, McDonald and Brenton, 2012, p. 948). While this dissertation
did not undertake to explore differences between the perceptions of field vs. headquarters
staff, future research could do so and could seek to find the reasons for any such
differences.
In addition, given the important role played by grants and contracts as noted
above, a quantitative or mixed-methods study examining in detail whether and to what
extent there is any correlation between volume of grants dollars on the one hand, and
downward implementation on the other, is warranted. One immediate challenge faced by
such a study would be how to operationalize downward implementation, given the gaps
in the data described above. As data collection and reporting improve, with the increased
adoption of organizational learning tools – if such improvement does take place –
meaningful correlation will become more feasible.
Concluding Thoughts
In the end, it seems that downward accountability, by traveling a distance from its
origins in the participation revolution in the last century, to becoming a quintessentially
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21st-century aid effectiveness tool, has experienced a journey similar to that of
participatory budgeting. In one analysis, over the course of its “international travel” from
South to North, participatory budgeting was transformed from a policy instrument – “a
means of orienting relations between political society… and civil society” to a device –
“a mix of technical components… and social components” (Lascoumes and LeGales, in
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2015, p 197). This description bears interesting parallels to the
one by Joshi and Houtzager, who contend that “widgets,” that is, value-neutral technical
tools such as participatory budgeting and many others, “[depoliticize] the very political
processes through which poor people access services” (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012, p.
146) These scholars assert that more promise lies instead in “watchdogs,” social actors
who, within their specific historical and political contexts, engage public providers in
efforts to hold them accountable (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). Whether peer review
mechanisms such as Accountable Now constitute such “watchdogs” is another matter,
and likely to be unsatisfying, since global organizations by definition, while not lacking
specific historical and political contexts, lie outside national borders and therefore outside
national-level politics of contention.
Instead, for development and humanitarian work to be truly transformational, it
would be necessary for the “watchdog” function to be enacted by actors found within the
local context. And this points to a second dilemma: the possibility that INGO-beneficiary
relationships embody clientelistic tendencies.
While clientelism typically refers to a relationship between those in a position to
give political support, i.e., votes, to office-seekers, it need not be limited to the political
context and can be defined more expansively (Montambeault, 2011; Stokes, 2011; Lewis,
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2017). Thus, Roninger’s definition is one that could have relevance to the structure of
INGO-beneficiary relationships:
Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power
and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals of groups of
unequal standing. It implies mediated and selective access to resources and
markets from which others are normally excluded (Roninger, 1994).
The relationships are helpful to the persons involved in projects and programs –
the beneficiaries – because they have need of the material goods and services that INGOs
provide. They are beneficial to the INGOs because this work is their raison d’être, and
thus, not insignificantly, their justification for raising funds from donors and the public
(Barber and Bowie, 2008; Bornstein, 2001; Yuen, 2011).
The analogy arguably breaks down, however, when it characterizes the
relationship as one involving a quid pro quo between the parties, particularly one in
which goods and services are essentially exchanged for votes. Naturally, such is not the
case here, as INGOs are not political parties. Nevertheless, it is hard not to glimpse
aspects of clientelism in the relationship, as when data reveal that feedback tends to
consist mainly of the expression of thanks, as noted earlier. Kelsall and Mercer (2003),
conducting fieldwork in Tanzania, found that while World Vision project beneficiaries
welcomed opportunities for what outsiders might term “empowerment,” they might not
necessarily have perceived them as being desirable in the same way:
[W]hile the poorest might express desires for an increased share of the benefits
[World Vision Tanzania] provided, they expressed few signs of wanting to be
“empowered” in an individualistic sense. Behind their statements one could
discern a desire for increased control over their lives, but this could equally be
understood in terms of gaining increased access to patrons, as to becoming “selfdirecting,” “self-sufficient,” or “autonomous.” Extrapolating, we might venture
that both empowerment and development are interpreted locally in an idiom of
clientelism, which sutures the divide between rich and poor (Kelsall and Mercer,
2003, p. 297).
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Beyond this particular country context, other analysts as well have come to see
“civil society, including Northern NGOs, as new sources of, and vehicles for, clientelistic
largesse” (Whaites, 2000, p. 138).
The quest for greater downward accountability, then, takes place in a larger
context in which structures more complex than the power balance inherent in INGObeneficiary relations complicate the implementation of accountability mechanisms and
systems. Seen from a perspective close to the grassroots level, existing ways of
understanding and enacting relationships between the powerful and the powerless may
undermine such attempts. Yet paradoxically, seen from the framework of those
structures that fund and sustain humanitarian and development work, technical
requirements and the responses to those requirements may – in the humanitarian context
– make possible the effective collecting of feedback and complaints, if not always more
thoroughgoing and authentic processes of consultation and participation.
Policy Recommendations
Given the state of affairs outlined above, what should be done regarding
downward accountability? Some desirable policy recommendations might be as follows.
First of all, donors would do well to adopt longer timelines for downward accountability
reporting. The organizational learning tools described above are only beginning to be
diffused across World Vision not only horizontally, but more importantly, vertically,
“down” to the field level. As has been shown, implementation has been uneven. On the
other hand, data collection on downward accountability practices at World Vision began
only about five years ago, and absorption of changes in the use of organizational learning
tools – notably the third iteration of its monitoring, evaluation, accountability and
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learning (MEAL) framework, LEAP 3 – has operated on a slower timeline than that of
the typical donor agency. Thus, the recommendation for donors is the classic one of
calling for them to recognize that genuine change takes time, and to adjust their timelines
accordingly. While some are beginning to do so, more needs to be done in this area.
As to recommendations for World Vision: it is desirable to (continue to) join with
other INGOs, through channels such as Doing Development Differently, to push for just
such a shift in donor frameworks and timelines. Despite the competitive pressures that
INGOs experience in the field, as vividly described above, with respect to policy
dialogue and particularly with respect to contributions to academic and policy research, it
is still possible to work in coalition with other INGOs – indeed such work is not
uncommon.
In the meantime, other more modest changes can be implemented internally.
These would involve collecting data more systematically and in a way that would make it
easier to assess progress over time – something that has been complicated by staffing
changes in the past. Quantifying such data in a standardized fashion would also be
desirable, as it would make comparisons across countries and regions more feasible.
In addition, a study of how World Vision’s social accountability work, CVA,
might inform its downward accountability work is recommended. One pragmatic area of
exploration would be to see what downward accountability data collection systems might
learn from the CVA data collection systems, which have a longer history and are likely to
be more thoroughly developed.
All of this is not to neglect the need to continue training the staff who implement
downward accountability – and what is more, to do so in a way that is at once pragmatic
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and expansive, and raises consciousness about the power imbalance inherent in the
relationship with project-affected persons and the corresponding need to correct that
imbalance by ceding power. This also requires, not surprisingly, increased resources, of
time as well as money. Here it is as well to give the last word to an interviewee with
significant experience in designing and conducting such training across a number of
countries. This interviewee remarked, “As costly as it is to run face-to-face trainings, I
mean costly in terms of time and money for me to be there, I think that without that
foundation it is more difficult to implement” (World Vision humanitarian accountability
specialist). The interviewee also made the following observation, which illustrates keen
awareness of the dichotomy between mere technical training and a fuller understanding
of what a transformative approach requires:
I start by training people on the concept. The concept involves these two things:
the definition [of accountability] and the discussion on the responsible use of
power…
So, for example, if we implement the project without involving people and then
we don’t invite them for their feedback and complaints, and act on those, is that
actually the responsible use of power?
So once [staff] people have this information – it’s an intangible thing, but if I’m
actually there with people, training them face to face, I can get a sense of when it
goes from the head to the heart.
And if it only stays in the head and it doesn’t reach the heart, I don’t think that
they will actually use their hands and feet to … support the implementation and
actually make changes happen (World Vision humanitarian accountability
specialist, emphasis supplied).
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Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brazil
Burundi
Cambodia
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo (DRC)
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Jerusalem West Bank
Gaza
Jordan
Kenya
Kosovo
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho

Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mexico
Mongolia
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
North Korea
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Korea
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Switzerland
Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Fundraising offices appear
in italics.
Child sponsorship offices
appear in bold and italics.
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General Role
Accountability Officer
Academic Expert
Senior Leadership
Safeguarding Expert
Accountability Officer
Development Officer
Social Accountability
Expert/Director
Former External Relations
Officer
Field Officer
Program Officer
Former Staff Trainer
Staff Trainer
Monitoring, Evaluation,
Accountability and
Learning (MEAL)
Expert/Director
Academic Expert
Social Accountability
Expert
MEAL Expert/Director
Humanitarian
Accountability Staffer
Field Officer
Social Accountability
Expert
Senior Leadership,
Humanitarian Aid
Field Officer
MEAL Expert/Director

Location
United Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Australia

Date of Interview
February 19, 2018
March 4, 2018
April 4, 2018
April 11, 2018
April 11, 2018
April 4, 2018
May 7, 2018

South Korea

April 13, 2018

South Korea
South Sudan
Australia
Zimbabwe
Canada

June 19, 2018
June 6, 2018
April 23, 2018
June 18, 2018
June 18, 2018

United Kingdom
United Kingdom

July 11, 2018
July 2, 2018

Australia
Canada

August 8, 2018
August 6, 2018

Myanmar
United States

July 31, 2018
August 9, 2018

United Kingdom

August 21, 2018

Myanmar
Jordan

August 27, 2018
August 16, 2018
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APPENDIX C
The 58 Field Offices That Included Downward Accountability Data
in their Child Well-Being Reports
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Afghanistan
Albania and Kosovo
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Burundi
Cambodia
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Democratic Republic of Congo
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Ghana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza
Jordan
Kenya
Iraq
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho

Malawi
Mali
Mexico
Mongolia
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Peru
Philippines
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
South Africa
South Caucasus
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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DOCUMENT
NUMBER:
EC/95/68
REVISION NUMBER:
BD/02/65
BD/17/53
TITLE:

Transformational Development

PURPOSE:

Poverty is a surmountable condition of deprivation, vulnerability and broken relationships,
which threatens human survival, involves unacceptable human suffering and prevents people
from fulfilling their God-given potential. Transformational Development is how World Vision
responds to poverty and vulnerability as we follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ to
promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the
Kingdom of God.
Transformational Development is both a vision and a process. The vision is “life in all its
fullness” for every child; girls and boys, families, communities and societies living abundant lives
characterised by dignity, justice, peace, and hope. The process is a transformational journey of
shared learning and holistic change, through which people discover God’s love and purposes
for them as they work with others to address injustices and improve and sustain child wellbeing.
The purpose of this policy is to establish the core principles of Transformational Development
that inform all World Vision’s work across all entities and in all contexts. The principles of
Transformational Development are applicable to other ministry policies and provide the
framework that brings all areas of work together into a coherent whole, focused on the
sustained well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable.

POLICY:

The pursuit of Transformational Development requires all World Vision entities and
programmes to:

Recognise God is already at work in the process of human and social transformation:
God is at work in the world to reconcile all people and the whole of nature to Himself.
World Vision recognises that God’s work is displayed wherever people show
compassion to those who suffer, relationships are reconciled and people are enabled to
live with dignity, justice, peace and hope. World Vision staff take the time to understand
what God is already doing, and to join with God’s work through life, deed, word and
sign, seeking to be good stewards of God’s creation and the resources with which we are
entrusted.
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Prayer and discernment are vital to the success of Transformational Development.
Acknowledging God as the author of transformation, World Vision teams actively engage in
prayer and discernment to understand how God has been working, and to seek direction and
strength from God for strategy, planning and implementation.
The goal of Transformational Development is “life in all its fullness”; the holistic well-being of
girls and boys within thriving families, communities and societies. Transformational
Development requires that the spiritual as well as the material, social and political root causes
of child vulnerability are understood and addressed. Spiritual nurture is integral to our holistic
approach of human development. We respond to God’s profound love for children through
our relationships and actions, with the desire that children in any context might experience
fullness of life.
Restored identities and relationships are central to the pursuit of ‘life in all its fullness’. Broken
relationships and a marred human identity are at the root of poverty and injustice. Restored
identity and relationships, centred on God’s love, bring hope and can transform individual lives
and entire nations. We recognise that it is impossible to achieve sustained well-being of
children without addressing the gender inequalities that are the source of injustice and poverty.
Through Transformational Development, girls and boys of all backgrounds, ethnicities, beliefs
and abilities are valued, listened to, included and nurtured within peaceful, reconciled and
gender equal families, communities and societies.

Empower children, their families and communities to plan and control their own
journey of transformation:
Transformational Development is the responsibility of the people themselves. World Vision’s
role is to empower girls and boys, especially the most vulnerable, with their families and
communities, to envision, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate their own development
processes in partnerships with local governments, businesses, and civil society. World Vision is
committed to facilitating community engagement that promotes the dignity and full participation
of females and males as equal in the sight of God.
Families are the primary social units and the basis of civil society. Our work supports families
to strengthen their resilience and improve livelihoods, enabling them to provide and care for
children. World Vision programs promote transformed lifestyles and relationships between
women, men, girls, and boys that enable children’s well-being and prevent violence and
discrimination.
Children play a key role as agents of transformation. World Vision will build children’s ability to
participate, taking into account their age, maturity and context. We uphold children’s rights to
be listened to; to express their opinions on matters that affect them; and to freedom of
expression, thought, association and access to information, while respecting the roles and
responsibilities of parents and others in authority.
World Vision’s contribution to a community’s journey of transformation will always be limited
and time-bound. Throughout World Vision’s involvement, there will be a continuous focus on
developing local leadership, seeking to strengthen communities’ resilience and capacities to
maintain and build on gains in child well-being and sustainable development after World Vision’s
contribution has ended.
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Identify, include and benefit the Most Vulnerable Children within each specific context:
The most vulnerable children are those most affected by extreme deprivation, serious rights
violations, abusive or exploitative relationships, disabilities, and vulnerability to disaster. World
Vision embraces the challenge of prioritising, including and empowering the most marginalised
and deprived girls and boys and their families.
World Vision will go to where they are, listen carefully and work respectfully with them to
understand and address the root causes of their vulnerability and build their capabilities,
decrease their vulnerabilities and enable their equitable access to services. Staff will work to
enable vulnerable people to be treated with dignity, not pre-judged or portrayed as victims,
incompetent, or in need of medical care.
Child Protection prevents and responds to exploitation, neglect, abuse, and other forms of
violence affecting children. World Vision upholds children’s rights to protection from all forms
of abuse and violence, especially gender-based violence, and all practices that undermine the
dignity of girls, boys, women and men and their right to protection from physical, sexual and
psychological harm.
World Vision expects that working with the most vulnerable girls and boys and their families
will lead to mutual transformation, where attitudes and beliefs about the spiritual, social and
political nature of vulnerability are challenged and changed. The values, beliefs and practices of
World Vision staff are challenged and changed, just as those of community members, leaders,
partners, governments and supporters are.

Recognise that the causes of child vulnerability are complex and require humility,
adaptability and active mutual learning, rooted in ongoing relationships:
The complex nature of child vulnerability requires that Transformational Development
processes are flexible; that design and implementation are merged through rapid cycles of
learning and adaptation; and that there is a real focus on achieving results.
World Vision’s approach to Transformational Development requires programme staff to be
rooted in positive relationships with girls and boys, their families and duty bearers and
committed to mutual learning together. These relationships are characterised by a humility that
recognises there is always more to learn; curiosity at how change happens within a context; and
accountability to those we serve. Through this listening and learning attitude, new approaches
and innovations are sought, identified, tested and shared.
World Vision’s technical interventions contribute to a locally owned vision of child well-being.
They are jointly identified and designed with stakeholders in each context and build on local
government and civil society capabilities. Technical interventions meet internationally accepted
sector-specific standards and guidelines, which are carefully adapted to local contexts through a
process of iterative learning, ensuring they have an impact on the root causes of child
vulnerability and lead to the progressive fulfilment of children’s rights at each stage of their
lifecycle.
Because global issues and systems affect poverty, World Vision maximises its influence on
international organisations, and seeks to engage donors and supporters deeply in their own
transformation, and to increase their prayer and actions on behalf of vulnerable children.
Organisations from all sectors of society – business, civil society and government – are already
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active in improving child well-being. Transformational Development requires identifying and
collaborating with a range of existing organisations including those of different faiths or
ideologies, celebrating our shared values of justice, love and hope. We embrace the risk and
rewards of partnering with those who are different to ourselves.

In working with partners, World Vision’s preferred role is as catalyst and convenor,
connecting stakeholders to better impact key child well-being issues and efforts.
A nurturing family, community and society is required for children to thrive. We recognise,
respect and strengthen others’ legitimate roles in upholding the rights of children and
contributing to their sustained well-being. This includes empowering children, families,
communities, civil society oragnisations, government and the private sector to work in
partnership on projects that support child well-being.
World Vision promotes relationships with and between partners that are transformational, by
living out the principles of mutual benefit, transparency and equity.
World Vision believes that the Church is God’s primary instrument to transform lives and
address the spiritual causes of poverty and injustice. For this reason, local churches, where they
exist, are indispensable partners in the work of Transformational Development. World Vision
works in ways that strengthen and enhance the local church’s engagement in and capacity for
ministry with vulnerable children.

Recognise that God desires the transformation of systems and structures so they work
for equity, justice and the well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable:
World Vision works with and strengthens governance systems, policies and structures at all
levels, helping to make them more transparent, accountable and effective in delivering on the
rights of their citizens.
Citizens, communities and civil society organisations are equipped and enabled to engage in
collaborative, constructive dialogue with national and local government officials and service
providers to hold them accountable for upholding children’s rights and the provision of quality
services against existing plans and policies.
World Vision seeks to enable donors’ and supporters’ own transformation as they participate
with communities to improve the lives of their children. Opportunities are provided for donors
and supporters to engage deeply and to increase their prayer and actions on behalf of
vulnerable children.

The WVI President or his/her designee may develop further detailed management
policies to implement this policy.
Such management policies are also authorised to revoke the Partnership Policy on
Programming Effectiveness in Long-Term Local Programming (BD/09/57), after having
incorporated relevant provisions as deemed appropriate.
Definitions

Children’s well-being refers to positive relationships, healthy individual development (involving
physical and psycho-social health, cognitive, social and spiritual dimensions), and contexts where
all children experience safety, social justice, and participation in civil society. World Vision’s
vision of “life in all its fullness” for every child is articulated through our four child well-being

185
aspirations: that each girl and boy enjoys good health; is educated for life; experiences the love
of God and their neighbours; and is cared for, protected, and participating.
The most vulnerable children are those most affected by extreme deprivation,
serious rights violations, abusive or exploitative relationships, disabilities, and vulnerability to
disaster. The more vulnerability factors children experience, or the longer they
experience any one of these factors, the more vulnerable they become.
The Church is the global body of Christ-followers. (WV Faith and Development Guiding Frame,
2017)
Holistic means positive change in the whole of human life: materially, socially, psychologically
and spiritually. (Myers, 2011)
SCOPE:

This Partnership Policy applies to all World Vision entities, including VisionFund and World
Vision microfinance entities. It is relevant to all operational contexts.
This policy supersedes the Transformational Development Policy (BD/02/65) approved by the
World Vision International Board in 2002.
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APPENDIX E:
Summary of World Vision’s Transformational Development Approach
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Transformational Development: How WV Promotes Transformational Change
Poverty is a combination of suffering, deprivation, vulnerability and broken relationships
that prevents people from fulfilling their God-given potential. Transformational
Development is how World Vision responds to poverty and vulnerability and works
towards a vision of “life in all its fullness” for every child in every context with the
exception of a Category III emergency response. This means girls and boys living
abundant lives, within transformed families, communities and societies characterised by
dignity, justice, peace and hope, as God intended. It is a journey of shared learning and
change.
TD involves 3 layers of change. World Vision programmes are designed specifically to
improve the well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable. The question is, what
happens after those projects have ended? Are families, communities, governments, and
local organisations able to maintain and build on the gains made for child well-being?
There are specific actions that World Vision can take to increase the sustainability of
project outcomes; by increasing local capacities, strengthening partnerships and networks,
increasing accountability, building resilience and restoring broken relationships. Our
Christian identity means that we do not stop at the sustained well-being of children. We
believe God is calling us to go deeper and seek the transformation of families, community
and society.
A thorough analysis of the root causes of poverty and vulnerability will eventually uncover
the deeper, often hidden, social, cultural and spiritual issues that prevent children from
enjoying life in all its fullness. These issues manifest as cultural practices, social norms,
or power dynamics that keep people trapped in poverty. WV is called to engage at this
deeper level, to understand and address these hidden root causes and to promote lasting
transformation. This is the third layer of change.
The core principles of Transformational Development, summarised below, inform all
World Vision’s work across all entities and in all contexts.
Listen - We listen to God, seeking to discern His voice and guidance. God is already
there, in the community, working to reconcile all things to Himself. He has been present
and working well before WV ever arrived; we join His work. We listen to the people we
serve. We use participatory assessments to ensure participants, including children, are
involved in the decisions that affect their lives. We seek to address the immediate needs
of the most vulnerable, as well as understanding and addressing the underlying root causes
of vulnerability, restoring broken relationships and building social cohesion.
Reach - We embrace the challenge of prioritising, including and empowering the most
marginalised and deprived girls and boys and their families, regardless of ethnicity,
religious affiliation or gender. We do this because in the Bible, we see God has a bias to
the poor. He expects us to care for and protect the vulnerable and marginalised. We work
with communities and other stakeholders to identify those that are most vulnerable to
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depravation, abuse, and exploitation. We include them in decision making and ensure they
are benefitting.
Empower - We create opportunities for beneficiaries to influence and increase their sense
of ownership over programme decisions. We hold ourselves accountable to those we serve.
Our work promotes the dignity and full participation of females and males as equal in the
sight of God.
Connect - World Vision cannot change the world on our own. To see deep and lasting
change, we have to be good at working together with others. We work with others on interagency assessments and implementing consortia. We work with and support partners who
share our desire to uphold the rights of children and and promote peace and protection. We
partner with local and national government; with churches and faith-based organisations;
with the private sector as well as other NGOs and CBOs. We strive for relationships with
and between other organisations that are characterised by equity, transparency and
mutual benefit.
Challenge – By definition, fragile contexts are places where governance systems are
broken or at best, fragile. The ability to “challenge them” is highly variable in context.
There may be no institutions left to challenge, or challenging those institutions that do
exist may put staff or beneficiaries at risk. Often the powerful figures in a community or
the duty bearers are the perpetrators of violence themselves. In spite of the risks, we still
seek to re-build a relationship of accountability between service providers and
beneficiaries because that is a critical requirement for work “on” fragility towards
resilience and recovery. Where possible we also share data from the front line to advocate
for peace and child well-being at the national and international levels to influence
behaviour and policies that affect children.
Adapt – The contexts where we work and the problems WV staff are working to solve are
complex, and it is often difficult to predict the outcomes of our actions. Programme staff
need to have the space and agility to use their understanding of context and close
relationships with communities to work flexibly towards a shared vision for child wellbeing in response to the changing situation. We use short cycles of action and learning, to
ensure that our programmes remain relevant to rapidly changing contexts, and they produce
the desired results.
These six principles of Transformational Development are put into practice in local
programmes using the Development Programme Approach, the Fragile Contexts
Programme Approach (FCPA), or the Urban Programme Approach as appropriate in
context. At national level, they are reflected in Field Office strategy, the Community
Engagement and Sponsorship Plan (CESP) and Technical Programmes.
Source: World Vision International.
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APPENDIX F
Stages of World Vision’s Critical Path
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Stage 1: Preparing
World Vision prepares to engage the community by learning about the program area and
by defining World Vision’s identity in the area. This stage is made up of assessment and
the first step of the Critical Path. Both are carried out mainly by World Vision staff.
There is limited interaction with communities.
Stage 2: Engaging and visioning together
In the second stage, World Vision staff engage with communities and local stakeholders
to find out who they are and what is currently being done to improve child well-being and
to address vulnerability in the area. This stage culminates in the development of a
community-owned vision and priorities for child well-being. This typically is cofacilitated by World Vision and other local stakeholders committed to child well-being in
order to ensure that it is locally owned and led rather than driven by World Vision…
Stage 3: Planning for partnering together
In the third stage, World Vision and local stakeholders work together to develop detailed
project plans to address the child well-being priorities that emerged from Stage 2. The
key outcomes of the stage are agreements on what will be done; what each stakeholder,
including World Vision, will contribute; and how stakeholders will collaborate…
Stage 4: Managing and transitioning together
The final stage includes the implementation and eventual transition of shared projects and
the program. During steps 7 and 8, monitoring and learning systems are established that
can be led by the communities and stakeholders… Baselines and evaluations are
conducted in a way that builds the capacity of local stakeholders. Transition refers to the
ending of World Vision’s involvement in a share project or program…
Excerpted from The Handbook for Development Programs, World Vision International,
2011, page 27.
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Codebooks
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Categories appear in boldface and codes follow below each category.

DEVELOPMENT WORK

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Complaint and Feedback - General
Accountability is foundational to World
Vision's work

Complaint and Feedback - General
Closing the feedback loop

Accountability broadens beyond information
provision to the other three pillars

Collecting and acting on feedback is more
advanced

Complaint and feedback mechanisms
Closing the feedback loop

Complaint and feedback
Complaint and feedback are doing well in some
cases

Complaint and feedback
Complaint and feedback are weak
Complaint and feedback is a newer pillar
Confidentiality
Face-to-face
Feedback mechanisms
Focus group discussions

Complaint and feedback are not systematized
Complaint and feedback are weak
Confidentiality
Dealing with negative feedback
Face-to-face
Focus group discussions
Food assistance as vehicle/context for downward
accountability

Positive feedback
Service provision
Technology - cell phones

Formal vs. informal feedback
Multiple feedback channels
Operational complaint and feedback is easier to
implement
Positive feedback
Sensitive complaints are difficult to handle
Sensitive issues
Type of feedback matters
Complaint and Feedback Mechanisms
Complaint and feedback mechanisms
Helpdesks
Mechanisms need to be complementary (i.e., of
various types)
Suggestion boxes
Technology - cell phones
Tipoff line
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Compliance Culture
Compliance Culture
Avoiding devolving into a tick-the-box exercise Compliance culture
Compliance culture
Program accountability becomes
instrumentalized

Focusing on deliverables rather than processes
Tick-the-box

Tick-the-box
Flexibility
Consultation
Collaboration
Consultation
Consultation is lacking
Context matters
Flexibility

Consultation
Being close to the field is important
Community-led decision-making
Consultation
Consultation includes needs assessment
Consultation is lacking
Consultation is strongest
Context matters
Cultural factors
Field-led
Translation issues (concepts of accountability)

Funding and Resources
Child sponsorship

Funding and Resources
Department for International Development
(DFID)

Department for International Development
(DFID)

Donor community growing fast in a fragile state

Donor influence is strong in humn. work

Donor influence is strong in humanitarian work

Donor pressures [in development context]
Donors
Donors have short time-frames

Donors
Donors lag in responding to feedback
Early start (in building in accountability) is
crucial in a humanitarian emergency

Funding

External funding comes with reporting
requirements

Funding fluctuations
Grant funding
Pressure is always there, even with private
funding

Funding
Funding fluctuations
Grant funding

Private unrestricted funding

Norm cascades
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
Resources
Resources are needed

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Pressure to spend money
Resources
Resources are needed

Humanitarian
Accountability started in the humanitarian side

Humanitarian Aid
Accountability started in the humanitarian side

Accountability in humanitarian contexts can lay Child Well-Being Report
the ground for social accountability
Core Humanitarian Standards

Core Humanitarian Standards are superior to the
Program Accountability Framework

Fragile contexts
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
Humanitarian emergency response
Humanitarian side = pragmatic
Humanitarian side strong on accountability
Humanitarian standards (various)
Humanitarian side good on complaint and
feedback

Core Humanitarian Standards
Difficulties of accountability in a fragile state
Fragile states
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
Humanitarian emergency response
Humanitarian side = pragmatic
Humanitarian side strong on accountability

INGOs have capacity for accountability in
humanitarian emergency but governments don't

Humanitarian standards (various)

Learning loops

Lack of propensity to question authority in an
illiberal society

PAF developed by humanitarian side

People in the humanitarian world have been
equating accountability with feedback and
complaints mechanisms
Post-distribution monitoring
Pre-distribution
Wider humanitarian community
Information Provision
Information provision
Information provision by itself insufficient
Information provision is not systematized
Information provision is weak
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
Management issues
Information provision

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Management Issues
Accountability cuts across all sectors and
programs.

Area Program
Capacity-building
Champions

Accountability is everyone's responsibility
Area Program
Burdensome nature (perceived) of accountability
tools

Clustering ADPs is not efficient as expected

Capacity of national staff in inverse proportion to
opportunities for jobs elsewhere in the economy

Development Programme Approach
Doing Development Differently
DPA linked to accountability
DPA linked to PAF
Had to adjust PAF to fit DPA
Leadership

Capacity-building
Champions
Development Program Approach
Feasibility
Food Programming Management Group
Formalization of downward accountability
procedures
Inconsistency in reporting on accountability
Internal capacity
Lack of institutionalization
Lack of international exposure among national
staff

Leadership buy-in
Logframes
Systematization
Training

Lack of management
Leadership
Leadership buy-in
Logframes
Mainstreaming accountability
Management
Mission creep in accountability reporting
National Offices
Senior leadership supporting program
accountability
Staff capacity
Standardization
Systematization
World Vision's federated structure
Zimbabwe - high-capacity MEAL staff
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
Design
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Organizational Learning
Applying the PAF to development work
Awareness of organizational learning tools is
lacking

Evaluation
Influencers of aid industry trends
Isomorphism within one INGO
LEAP 2 to LEAP 3 is a radical change
LEAP 3 not promoting accountability to donors

Design
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation
Evaluation
Global Centre
Global experts

Leveraging the interest in external systems
M&E
M&E becomes MEAL
MEAL
Metrics
Organizational learning tools
Organizational culture

Isomorphism within one INGO
Local centers of excellence
M&E
M&E becomes MEAL
MEAL
Metrics
Organizational learning differs between
humanitarian and development groups

Organizational learning
Organizational learning tools
Program Accountability Framework
Theory of Change

Organizational learning tools
Organizational culture
Organizational learning
Program Accountability Framework
Rapid assessment
Tools
Participation
Participation
Participation is lacking
Participation is strongest

Power
Advocacy
Building a CBO from scratch

Power
Accessibility
Accountability as a foreign concept
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
Citizen Voice and Action
Communities using CVA methods vis a vis
World Vision

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Accountability means giving up power
Advocacy

Contrast between CVA and program
accountability

Agency

DPA linked to Transformational Development

Asking communities how they want to give
feedback

Duty-bearers
Empowerment
Few linkages between CV&A and acct.
Gender
Inclusion of the most vulnerable
Key difference between CVA and program
accountability

Building a CBO from scratch
Chauvinism and bigotry among staff
Collaboration with CVA
Conflict between the CBOs and the community
Duty-bearers
Empowerment

Lack of collaboration with CVA
Listening
Multiple accountabilities
National leadership
Ownership
PAF linked to CVA
PAF linked to Transformational Development

Inclusion of the most vulnerable
Lack of collaboration with CVA
Lack of inclusion of the most vulnerable
Participatory budgeting
Partnership
Power
Power - the responsible use of

Participation
Participatory approach in monitoring and
evaluation

Power imbalance
RBA

Participatory budgeting
Partnership
Policy advocacy
Power
Power - the responsible use of
Power imbalance
Program accountability leading to social
accountability

Traditional leaders
Transferring power
Transformation
Visioning

Rights-based
Root causes
Seeking linkages between CVA and program
accountability
Social accountability
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DEVELOPMENT WORK
Sustainability
Teeth of accountability
Traditional leaders
Transferring power
Transformation
Transformational Development
Transparency
We have tried to really discourage using the
Citizen Voice and Action approach on World
Vision,

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Results Agenda
Child Well-Being
Child Well-Being outcomes crowded out
Transformational Development

Results Agenda
Cases exist where accountability is successful
Effectiveness

Effectiveness
Evidence
Incentives
Indicators
LEAP 3 seeking greater efficiency
Outcomes
Popular benchmarks
Research
Results
Standardization

Evidence
Indicators
Influencers of aid industry trends
Outcomes
Research
Results
Benchmarks
Standards

Safety and Safeguarding
Oxfam scandal impact
Safeguarding
Safety (from retaliation)

Safety and Safeguarding
Levers
Oxfam scandal impact
Safeguarding
Safety (from retaliation)
Trust
Training
Training
Training in the "why" of accountability is crucial
Training of trainers
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APPENDIX H
Programme Effectiveness Performance Indicators in the Accountable Now Reporting
Guidelines
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NGO1: Involvement of affected stakeholder groups in to inform the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes.
Sustainable change will only be achieved if affected stakeholders develop ownership of
the process and its results. Please describe the involvement of affected stakeholder
groups.
How does your strategy translate into specific roles/decision making power of e.g. people
affected by your programs or campaigns?
In which formats and frequency do you engage stakeholders: e.g. surveys, focus groups,
community panels etc.? …
NGO2: Mechanisms for stakeholder feedback and complaints to programmes and
policies and in response to policy breaches.
Do you have a written feedback and complaints handling policy in practice?
How many and what types of formal complaints did you receive? Who is responsible to
act upon them, in what time frame? Have most formal complaints been resolved?
Can you provide evidence that your complaints policy is well known and has led to
positive management response?
NGO3: System for program monitoring evaluation and learning (including
measuring program effectiveness and impact).
Please describe how you monitor and evaluate impact and progress against your strategic
objectives.
How do you publicize results and put program adjustments into effect?
Can you provide evidence that MEL led to positive management response?
NGO4: Measures to integrate gender and diversity into program design and
implementation, and the monitoring, evaluation, and learning cycle.
Diversity is not just a question of fairness, but also a potential quality driver. It enriches
implementation strategies by inviting different views; it allows tapping into more
networks and broadens the basis of acceptance; it fosters resilience that monocultures do
not tend to possess.
What systems do you have in place to identify stakeholders that risk being excluded from
your work due to e.g. disability, ethnicity poverty, illiteracy, age, gender?
How does this inform the planning, implementation and evaluation of your work?
Have you set yourself specific targets? What has been achieved so far?
NGO5: Processes to formulate, communicate, implement, and change advocacy
positions and public awareness campaigns.
Advocacy and public awareness-raising have become an increasingly important part of
NGO work. At the same time public criticism in regard to NGO legitimacy and
effectiveness is rising. Good accountability for advocacy can address both criticisms.
Do you have a published process for adopting public policy positions ensuring that they
are evidence based, truthful, effective and respectful of people’s dignity?
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How do you ensure meaningful stakeholder participation in your advocacy work?
How is corrective action taken when appropriate? Can you provide examples?
Identify the organization’s process for exiting a campaign.
NGO6: Processes to take into account and coordinate with other actors.
Complex situations, numerous actors and fast-moving targets are a reality for most
NGOs. Strategic and effective coordination with the activities of other actors is
important to reduce duplication, leverage impact and improve cost effectiveness.
What systems do you have in place to avoid duplication and identify opportunities for
engagement with others to improve and leverage your effectiveness?
Can you provide evidence that these systems work well in practice?
Who are your key stakeholders in such a process (e.g. governments, rights-holders,
multilateral institutions, NGOs, business, donors etc.), and what role do they play?
How do you ensure that partners also meet high standards of accountability?
Excerpted from Reporting Guidelines: Based on GRI NGO Sector Supplement 3.0 Level
C Reporting Template. Accountable Now, 2014, pages 6 – 7, emphasis in the original.
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APPENDIX I
Interview Guide
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Interview Guide
Date (of interview): ___________________________________
Location (city where interviewee is located):_______________
Respondent’s Name: __________________________________
Gender of Respondent: M F
Approximate Age of Respondent: 22-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. The purpose of this research study is to
produce findings about potential causal mechanisms behind the adoption and the
implementation of policies and practices to promote accountability to beneficiaries.
As noted in my letter to you, this interview may take about 45 minutes to one hour, and
all data will be kept strictly confidential. Before we start, I would like to ask your
permission to record the conversation with this digital recorder so that we don’t miss any
of the important parts of our conversation.
[After oral consent is given, audio recording begins.]
We are going to start with a few questions about the attributes of your organization and
about your position in the organization. Then will we move into more substantive issues
regarding program accountability.
Regarding any foreseeable risks or discomforts resulting from this study, the study
involves no more risk than the risks you encounter in daily life.
While there may be no direct benefit to you from participating in this study, the indirect
benefit of participating will be knowing that you helped researchers better understand the
drivers of program accountability at a leading international NGO. Additionally, and
ideally, this understanding may help to inform World Vision’s future efforts at advancing
program accountability.
Personal and Organizational Attributes
First, can you confirm for me where in the organization you work (e.g., at World Vision
headquarters, a regional office, etc.)?
Would you please describe the specific role you play in World Vision?
How long have you been in your position?
How long have you been in the organization overall?
Accountability
Please share what you know about how World Vision developed its program
accountability.
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What previous experiences informed the decision?
What were the steps that you recall that led to this decision?
What was the rationale for undertaking program accountability?
What obstacles initially stood in the way of the decision?
How were these obstacles overcome, to the extent that they were overcome?
If (since the time that World Vision first adopted program accountability), thinking about
program accountability has changed in your organization, how has it changed?
Which staff persons or departments are those championing program accountabilities?
What issues do they face?
What staff incentives exist to promote program accountability?
What staff incentives do you think should exist for this purpose, that currently do not (if
any)?
How has the process of federating affected the adoption and/or implementation of
program accountability, if it has?
Now I’d like to hear about how the program accountability that you described above is
put into implementation at World Vision .
Of the four pillars of program accountability at World Vision (information provision,
community consultation, promotion of participation, and collecting and acting on
feedback), which do you consider the area(s) in which the most progress has been
achieved? Why?
What successes and failures have you perceived in the areas that you identified?
How effective do you find the provision of information and/or training to World Vision
staff about program accountability measures?
I’d like to focus now on the fourth pillar, collecting and acting on feedback.
What successes and failures have you perceived in this area? What are the reasons for
these?
What would you recommend for improving the practice of collecting and acting on
feedback?
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What are your impressions about any resistance or challenges to these mechanisms?
Where such mechanisms have been successful, what do you think are reasons for this
success?
What do you think it would be most important for WVI to learn about program
accountability?
What do you think is the most effective way for this learning to take place?
What are the implications for other INGOs? How do you think their experiences might
echo or differ from yours?
Finally, is there anything else that you would like to add? Do you have any questions for
me, or would you like clarification about anything that we have discussed?

